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In this project, I explore cultural representations of aberrant embodiment, society’s monsters, to 
assess the sociopolitical implications of corporeal deviance. I contend that imaginative literature 
participates in the re/construction of monstrous bodies as an element of a larger social process of 
individuation and communal boundary-making, the defining of self and community through 
exclusionary practices embedded in the body. By situating Victorian and modernist British 
novels in dialog with one another, I chart a trajectory in cultural understandings of embodied 
deviance that moves “from prodigy to pathology.” The change occurs, I argue, because the rise 
of modern medical practices ultimately constitutes the “domestication” of the monster, rendering 
it knowable, predictable, and containable within the boundaries of the diagnostic paradigm. 
Whereas the monster in Victorian fiction presents an ambivalent figure, both threatening and 
alluring, in modernism, the monster has been rendered largely performative and instrumental, the 
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I have seen no more evident monstrosity and miracle in the world than myself. 
Michel de Montaigne 
  
 This text centers upon the study of human “monsters,” those beings who, in the radical 
singularity of their bodies (and, sometimes, their minds) call into question both the status of their 
own humanity and the limits of the human within us all. Within this context, the term 
“monstrous” will be used to denote those bodies which, by virtue of a perceived physical, sexual, 
racial, or psychological difference have been discursively, ideologically, and politically situated 
outside of an imagined norm that is itself highly contextual and contingent, but which derives its 
power and its authority through the construction of a monstrous
1
 other. A core premise of this 
analysis derives from a founding principle of feminist, post-colonial, and disability studies: that 
material bodies are at once the substance and the product of ideological construction, the 
corporeal manifestation of and rationalization for the cultural metanarratives upon which 
hierarchical norms, values, and power structures are based, as well as the potential and actual 
sites for the interrogation and contestation of these hegemonic paradigms. As both flesh and 
discourse, then, bodies function within the social space as the occasion for and outcome of 
narrative. Within this context, non-normative bodies occupy a unique position in that they at 
once validate and frustrate the discursive paradigms into which they come, eliciting the 
normativizing parables seeking to construct and contain the normative subject while also 
embodying the subversion of that norm, the ever-present reality of the body’s refusal to be 
circumscribed by natural laws and the social order ostensibly dependent upon and authorized by 
such laws.  
                                                          
1
 I use this term specifically signify those bodies which are perceived to be in some way singular, non-normative, 
extraordinary, aberrant, or deviant in reference to paradigms of the “normal.” 
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The nexus between body and discourse lies at the heart of this study, then, insofar as the 
following chapters will highlight and problematize the dialectical networks connecting cultural 
production with empirical inquiry. Specifically, this analysis will center upon the complex, fluid, 
and interdependent relationships between literature and science from the high Victorian to the 
high modernist eras. The centrality of literature to this study derives from the premise that 
singular embodiments have long occupied a pivotal role in narrative but that the function of such 
non-normative characters had received relatively little attention prior to the advent of disability 
studies in the late twentieth century. As David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder note 
[D]isability pervades literary narrative, first, as a stock feature of 
characterization and, second, as an opportunistic metaphorical 
device…a primary impetus of the storyteller’s efforts….[and] a 
metaphorical signifier of social and individual collapse. (par. 2) 
     
The role of the extraordinary body in authorizing narrative while materializing individual and 
collective anxieties, questions, and concerns is nevertheless coupled with an attendant 
obfuscation of the political and ideological valences of such representations. Mitchell and Snyder 
argue that, despite the non-normative subject’s being a principal locus of attention, literary 
representations “rarely take up disability as an experience of social or political dimensions” 
(Ibid.).  This erasure of the social and political realities of non-normative figures reifies the 
position of the singularly embodied subject as narrative construct, an idea and an ideology which 
renders the material presence of such subjects particularly threatening, taboo, and transgressive.  
 My focus in this analysis on the intersections between culture and science seeks to restore 
the social and political valences obscured in literary representations of monstrous bodies. This 
study will center upon representations of aberrant bodies in the British novel from 1850 to 1930, 
taking as its subject canonical and non-canonical texts from the high Victorian, fin-de-siècle, and 
modernist periods. The scope of this study coincides with what has been widely recognized as 
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the period in which the modern professional sciences, as we understand them today, began to 
emerge. As will be shown in the following chapters, the mid-nineteenth through the early 
twentieth centuries saw not only the ascendance of clinical medicine and of a discrete, though 
not uncontested, medicalized culture, but also the advent of the modern biological sciences, the 
rise of professional psychiatry, and the solidifying of the marriage between social engineering 
programs and the emergence of governing bodies populated by a meritocracy of experts and 
specialists
2
.  The analyses in the following chapters of works by Dickens, Stoker, Stevenson, 
Joyce, and Woolf will highlight the dynamic relationships between the evolution of the modern 
professional sciences and literary production within the context of the extraordinary body. As 
will be shown, orientations toward and the understanding of non-normative bodies derive from 
the body’s status as both material and discourse, matter and story. In the chapters that follow, 
then, I will examine the unique subject positions of material bodies at various historical moments 
and in an array of contexts, from the mid-century freak show to the drawing-room exhibition of 
prodigies in the Victorian era and from late-century case histories of hysteria and “double-
consciousness” to post-World War I images of the mutilated bodies of veterans and the eugenics 
films which sought to perfect and preserve the health of the British “race.”  In keeping with the 
premise of the dialectical relationship between literary representation and its socio-political 
context, I will position my efforts to historicize non-normative bodies alongside analyses of their 
                                                          
2
 To be certain, the divesting of such power into the hands of an elite few is not new or unique to this era. What is 
significant, however, is the emergence of a professional elite who, by virtue of highly specialized training, as 
opposed to economic affluence or inherited social status, garnered the right to assess and direct public policy. For 
the first time, it was trained experts, especially scientists and physicians, in whom the power to define and to 
direct the fate of the nation principally rested, not in the titled gentlemen and wealthy landowners of old.   
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representation in narrative, exploring the various strategies by which authors reflect, 
problematize, shape, and subvert social
3
 orientations toward embodied aberration.  
As such, this study will constitute only one small step in a tradition of exploring, 
analyzing, and assessing superlative bodies that dates back thousands of years. The ancient 
Greeks variously defined “monstrous” bodies as the rare but predictable operation of the natural 
order
4
 and as indexes of racial difference,
5
 while in the Dark Ages and the medieval period, 
singular embodiments were read as the markers of original sin,
6
 portents of divine judgment,
7
 as 
the hallmark of the wondrous variety of creation, or as the material manifestation of parental 
immorality.  
It is no coincidence, then, that the term “monster” derives from the Latin monstrum, 
meaning “to show,” and monere, meaning both “to warn” and “to instruct.” The vast and varied 
connotations of the monstrous body, its unique status as a sliding signifier, are as ancient as they 
are universal. Representations of extraordinary bodies in the Classical and medieval periods 
enable us to illuminate the potent power of physical difference in shaping, affirming, and 
unsettling boundaries. The wide-ranging and frequently contradictory interpretations of aberrant 
embodiments exemplify the ontological uncertainty inherent in non-normative flesh, the material 
disruptions of the “rules” of the flesh calling forth a host of pervasive but often submerged and 
subliminal anxieties and uncertainties surrounding the nature of one’s self and one’s world. In 
Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self, Margrit Shildrick writes 
                                                          
3
 Obviously, this study will focus in particular on medico-scientific readings of the extraordinary body and on 
literature’s role within this field, participating in, advancing, and, often, resisting or redefining medico-scientific 
narratives. 
4
 This is explored with particular breadth in Aristotle’s “On the Generation of Animals.” 
5
 Pliny the Elder’s Natural History, in which he describes the various “monstrous races” which reside at the far 
edges of the known world, is an important example. 
6
 This includes, most notably, St. Augustine of Hippo’s writings in the 4
th
 century A.D. on the humanity of 
monstrous beings, their capacity for rational thought and, by extension, their eligibility to receive the sacraments. 
7
 Within this context, the birth of an extraordinarily embodied child could be taken either as a sign of divine 
chastisement or of God’s favor. 
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It is not simply that monsters—strangers in general—disrupt the 
usual rules of interaction in that their cultural distance may be 
offset by physical proximity, but that they may not be outside at 
all. Although they are always there in our conscious appraisal of 
the external world, they are also the other within. In seeking 
confirmation of our own secure subjecthood in what we are not, 
what we see mirrored in the monster are the leaks and flows, the 
vulnerabilities in our own embodied being. Monsters, then, are 
deeply disturbing; neither good nor evil, inside nor outside, not self 
or other. On the contrary, they are always liminal, refusing to stay 
in place, transgressive and transformative. They disrupt both 
internal and external order, and overturn the distinctions that set 
out the limits of the human subject. (4) 
   
This study takes as its foundation the premise of the liminality of the monstrous, the 
unboundedness of the extraordinary body which renders it at once heavy with signification and 
void of intrinsic meaning. The monstrous body, within this context, is a blank slate upon which 
communities and selves write their own narratives, inevitably autobiographical, while 
simultaneously confronted in the transgressive materiality of the monstrous body with the 
failures of discourse, the collapse of narrative in the presence of bodies that defy inscription and 
exceed the logic of language.  
  While much important work has already been done on the significance and representation 
of extraordinary bodies in the Classical and medieval periods, the focus in this analysis on 
representations of singular embodiment in modernity seeks to identify and explore an important 
shift in orientations toward normative and non-normative bodies. Specifically, this analysis will 
foreground the discursive and ideological foundations which have always operated to construct, 
describe, and condition the singular subject. The special interest within this text of the position 
and status of the singular body between 1850 and 1930 is predicated upon the premise of a 
significant and influential shift in orientations toward aberrant embodiments since the 
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Enlightenment—a shift away from the mythopoeic and theological and toward positivist 
rationalism.  
 While efforts to empirically assess, describe, and classify deviant bodies are as old as 
antiquity itself, the Enlightenment “dare to know” ethos inspired a taxonomic zeal in which the 
collection and categorization of monstrous bodies assumed new and profound resonance. As will 
be shown in the following chapters, Enlightenment rationalism galvanized and authorized the 
professionalization of the sciences beginning at mid-century, as theorists and practitioners 
pursued ever-increasing levels of expertise through the fracturing of scientific inquiry into 
increasingly discrete and nuanced areas of professional specialization. Contemporaneous with 
this emergence of distinct bodies of highly trained specialists were the ascendance of new and 
often incompatible discourses of the body laden both with the practical modalities and 
ideological investments of the insular fields from which they derived. Efforts to narrate the 
material body, whether through the discourse of science or of fiction, were informed by and 
complicit in this on-going and often contentious program of discursively constructing, 
deconstructing, and reconstructing the material body.  
 The four chapters of this study will trace pivotal moments in the ideological, 
narratological, and sociopolitical re/construction of material bodies. The chronological structure 
of this text is not intended to suggest, however, that the paradigms explored here are linear, 
monolithic, or uncontested. The collectivist orientations of Bleak House which inspire this 
study’s analysis of the discursive construction of the extraordinary body in the high Victorian era 
may be seen to prevail today in the altered but no less ideologically congruent form of the 
cost/benefit analysis of prenatal testing and of end-of-life measures, in which the preservation of 
aberrant bodies is weighed against the collective good. Likewise, echoes of the modernist drive 
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to formulate an anti-authoritarian discourse of the body that is the subject of chapter three’s 
analysis of Joyce’s Ulysses can be detected in the Classical and medieval periods, in which 
extraordinary bodies were described as the manifestation of the irreverence, capriciousness, and 
playfulness of nature.  
 Rather than suggesting a sequential, orderly, and predictable evolution in modes of seeing 
and speaking the body, the chronological structure of this text is intended only to facilitate the 
analysis of the nexus between social, cultural, and politico-scientific narratives of the body and 
of the material flesh which shapes and is shaped by such narratives. By focusing upon three 
pivotal moments and movements in literary history—the social reformist novel of high 
Victorianism, the gothic romance of the fin-de-siècle, and the post-WWI novel of high 
modernism—this study seeks to trace evolving and often contested narratives of the body within 
the context of the emergence of modern clinical medicine and what disability studies scholars 
have defined as a modern medicalized culture.
8
 The title of this text, From Prodigy to Pathology, 
is derived from Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s claim in Extraordinary Bodies that the 
ascendance of the modern medical model has resulted in the pathologizing of the prodigy, “a 
conversion of wondrous, ominous, pre-Enlightenment monsters…to medical cases” (79). 
  In the first chapter, “Excess, Transgression, and Transformation,” I explore the social 
reformist novel of the high Victorian era within the context of mid-century British imperialism 
and the explosive growth of the London metropolis. My reading situates the scarred body of 
Dickens’ heroine, Esther Summerson, alongside real-life British monstrosities, including Daniel 
Lambert, Britain’s fattest man, and Charles Byrne, “the Irish giant.” These so-called “monsters 
                                                          
8
 By this I mean a culture informed by the medical model, the commodification of health and hygienic practices, 
and orientations toward physical and psychological health as a public responsibility and a collective good. 
According to this paradigm, medical modernity is predicated upon both the guidance and intercession of the 
expert authority and upon individual self-monitoring and regulation. 
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of proportion,” I argue, embody the transgression of limits which Dickens’ Esther also 
corporealizes in bearing the scars of her smallpox infection, an infection which signals the 
presence of her material body in the disease-ridden enclaves of the city slums, sites unfit for and 
forbidden to upper-middle class women like Esther. Such a transgression of limits as 
materialized in the real and fictive bodies of Lambert, Byrne, and Esther Summerson, I go on to 
show, signifies prevailing anxieties related to the growth of the empire abroad and of the city at 
home, suggesting a body politic unmindful of limits and in danger of collapsing beneath the 
weight of its own disproportionate ambitions. Intemperate, vulnerable, and unpredictable, the 
social body, like the individual body that is its metonym, calls for intercession, the regulation of 
the authority capable of reading the signs of distress and debility and of restoring the body politic 
and the citizen’s body alike to a state of equilibrium, to health through moderation and 
conscientious care. 
   In the second chapter, entitled “Unbounded Bodies/Unbridled Blood,” I explore fin-de-
siècle gothic romance in its analysis of Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde and Bram Stoker’s Dracula. Late-century gothicism emerges, I contend, as a 
result of growing fears for the integrity of the individual and the social body. The popularization 
of the tripartite theory of consciousness, and, in particular, of the existence and potency of 
subconscious drives and desires galvanized a sense of the individual self-as-other which gave 
rise at the turn of the century to a fascination in the real world with hypnotism, hysteria, and 
double-consciousness and to the trope of the secret-sharer or second self in the literary world. 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, I argue, exemplifies the era’s anxieties over the stability and the 
knowability of the self, an anxiety paralleled in the popular interest in conjoined twins, such as 
Millie-Christine McKoy and Daisy and Violet Hilton. This chapter juxtaposes scientific, cultural, 
10 
 
and biographical accounts of conjoined twins with Stevenson’s representation of the 
“multiplicity of selves” within Dr. Jekyll to argue that at the end of the nineteenth century 
optimism for the burgeoning fields of modern biological and psychological science were met 
with an equal if not greater fear of their limits, of the other within that science could neither fully 
explain nor hope to eradicate. 
 While the first half of chapter two analyzes representations of conjoined twins and 
literary secret sharers to illuminate prevailing fears of internal threats to the solidity and integrity 
of the self, the chapter’s second half, which takes Stoker’s Dracula as its focus, centers upon a 
parallel concern: the fear of the other within shifts to the fear of the other without. I deploy the 
concept of the Eastern Threat
9
 to explore themes of degeneration and racial contamination at the 
fin-de-siècle. My reading of Stoker’s novel is twinned with an analysis of medical, 
anthropological, and cultural discourses on racial and ethnic others, focusing specifically on 
Sarah Baartman, the so-called “Hottentot Venus.” Representations of racial and ethnic otherness, 
I assert, are predicated upon readings of the extraordinary bodies of such others that define 
perceived bodily differences as dangerous, omnipresent, ineradicable, and self-perpetuating. The 
ostensible sexual rapacity of racial and ethnic others is reflected in the Count’s infecting of 
would-be wives and mothers with the disease of a voluptuous vampirism, as well as in the 
medical and anthropological analyses of Baartman’s anatomy, which purport to find in her body 
the stigmata of the voracity and fecundity of the non-European, a pernicious lasciviousness 
which threatens not only the individual body susceptible to “infection” by contact with the 
foreign other, but also the British racial body, which the atavistic fertility of the racial other seeks 
to “breed” out of existence. Thus, the emphasis in chapter two on pervasive anxieties at the fin-
                                                          
9
 This term is used to denote fin-de-siècle Europeans’ fear of the non-Christian (and, specifically, Muslim) other 
who resides at the frontiers of Europe, the borderlands between the Orient and the Occident. 
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de-siècle over the safety and stability of the individual and social body, over the internal and 
external threats to which both are vulnerable, authorize discourses of the body which provide 
renewed vigor for projects of detecting, defining, and containing otherness in its myriad forms. 
From the identification of markers of latent insanity, addiction, and promiscuity to the locating of 
the stigmata of racial and ethnic difference in the materiality of the flesh, the diverse discourses 
of the biological, natural, and social sciences at the fin-de-siècle resulted in a vast corpus of 
narratives of the body that were reflected in the gothic romances of the day, narratives which, in 
their almost hysterical profligacy, sought security in the premise of rendering the other knowable 
and containable.  
 Chapter three, “Discursive Monsters/Monstrous Discourse,” constitutes a definitive shift 
in social, scientific, and literary representations of singular bodies. In this chapter, I turn my 
attention to high modernism, deploying Virginia Woolf’s assertion that “in or about December 
1910, human character changed” (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” 320) to argue that narratives of 
extraordinary bodies in high modernism fundamentally differ from those of the Victorian era and 
the fin-de-siècle. In chapter three, I focus on James Joyce’s iconic novel of the body, Ulysses, to 
argue that Joyce’s experimental techniques serve to problematize and to context prevailing 
discourses of the material body. Specifically, the ascendance of the medical model in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, I assert, is countered in Joyce by the effort to interrogate 
discursive constructions of embodiment and to discover and advance various counter-narratives 
that speak to realities of embodiment that are, ultimately, unspeakable. Unlike the analyses 
presented in the first half of this study, this chapter and the chapter to follow will not pair literary 
analysis with an analysis of real-life representations of extraordinarily embodied subjects. This 
tactical shift reflects the informing premise of this entire work: that after the turn of the century, 
12 
 
the ascendance of the medical model has instigated a domestication of the extraordinary body 
through its co-optation into the clinical medical paradigm. This pathologizing of the non-
normative body constitutes a form of discursive and ideological erasure insofar as the 
extraordinary body has been rendered a medical case, with the clinician and the physician alone 
capable of comprehending and narrating the diseased and deformed body. Thus, with the 
discursive monopoly of clinical medicine on the non-normative body comes the power to 
coordinate and to contain such bodies. A penumbra of shame and silence surrounds non-
normative bodies when taken outside of the clinical context, as the locus of visibility proper to 
monstrous embodiment moves from the freak show, the drawing room, and the exhibition hall 
and to the controlled confines of the examining room, the medical photograph, and the hygiene 
film. It is with this shift toward the monolithic discourse of pathology that Joyce contends in 
Ulysses, as he seeks to restore to the materiality of the body the ambiguity, instability, and 
inarticulateness that the language of pathology would domesticate or deny. 
 The fourth and final chapter of this study, “Dis/Embodying the Community,” explores 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway within the context of both the eugenics movement and post-
World War I efforts to redefine the nature and limits of the community. In the wake of the 
collective trauma of the Great War and inspired by the idealistic discourse of human 
perfectibility on which eugenics relies, Woolf’s powerful elegy problematizes madness as a trope 
through which individual and collective bodies define themselves. The twinning of Clarissa, the 
consummate hostess, and Septimus, the incurable hysteric, Woolf interrogates the modalities of 
otherness which build communities and selves through a programmatics of disavowal. Woolf’s 
representations of psychiatric practices in the early twentieth century align with her emphasis on 
the collective work of mourning that must be accomplished if the British social body is to 
13 
 
recover from the physical and psychological injuries of the Great War. The parallel concerns 
with psychological debility and appropriate mourning, I contend, signify the novel’s exploration 
of the programmatics of right conduct, exemplified by the novel’s “Goddesses”—Proportion and 
Conversion. Singular bodies, I argue in this chapter, not only define the boundaries of the 
community by materializing, through non-normative form or functioning, that which the 
community is not but they also enable and authorize the re/definition and re/construction of the 
community through the individual’s demonstration of “appropriate” action toward them. Like the 
collective gaze turned toward the airplane in the novel’s first scene, which transforms discrete 
individuals into a uniform group engaged in a project of meaning-making, meditations on and 
sympathy for Septimus’ death join the fractious members of Clarissa’s party in their own work 
of mourning, a microcosm of the project in which the whole of the British social body is engaged 
in these post-war years. Likewise, Septimus’ action authorizes and motivates Clarissa’s own, 
enabling the celebration of life through the material presence of death.
10
 This injunction for the 
erasure of singular bodies,
11
 I argue, echoes what disability scholars have labeled the 
cure/cover/kill paradigm within the medical model, a model in which those whose embodiments 
are deemed not recuperable to the norm are often pathologized to the point of civil death,
12
 
authorizing and frequently compelling their removal--through institutionalization or death--from 
the public gaze.  
 Taken as a whole, then, the four chapters of this study endeavor to trace the shifting, 
amorphous, and frequently contentious position of monstrous bodies in the era of the emergence 
                                                          
10
 At the moment that Clarissa learns of Septimus’s suicide, she feels it tangibly from the perspective of Septimus’s 
falling body. The narrative of his suicide is momentarily transformed into the physical manifestation of the act, as 
Clarissa feels herself in the flesh of Septimus in the seconds prior to and at the moment of impact. 
11
 This paradigm is activated through rehabilitation (i.e. Proportion and Conversion), institutionalization, or death. 
12
 This is a legal term signifying the loss of the status of the “human” and the forfeiture of rights and protections 
attending the human. 
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of the modern medical model, exploring how and why the monster transformed in this era from 
prodigy to pathology. In the process, this study takes as foundational the premise that the body is 
at once word and matter, a corporeal entity calling for and constructed by discourse. In seeking 
to foreground the vexed and complex interdynamics of culture, politics, and science, literary 
representations of monstrous bodies are situated alongside contemporaneous non-fiction 
discourses of the body, illuminating the role of literature in popularizing, deconstructing, and 
subverting body narratives. As this study shows, the act of narrating the body, whether through 
the empirical language of science or the imaginative discourse of fiction, is inevitably an 
ambivalent endeavor inasmuch as it seeks to speak for that which is silent, an ostensibly 
politically and ideologically empowering act, while transforming into discourse that which is 
















Excess, Transgression, and Transformation:  




London is the Daniel Lambert of cities. 
                                           George Meredith 
 
Subdue your appetites, my dear, and you’ve conquered human nature. 
Charles Dickens 
 
                                             
At Home in the Monstrous City 
This study begins with the high Victorian era and Dickens’ ambitious novel of mid-
nineteenth century London, Bleak House. This text provides an auspicious foundation for the 
examination of the nexus between cultural production and the status of extraordinary bodies 
insofar as the novel is in itself an “extraordinary body,” reflecting in its form and content the 
ambivalence of proportion characteristic of the era. This chapter also seeks to establish a sort of 
dialectic between Dickens’ novel and another of the era’s most famous “monsters of proportion,” 
Daniel Lambert, widely celebrated as Britain’s fattest man. As will be shown throughout this and 
subsequent chapters, between the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the British novel 
plays a vital role in mirroring, problematizing, and re/envisioning extraordinary embodiment 
through not only the novels’ representations of cultural “freaks” but also through the myriad 
forms emerging in the Victorian, fin de siècle, and modernist eras, as well as through the 
discursive structures arising to signify and to interrogate prevailing cultural constructions of 
singular bodies. As will be explored in this chapter, Dickens’ Bleak House occupies a critical 
moment in the representation of the extraordinarily embodied and of their tenuous incorporation 
into the collective body of imperial Britain. Caught up in an amorphous and ambiguous subject 
position where the “freak,” the “curiosity,” and the “wonder” collide, the singularly embodied 
subject could have as easily found him/herself entertaining the elite in the drawing rooms of the 
aristocrat as on display for the delight of the masses in one of the ubiquitous freak shows 
continuously touring the British countryside. The vexed positionality of the extraordinary body 
in this era reflects the contending discourses of Enlightenment rationality and Romantic wonder, 
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the locus where the eminently decipherable laws of nature clash with the irresolvable mysteries 
of creation. The deviant body, as will be seen, provides the occasion for and the reflection of this 
contest between the knowable and the unknowable, the predictable and the unforeseen. As such, 
corporeal singularity enables the casting of prevailing cultural anxieties, questions, and concerns 
onto itself, reflecting in its abject and marvelous materiality all that cannot be absorbed, 
understood, or delineated within a culture. Thus, the extraordinary body marks the meeting point 
of the wondrous, the portentous, the curious, and the freaky, both eliciting and excusing the 
attention it garners, as the ambiguous status of the singular self comes to metonymically reflect 
and replace the status of the social body into which it comes.        
 Within this context, then, the concern of this chapter to situate a reading of Bleak House 
within the context of high Victorian representations of extraordinary embodiment in general and 
of “monsters of proportion” in particular becomes clear. Scholars have long recognized the social 
reformist aesthetic of Dickens’ great novel, finding in his depiction of mid-century London not 
only an indictment of the abhorrent conditions to which the city’s most vulnerable populations 
were subjected but also of the labyrinthine structures of the systems of power, symbolized by the 
court of Chancery, whose sole function is to abuse and exploit those which they were designed to 
serve. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to the novel’s exploration of singular 
embodiment, its representation of the myriad cultural “monsters” in the midst of the great city. It 
is the goal of this chapter, then, not only to situate the novel within an historical context in which 
extraordinary bodies routinely provided a source of rich entertainment for the affluent and the 
lower classes alike, but also to problematize the novel’s function as an extraordinary body itself, 
an excessive and transgressive text which, like other “monsters of proportion”, absorbs, 
deconstructs, and reflects back the collective anxieties of a prodigious (and growing) city at the 
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heart of an ever-expanding empire. By situating the novel alongside representations of “freaks” 
and “curiosities” like Daniel Lambert, the function both of the extraordinarily embodied subject 
and of the novels which represent them will become clear. This chapter will demonstrate that 
both singular bodies and the novels which reflect them ultimately serve a therapeutic function, 
enabling the diagnosis and ultimate cure of the social body which they represent through a form 
of discursive reconstruction—rehabilitation through narrative.   
The first serial installment of Charles Dickens’ Bleak House appeared just one year after 
London’s Great Exhibit of 1851 and roughly fifteen years prior to the Berlin Conference and the 
start of the infamous “Scramble for Africa.” Conjoined with the critical political, economic, and 
military implications of these two events were scientific and especially medical revolutions 
occasioned by the experimentations of anatomists and Darwinian-inspired biologists. The vastly 
growing body of research and the insights gleaned through the increasingly professionalized 
physical sciences gave rise to a ubiquitous discourse of the body that came to permeate social, 
cultural, and political systems. Indeed, the Victorian era is characterized by the somatization of 
socio-cultural preoccupations, as pervasive social questions and concerns were etched into the 
flesh of both corporate (i.e. “average,” “normal”) social bodies and individual (and typically 
anomalous) subjects. 
 It is within this context, then, that Bleak House may be understood to participate in a 
complex interplay of discourses, as medico-scientific, political, and cultural paradigms intersect 
with one another to construct, confound, and complicate socially permissible understandings of 
the human body and its role in constructing individual subjects and social systems. A 
fundamental issue at stake in Bleak House, therefore, is the fluid process of configuring and 
refiguring the embodied individual in an environment of unprecedented urbanization and its 
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attendant social change. Informed by revised understandings of biological processes and material 
embodiment and galvanized by the intractable assertion of English aspirations to global 
economic and political dominance manifest in the Great Exhibition, Bleak House interrogates the 
implications of unchecked growth, advancing a difficult view of contemporary life and embodied 
individuation in a period of unprecedented growth and change through industrialization. Bleak 
House, like the London which may constitute the novel’s most significant character, is 
prodigious and excessive. Its sprawling discourse mirrors the prodigious disproportion to which 
its London has succumbed, while the multiform plot structure traces a narratological trajectory 
from enervating diffuseness to potent interconnectedness that is the novel’s answer to the 
pernicious effects of imperial England’s unprecedented expansion.  
 As a consequence of the era’s pervading concern with the consequences of breakneck 
mechanization and massive growth, George Meredith’s comparison of London to Daniel 
Lambert provides an important context through which to understand Dickens’ characterization of 
the city, its use in problematizing the impact of urbanization on the social system in general and 
on the embodied human subject in particular.  In her analysis of Victorian “freakery,” Joyce L. 
Huff argues for the central role played by Daniel Lambert in a vexed project of English national 
identity formation (37-39). Lambert, who at the time of his death in 1809 was reportedly 
Britain’s heaviest man, weighing in at more than 700 pounds, enjoyed a national fame that 
continues to this day—most overtly in the widespread practice of naming taverns and inns for 
him. Invoking and extending M.M. Bakhtin’s assertion that the fat man in Victorian Britain came 
to embody the carnivalesque, subsuming all other potential forms of aberrance into a sanitized 
figure of unregulated excess, Huff maintains that these “prodigies of human proportion” 
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corporealized the ambivalence which lay at the heart of a population undergoing rampant social 
upheaval.  
As arguably the first fully modernized, industrial nation in Europe, one whose grasp 
traversed the globe in the form of a rapidly expanding empire, England and its major industrial 
cities experienced a disorienting and exhilarating explosion of growth. Its citizens found 
themselves challenged to construct new identities in the face of changing economic, social, and 
political realities. It is no coincidence, then, that a citizenry confronted every day with a social 
order ever transgressing scientific, ideological, and geopolitical boundaries and spilling across 
physical and psychological borderlands once deemed both impenetrable and sacrosanct should 
discover in the monster of physical disproportion a fitting, fascinating, and terrifying corollary. 
 In Lambert, Victorian audiences found a mirror for the hubristic, insistent enlargement in 
which they, as citizens of a seemingly unstoppable industrial empire, daily participated. As Mary 
Douglas notes, “What is being carved in human flesh is an image of society” (143). In the almost 
obsessive examination, speculation, lionization, and—sometimes—the repudiation of anomalous 
figures like Daniel Lambert, Britons materialized latent social desires even as they distanced and 
neutralized their anxieties by projecting menacing forces onto the body of a deviant other. 
Carved safely, intractably, and irredeemably onto a fetishized body that participates in but is, for 
all intents and purposes, excluded from an overarching social body,
13
 collective fantasies and 
fears of unrestrained growth are given physical form. Furthermore, the incessant inspection of 
the giant’s accoutrements—his clothes, his carriage, his furnishings (Huff 46)—manifests a 
                                                          
13
 As will be shown, this overarching social body is one which is created and authorized by constructions of the 
norm. The creation of the norm is a process of social ideation in which the potent figure of the anomalous and 
unincorporable (what Foucault terms the “disavowed”) other is harnessed by the overarching social body to build 
an ideal image of itself. 
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communal dream and terror of disproportionate consumption, of an infinite supply of goods 
limited only by unstable boundaries of the consuming body itself. 
 
The Beast Within: Metamorphic Bodies and the Monstrous City in Bleak House 
Meredith’s equation of London with the prodigious body of Daniel Lambert provides an 
important framework through which to understand Dickens’ Bleak House, for the prevailing 
narrative impulse is the examination
14
 of the city’s “body” and its functioning, the description of 
the deforming effects of heedless enlargement and the identification of opportunities for 
restoration.  Like Lambert, nineteenth century London presented both the thrill and the threat of 
unmitigated growth. Its industrialization provided impoverished laborers and ambitious 
businessmen both the fantasy of heretofore unimaginable success and the terror of unspeakable 
deprivation. This troubling duality is figured in the celebrated corpulence that simultaneously 
delighted Daniel Lambert’s audience while endangering, and ultimately claiming, Lambert’s life. 
As will be shown, this problematic duality of profligate growth also lies at the heart of Bleak 
House. 
In perhaps no other work does Dickens, the quintessential writer of the city, capture the 
spirit and sense of industrializing, imperial London. Here, the streets of London lie open to 
exhibition, dissection, wonder, and fear, like the body of Daniel Lambert himself before an awed 
audience. Its most troubling attributes—its poverty, its violence, its sickness—are dragged before 
the fascinated spectator like the emblems of Lambert’s own monstrous disproportion: the suit of 
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 I use the term “examination” here expressly for its medical resonance because, I will argue, Dickens’ project 
appears to be fundamentally one of diagnosis and narratological cure. Dickens’ primary investment here is in a 
program of redeeming the material human body from the depersonalizing, de-corporealizing effects of social 
discourse, power/knowledge systems, and disciplinary practices. Thus, Dickens subjects London to medico-legal 
processes of surveillance, examination, and description as a means of revoking their effects, restoring individuality 
to embodied subjects through a return to language and the resulting construction of strategic counter-narratives. 
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clothes that attest to a body rendered terminal by the force of its own obsessive consumption. 
The material evidence of its rapid overgrowth—the labyrinthine streets, the slums, the 
impromptu and perilously impermanent structures of Tom-All-Alone’s—are the geographical 
counterparts to Lambert’s oversized furnishings, bearing witness to the reality of a world not 
made to sustain the flesh of such a wonder. It may be that Henry James had Dickens’ Bleak 
House particularly in mind when he described Victorian novels as “loose baggy monsters,” for 
Bleak House is monstrous indeed, its pages filled with heterogeneous crowds like so many 
Englishmen simultaneously trying on Lambert’s suit of clothes. Its plotlines teem with the 
diseased, the dangerous, and the endangered who, like Lambert’s exhibited flesh, sicken and die 
under the weight of an ever-growing excess. 
Perhaps Bleak House’s most famous scene is its opening one. Dickens’ celebrated 
description of the blinding London fog, the cloying city mud, and the contaminating effluvia of 
its overcrowded streets has justly received the lion’s share of critical attention since the novel’s 
first serialization. What has been less often noticed, however, is the degree to which such 
depictions of the urban center amplify prevailing anxieties regarding the unregulated expansion 
of the city. Of particular importance in this regard is the flight of both the rural poor and the 
colonial expatriate into the heart of England. In his The Moral and Physical Condition of the 
Working Class in Manchester, James Kay Shuttleworth equates the squalor and the 
overcrowding of English industrial cities within an indiscriminate flood of diverse, unregulated, 
and exogenous populations to the metropolis. For Shuttleworth, the appalling conditions of the 
city slums are the direct result of a natural tendency on behalf of some of its inhabitants to a 
pernicious fecundity and an unhealthy conglomeration of disparate—and disharmonious—parts:  
Frequently the Inspectors found two or more families crowded 
together in one small house….and often more than one family 
23 
 
lived in a damp cellar containing only one room in whose 
pestilential atmosphere from twelve to sixteen persons were 
crowded. To these fertile sources of disease were sometimes added 
the keeping of pigs and other animals to the house with other 
nuisances of the most revolting character….(Pauper houses) are 
frequently able to accommodate from twenty to thirty or more 
lodgers among whom are the most abandoned characters….Here 
without distinction of age or sex, careless of all decency, they are 
crowded into small and wretched apartments, the same bed 
receiving a succession of tenants until too offensive for their 
unfastidious senses….The houses (of the poor) are often built with 
a total neglect of order. (n.pg.) 
 
For Shuttleworth, the horrors of the city derive from the breakdown of social hierarchies. 
Familial, gender, and racial taxonomies collapse beneath the exigencies of poverty. Indeed, amid 
such volatile conditions, the very integrity and sanctity of the human are threatened, as 
Shuttleworth demonstrates in his description of an “ignorance and pauperism” that turns men and 
women into brutes and animals. The rampant commingling of “incompatible” groups, the 
homogenizing of national, social, and gender identities, deprives the body of its stability, 
according to Shuttleworth, rendering it permeable, vulnerable to both spiritual and physical 
contamination. These “promiscuous” slums, Shuttleworth asserts, become the originary points 
not only for moral depravity but for the infectious disease to which immorality is metonymically 
linked.  
In Shuttleworth’s formulation, the swelling populations, rampant urban growth, and 
inattention to social taxonomies in the overcrowded city slums engenders a fundamental change 
in all orders of the social body, the nation-state irrevocably and perniciously altered by those 
unincorporable bodies absorbed into its “flesh.” While Dickens’ Bleak House suggests a far less 
xenophobic orientation than Shuttleworth’s treatise, particularly in Shuttleworth’s scapegoating 
of Irish immigrants, his aligning them with a contaminating barbarism that infects and transforms 
the laboring classes exposed to them, Dickens’ novel does suggest a similar concern with the 
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homogenizing and departicularizing influences of the industrial metropolis.
15
 Bleak House’s 
swirling fog and omnipresent mud serve important symbolic functions here insofar as they 
represent an understanding of the city as a site which obscures and elides boundaries between 
persons. Bodily integrity gives way to the opaque fog; rituals of physical purity collapse beneath 
the mire of penetrating mud. Surfaces lose their distinctiveness in the flux and flow of cloudy, 
pestilential air and thick, filthy water.  
While Shuttleworth equates the threatening departicularization of the individual body, its 
permeability and transmogrification by the contaminating influences of untenable elements (i.e. 
the racial and ethnic “other”), Dickens seems to align this transforming and homogenizing 
process with the machinations of the industrial center itself. Human embodiment, individuation 
itself, is lost in the fog and mud of the city: these pernicious elements arise not from any human 
operation, but from the streets, the buildings, the factories,
16
 and, most important, from the social 
institutions by and through which the metropolis operates.  Dickens’ understandings of the city 
as an abstract principle operating autonomously in the de-individuation of discrete subjects for 
the perpetuation of impersonal, preexisting, and pervasive social systems anticipate in important 
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 An important example of this would be the character of Hortense, the immoral, embittered, and startlingly 
vampiric French servant. While her malevolent influence threatens all orders of society, endangering Lady Dedlock 
most especially, her impact on Guster, the Snagsbys’ maid, is most telling. In Hortense’s presence, Guster endures 
the most violent and long-lasting series of epileptic seizures she has ever experienced. These scenes echo 
Shuttleworth’s formulation of the perniciously deforming effects of the bodies of foreign “others” on the working 
class. For Shuttleworth, the lower classes are particularly vulnerable to such influences, the rampant rise and 
spread of infectious disease illuminating the dire consequences of such reckless commingling. For Dickens, 
however, these scenes illustrate one of the novel’s most important concerns: the body’s sensitivity to moral 
depredation, its capacity to reflect and magnify hidden truths. For Dickens, the body becomes a barometer of 
individual as well as social well-being. 
16
 Significantly, while Dickens does seem to lay a great deal of the blame for the poverty, illiteracy, violence, and 
sickness of the laboring classes at the feet of industrialization, particularly in his later novel, Hard Times, it would 
be incorrect to categorize Dickens as anti-industrialization. On the contrary, Bleak House’s portrait of the iron-
master, Mr. Rouncewell, is largely positive. Here Dickens appears to promote the potential benefits of an 
industrialization informed by compassion and humane principles. In particular, the education of the sons’ wives 




ways Foucault’s analyses of the rise of disciplinary power/knowledge structures in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. In his seminal studies of the mechanisms of modern subject-formation, 
Foucault emphasizes the critical importance of the homogenizing process, describing it as  
a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its 
elements, it gestures, its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery 
of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it. A ‘political 
anatomy,’ which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was being born; it defined 
how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do 
what one wishes, but so that they may operates as one wishes, with the 
techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. (138) 
 
According to Foucault, the modern body becomes subject to the regulating forces of 
Enlightenment power/knowledge systems through a process of standardization, incorporation, 
and transposition. In industrialized, capitalistic society, the hegemony of the norm mandates the 
wholesale interchangeability of the human body. Foucault writes, “For the marks that once 
indicated status, privilege, and affiliation were increasingly replaced…by a whole range of 
degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogenous social body….In a sense, the 
power of normalization imposes homogeneity” (184). A body which cannot be assimilated, that 
which is not amenable to the capitalistic forces of production, relying as they do on the regulated 
standards of appropriate bodily function and proportion, is cast beyond the pale of society, 
rendered deviant.  
Furthermore, as Paul Youngquist argues, this normalizing process is a direct consequence 
of mechanization, as bodily expectations and requirements begin to be shaped by the machines 
which these bodies are required to operate (xvi-xxv, 12). Bleak House’s penetrating fog 
powerfully emblematizes the regulating forces of a rapidly expanding industrial society, while 
the mud that settles into the most private spaces of the individual body, simultaneously marking, 
obscuring, and befouling it, suggests the profound vulnerability of the body to encroachment and 
26 
 
change. The bodies of Dickens’ city dwellers are powerfully altered by the environments into 
which they come, made unrecognizable even to themselves by incorporation into the body of the 
industrial giant.  
 
Embodying the Environment: “Fever Houses,” Contagion, and the Social Body   
If, as Bleak House suggests, private bodies are both receptive and malleable, susceptible 
to the processes of urbanization which define, constrain, and compel corporeal appearance and 
functioning, then the boundaries of the body can never be fixed. The borders between selves and 
the spaces they inhabit become increasingly porous, as sensitive to the pressures exerted from 
without as those issuing from within. Such bodily fragility lies at the very heart of Bleak House. 
A central preoccupation is the extent to which bodies are shaped, threatened, disfigured, and 
even killed through the devastating influences of an unhealthy environment.  
The “bad air” which so haunts Dickens’ London takes its most important precedent from 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century “miasma” theory, the idea that bodily health is directly 
proportionate to the healthful or pestilential airs one breathes. Agitators for sanitary reform 
lobbied for the creation of effective sewer systems and the draining of city slums as a method of 
preventing disease outbreaks. In important contrast to the germ theorists which would take 
precedence in the second half of the nineteenth century, miasma theorists posited an unassailable 
correlation between human and environmental “health.” As the presumptive leader of the 
sanitary reform movement, as well as Jeremy Bentham’s most important disciple, Edwin 
Chadwick’s philosophies provide vital insight into the principles and mechanisms of the 
movement in which Dickens himself was fervently involved. In his important Report on Sanitary 
Conditions, Chadwick asserts that “such diseases, wherever its attacks are frequent, are always 
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found in connection with…physical circumstances” (n.pg.). Furthermore, as in Shuttleworth’s 
earlier formulation, the pernicious effects of an unhealthy environment acted upon the moral 
nature as well as the physical body:  
That in the districts where the mortality is greatest, the births are 
not only sufficient to replace the numbers removed by death but to 
add to the population. That the younger population bred up under 
noxious physical agencies is inferior in physical organization and 
general health to a population preserved from the presence of such 
agencies. That the population so exposed is least susceptible to 
moral influences and the effects of education are more transient 
than with a healthy population. That these adverse circumstances 
tend to produce an adult population short-lived, improvident, and 
intemperate….That these habits lead to the abandonment of all 
conveniences and decencies of life and especially lead to the 
overcrowding of their homes which is destructive to the morality 
as well as the health of large classes of both sexes. (Ibid.) 
                                                     
                                                                   
The moral and physical debility envisioned by sanitary reformers like Chadwick and 
Shuttleworth derive from the body’s porosity, its vulnerability to the influences of other bodies 
and the spaces they inhabit. Such bodies are always already marked as excessive, transgressive, 
and disproportionate insofar as they impugn cherished ideas of bodily integrity and give the lie to 
Enlightenment notions of autonomous selfhood, actuating in their stead a dynamic of 
consumption/absorption that renders impossible any sense of a stable, definable, discrete, and 
insulated identity.  Like Daniel Lambert and other monsters of human proportion, the body 
posited by the sanitary reformers refuses to recognize any law of physical moderation, advancing 
instead the body’s metamorphic instrumentality. For sanitary reformers, including Dickens 
himself, the body is simultaneously receiver, conduit, and catalyst of external forces, one which 
remakes all things in its own image, even as it, too, is transformed into the likeness of that which 
it sees and touches. It is therefore no coincidence that, as Huff notes, Lambert’s possessions 
continued to draw crowds long after his death, for the Victorian association of the body with its 
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environment was so strong that personal items and private dwellings were often sufficient for 
audiences to invoke the absent body that once lived among them.       
Another vital issue evinced in the passage cited above is the purported unnatural 
fecundity of the laboring body, replicating on the level of human reproduction the body’s 
capacity to engender change throughout the social system, anticipating what McHold has 
identified as a general fear of disorder and degeneracy pervading the whole of Europe by the 
1860s (24). This expectation of general social decline borrows from Lamarckian beliefs in the 
inheritability of acquired traits, the sense that deformities, once suffered, may be passed from 
generation to generation until the entire system collapses.  
Echoing Shuttleworth’s vision of English society as one large, interconnected body in 
which a threat to one order inevitably harms the entire structure, the world of Bleak House is one 
in which disorder, danger, and contagion can never be contained. The pernicious influence of the 
so-called “bad air” not only threatens the physical, social, and moral framework of the slum 
dwellers, those most immediately exposed to these pestilential vapors, but also the morality and 
integrity of the whole social body. In Bleak House, Tom-All-Alone’s, the slum encircling the 
city, functions as a menacing presence overshadowing every operation of the city: 
[Tom] has his revenge. Even the winds are his messenger, and they 
serve him in these hours of darkness. There is not a drop of Tom’s 
corrupted blood but propagates infection and contagion 
somewhere. It shall pollute, this very night, the choice stream (in 
which chemists on analysis would find the genuine nobility) of a 
Norman house, and his Grace shall not be able to say nay to the 
infamous alliance. There is not an atom of Tom’s slime, not a 
cubic inch of any pestilential gas in which he lives, not one 
obscenity or degradation about him, not an ignorance, not a 
wickedness, not a brutality of his committing, but shall work its 
retribution up to the proudest of the proud and to the highest of the 
high. Verily, what with tainting, plundering, and spoiling, Tom has 




Within the context of rampant, indiscriminate, and pervading contagion, Esther 
Summerson’s illness assumes vital importance. As the illegitimate and unacknowledged 
daughter of a Baroness and a disgraced and impoverished sailor, Esther is a liminal figure, 
uneasily inhabiting an ambiguous social and moral ground. However, in her role as housekeeper 
and lynchpin of Bleak House, her position is decidedly middle class, the product of a monied 
intervention that allows her upward social mobility. As the passage cited above demonstrates, 
however, not even the insulated walls of the upper-middle class home or the love of its 
inhabitants can quarantine Esther from the contaminating influence of Tom-All-Alone’s. The 
homogenizing and all-encompassing tendencies of the monstrous city cannot safely absorb all of 
its component parts. Bodies altered by abuse, neglect, and disease will have their effect, 
changing in both subtle and dramatic ways the entire social body. Though seemingly far 
removed from Esther’s idyllic world of peaceful domesticity, Jo’s contaminating presence still 
finds its way into Bleak House. That Esther and Charley seek out the sick boy makes little 
difference. Where the compunctions of charity and obligation do not obtain, the inevitable forces 
of revelation and revenge will.  
 Esther’s startling description of her incipient illness provides an important illustration. As 
she begins to succumb to the smallpox infection, Esther feels “a curious sense of fullness…as if I 
had grown too large” (463, emphasis added). This odd comparison of fever with largeness, 
disproportion, and excess is critical in a text preoccupied with the ramifications of reckless and 
immoderate urbanization. Esther’s sense of her body as having surpassed its boundaries operates 
as a powerful metaphor for the city that consumes and discards without care or compassion. In 
her extraordinary study of purification rituals, Purity and Danger, Douglas defines “dirt” as 
“matter out of place” (44). Perpetually harried and “moved on,” Jo, too, is matter out of place. 
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The homeless child of unknown parentage, he is without social role, his body incapable of 
assimilation
17
 into the structure that has both made and disavowed him.  
In Foucauldian paradigms of disciplinary subjectification, the modern subject is 
constructed through the creation of a docile body that is standardized, interchangeable, “normal,” 
and normative. The homogenized, unmarked body is, therefore, virtually indistinguishable from 
other “normal” bodies. This incorporable body is one which is capable of invisibility, its 
standardization and interchangeability akin to a form of disembodiment which the aberrant 
figures of Bleak House can never know. Thus, in contrast to the transparency of the norm, Jo, 
like Daniel Lambert and similar monstrous others, is hyper-visible.  
Indeed, the extreme visibility of Bleak House’s unincorporable characters mimetically 
links to the lived experiences of real-life “deviants,” typified by popular entertainment in the 
freak show and traveling carnival and in elite culture with the scientific museums and lecture 
halls of prestigious universities. Jan Bondeson describes Lambert’s initial refusal to exhibit 
himself and his disdain for the insatiable curiosity of townsfolk who converged, uninvited, to 
gawk at him (245). That Lambert ultimately renounced his opposition testifies both to the social 
pressure he endured and to the financial and physical difficulty of making a living in a social 
environment not built to support such aberrant embodiments.  
More tragic still is the case of Charles Byrne, the so-called Irish Giant. Standing over 7 
feet tall, Byrne suffered a lifelong terror of being placed on display against his will, reportedly 
paying £500 to have his body cast into the sea upon his death. Unfortunately for Byrne, the 
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 It is important at this point to differentiate between assimilation, incorporation, and absorption. In this context, I 
take assimilation to mean the defining and successful assumption of a discrete and recognized social role. Similarly, 
I use the term incorporation to signify the assignment of the subject to that role. Conversely, I take absorption 
simply to mean the inclusion within social and territorial boundaries entities which may or may not have a 
legitimate and predefined “place” within them. By such definitions, therefore, Jo, solely by virtue of his physical 
presence there, may be seen as absorbed into the city, but, without a recognized social role, he is not and cannot 
be assimilated or incorporated to it.  
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illustrious physician, anatomist, and dissectionist, John Hunter, reportedly doubled the 
conspirators’ pay to retrieve the body. Once sufficiently dissected and catalogued, Hunter placed 
Byrne’s skeleton on display at Mr. Tulkinghorn’s own Lincoln’s Inn Field.  
Foucault defines such compulsory visibility as another vital manifestation of 
power/knowledge structures: 
The existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for 
measuring, supervising, and correcting the abnormal brings into 
play the disciplinary mechanisms to which the fear of the plague 
gave rise. All the mechanisms of power…are disposed around the 
abnormal individual to brand him and to alter him. (199-200) 
 
Those who by volition, circumstance, or nature defy culturally-imposed standards of behavioral, 
economic, and/or physiological proportion are ascribed to an incessant and conspicuous 
visibility. Through this compulsory visibility, normal/abnormal binaries may be defined, 
exemplified, and enforced for the entire population. 
As significant as Jo’s visibility are the catalyzing influences of his body. If a well-
regulated and normalized body may be of a nature with a virtual disembodiment, then 
extraordinary embodiments, in whatever form, come to emblematize pure corporeality, a 
threatening fleshly presence that has reverberations throughout the entire social structure. 
Esther’s feverish “largeness” is the direct result of the contaminating influence of Jo’s body: it is 
a menace that functions beyond the will of the subject, a wholly involuntary consequence of 
bodies acting upon one another in physical space. Her sickness and disfigurement arise as the 
result of the absorption of the “other,” of the penetration of the boundaries of the body by that 
which is unassimilable to it. In her analysis of pollution beliefs, Douglas argues that the 
“uncleanness of dirt is that which must not be included if a (social) pattern is to be maintained” 
(50).  For Douglas, matter which is “out of place” is volatile, for, in lacking a stable, predefined 
32 
 
social space, it threatens to assert its polluting presence anywhere and everywhere in the social 
body, transforming that social body through the insistent existence of the excessive and 
unthinkable. 
The pernicious power of Jo’s unassimilable body evades every attempt of the social 
structure to disavow it, to quarantine itself by forcing him perpetually to “move on.” On the 
contrary, the inevitably transient nature of Jo’s existence, the very refusal of the social system to 
provide him a stable place within its structure, ensures the circulation of his pestilential frame 
across the cultural echelons, as exemplified by Charley’s and Esther’s sickness. Representing as 
they do the polar ends of the class spectrum, their contamination by a single agent suggests the 
leveling forces at play as the urban giant endeavors to homogenize, standardize, and regulate 
bodies according to its own self-serving interests. Indeed, Jo presents only one of a host of 
instances of contaminated and contaminating bodies matriculating through the streets of London. 
The residents of the brickmakers’ hovels provide additional examples, hunger forcing them to 
migrate from the countryside to the city center and back again as an industrial London uses their 
bodies for its own survival and casts them away when no longer needed.   
Bleak House’s smallpox narrative figures importantly in the social reformist agenda 
which informs much of Dickens’ oeuvre. The interconnectedness which Dickens sees at the heart 
of modern society necessitates a vested interest in and an inevitable anxiety toward legislative 
agendas and public policies that perpetuate unjust treatment. Just as physicians argued the 
influence of the organism’s diet in shaping the consuming body, so Dickens asserts the 
interdependent relationship of public and private bodies. Jo’s menace is the direct result of the 
social forces that shaped him; he is the ignorant beast rampaging through city streets, 
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inadvertently hurting himself and others by virtue of his inability to belong anywhere in the 
social body: 
Jo and the other lower animals get on in the unintelligible mess as 
they can. It is market-day. The blinded oxen, over-goaded, over-
driven, never guided, run into wrong places and are beaten out, and 
plunge red-eyed and foaming at stone walls, and often sorely hurt 
the innocent, and often sorely hurt themselves….Turn [a] dog’s 
descendents wild, like Jo, and in a very few years they will so 
degenerate that they will even lose their bark—but not their bite. 
(238) 
                                                                 
Just as his infectiousness disfigures Esther’s face, removing her from whom she once was, so 
will the “teeth” of Jo’s illiteracy, vagrancy, and contagiousness ultimately devour the social body 
that has devoured him.  
 
Entropy and Exhaustion: Expansionist Dreams and Consuming Nightmares  
 
Themes of degeneration, entropy, combustion, and collapse recur throughout Bleak 
House. These pervasive images extend what occurs with individual bodies on the micro level to 
the macro of the social body. Dickens’ London is worn out, drained, and disintegrating beneath 
the weight of its own convolutions.  Significantly, this characterization of the city as depleted by 
excess is strongly reminiscent of broader nineteenth century understandings of the giant’s body 
itself. Physicians, scientists, and laymen alike assumed a paradoxical mental and bodily 
weakness attendant with prodigious size. W. Gordon Smythies asserted that giants are “given to 
melancholy, the burthen of their greatness becomes an intolerable weight not to be cheerfully 
borne, which they shuffle off at an early age, most of them dying while still in the prime of life” 
(715).  Like the city which cannot bear the pressure of its immensity, the physical body grown 
too large demonstrates a similar lack of strength.  Human giants, whether tall of stature or obese, 
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were regularly assumed to be short-lived, their vital forces sapped in the effort to sustain such 
disproportionate bulk. For Dickens, pervasive cultural understandings of the nature of the human 
giant finds a haunting corollary in the swelling British empire at the heart of which is the 
megalithic city, London. The informing impulse at work in Bleak House is the illumination of 
the parallels between social and individual disproportion, the effort to write his way out of the 
tragic fate suffered by real-life human giants. 
The interconnectedness of the private and public body which is so critical to Dickens’ 
narrative project manifests most sharply in two representational polarities, the crowd and the 
individual body. Tom-All-Alone’s is presented primarily as an abyss of excessive, 
undifferentiated embodiments. When Snagsby and Bucket enter the slum, perhaps the greatest 
terror they encounter is the mass of nameless humanity that seems to emanate from the 
dilapidated walls and dank streets only to be immediately absorbed back into them: “[T]he 
crowd…hovers around the three visitors like a dream of horrible faces and fades away up alleys 
and into ruins and behind walls, and…flits about them until they leave the place” (331).  
In contradistinction to the amorphous, replete, and tidal horrors of the crowds at Tom’s, 
Dickens installs a cavalcade of grotesque figures to further emblematize how the abject body 
deforms the environment into which it comes. From Jo’s infectiousness to the hideous Phil 
Squod’s greasy imprints along every route he takes, Bleak House affirms the inherent influence 
of all whom the social body consumes, implicating the public in its own mutilation when it fails 
to provide a sustainable place for its itinerate and unwanted vagrants.  
Krook’s death by spontaneous combustion provides an important example of this idea in 
the novel’s symbolic economy. Metonymically linked to Chancery Court’s Lord Chancellor, 
after whom he is nicknamed, the fate of Krook’s body presages the destiny of the public body 
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which consumes without care, absorbing disparate elements without thought or recognition. 
Krook’s rag and bottle shop mirrors Chancery’s pernicious acquisitiveness, absorbing all things 
into itself while rendering those elements useless, broken, impotent.  That the manifestation of 
Krook’s demise should be an all-pervading, rancid ooze is especially significant here. As 
Douglas asserts in her analysis of Sartre’s famous description of viscosity, 
The viscous is a state half way between solid and liquid. It is like a 
cross-section in a process of change. It is unstable, but it does not 
flow….There is no gliding on its surface. Its stickiness is a trap, it 
clings like a leech; it attacks the boundary between myself and it. 
Long columns falling off my fingers suggest my own substance 
flowing into the pool of stickiness….[T]o touch stickiness is to risk 
diluting myself into viscosity….In this way the first contact with 
stickiness enriches a child’s experience. He has learnt something 
about himself and the properties of matter and the interrelation of 
between the self and other things. (47) 
                        
Meditation on the interdependent relationship of selves to one another and to the spaces they 
inhabit operates on the level of the individual, physical body because, as Douglas goes on to 
argue, “The structure of living organisms is better able to reflect complex social forms….[The 
body’s] boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious” (142). 
Dickens’ maimed, disfigured, disintegrating, and combusting bodies parallel a similar social 
disintegration, the collapse of an expansive and expanding body politic ever in danger of 
transgressing its limits, of superseding its capacity for self-rule and self-care. 
The draining of the (public and private) body’s energy unleashes another destructive 
force, that of regressive temporality. Dickens’ tactic counters laudatory assumptions of the 
irrefutable march of progress presumed by Enlightenment rationalism. Dickens rejects paradigms 
of a modern, progressive London by substituting for a pre-lapsarian city emerging from the 
primordial ooze and moving toward ever greater levels of civilization the image of an 
apocalyptic city, one that is devolving rather than evolving through time toward an inevitable 
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oblivion. Once again, such a thematic may be traced to scientific and cultural views of the giant 
as primeval monster, both the antithesis and the menace of the self-determining, perfectible, and 
ever-evolving Enlightenment subject. This devolution is the inevitable consequence of an 
England constrained and consumed by the monster of its own excess.  
Mired in the incomprehensible, blinding muck, the human subject loses not only his 
individuality but his potential for self-actualization. Involuntarily incorporated into a system not 
of his own making, individuals like Richard Carstone become the instruments through which the 
system perpetuates itself. Such a reading graphically exemplifies Foucaldian models of discipline 
and subjectification, as individuals are co-opted into and transfigured by preexistent, obfuscating 
power/knowledge systems, systems which are themselves actuated solely by principles of self-
preservation. 
      Such considerations of the public and private body deformed by improvident growth and 
temporally regressed by an irrational drive to explode boundary-marking principles of rational 
self-containment were critically important in the context of Bleak House’s initial serialization. 
Dickens published the novel’s first installment a little more than a year after the famed Great 
Exhibition of 1851. Ostensibly an occasion to exhibit the cultural and technological 
achievements of nations around the globe, the Exhibition in reality was an irrefutable assertion of 
England’s industrial, scientific, and imperial dominance.  
 While Dickens rarely mentions the Great Exhibition explicitly in his contemporaneous 
writings, England’s expansionist agenda plays a vital role in Bleak House. Exemplified most 
importantly by Mrs. Jellyby and the “active ladies” with which she associates, Dickens laments 
the “telescopic philanthropy” that produces corruption and despair both at home and abroad. 
Mrs. Jellyby and her ilk dedicate every waking hour to the planning of foreign charitable exploits 
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while their own homes and children go to rack and ruin through maternal neglect. Significantly, 
these excursions typically end in tragedy not only for those at home but also for the colonized 
recipients of the women’s benevolence.  
Dickens’ characterization of England’s charitable ladies is significant insofar as it 
manifests the ultimately interdependent nature of personal, social, and national contact: in 
Dickens’ world, the currents of both benevolence and of harm are never unidirectional. The 
unintentional hurts imposed abroad are reciprocated, and indeed one may argue that they are 
amplified, at home. The dehumanization of Jo is an important example of this dynamic:  
It must be a strange state, not merely to be told that I am scarcely 
human…but to feel it of my own knowledge all my life. To see the 
horses, dogs, and cattle go by me and to know that in ignorance I 
belong to them and not to the superior beings in my shape whose 
delicacy I offend! (237)  
 
Misguided philanthropy, Dickens suggests, aligns with and may indeed exacerbate the injuries 
inflicted by flagrant imperial aggression, rendering innocent victims monstrous or bestial through 
both callous neglect and through misguided intervention which are the twin weapons of 
telescopic philanthropy. For Dickens, the incapacity of Mrs. Jellyby and her colleagues to “see 
anything nearer than Africa” imposes a brutalizing blindness to suffering at home and an equally 
destructive paternalism abroad. These paradoxical forces of neglect and disruption exemplify a 
social body grown so large its proportions defy its own self-understanding. These over-reaching 
ladies have no ability to comprehend what they do; they are blind to their own excesses and the 
catastrophic consequences of them. 
The Power, Pleasure, and Privilege of Excess  
 While Dickens is deeply invested in defining the pernicious consequences of a rapidly 
urbanizing London on the bodies, minds, and spirits of its inhabitants, of equal importance to his 
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project is the assertion of the redemptive potential intrinsic to individuated subjectivity. 
Embodied subjects in Bleak House possess the potent privilege of a strongly material selfhood 
informed by will, desire, and embodied experience. The novel’s competing imperatives of 
optimism and fatalism reflect in important ways rival tendencies in mid-Victorian society toward 
the belief in rational progressivism and the contrary fear of wholesale cultural degeneration. The 
perverse and prodigious narrative of Bleak House mirrors the mid-Victorian struggle against a 
confounding duality that characterized this period of unprecedented expansion and attendant 
social change.   
 Significantly, Dickens continues an established paradigm through which such social 
paradoxes are inscribed on and resolved through anomalous bodies. Like the antagonistic forces 
of envy and revulsion manifest in audiences’ responses to Daniel Lambert, Dickens invokes 
scarred, repudiated, and disavowed bodies to corporealize both socio-cultural deformations and 
their resolution. Dickens’ complex and controversial dual narrative structure is a principal 
instrument of this. It is no coincidence that the second narrative voice belongs to Esther 
Summerson, the disfigured smallpox survivor whose illegitimate birth brings disgrace to an 
ancient aristocratic family. Esther’s status as first-person narrator suggests the vital role played 
by deviant subjects in reforming, restoring, and transforming the social body. Indeed, as will be 
shown, Esther’s narrative acts as a potent corrective to the impersonal—and considerably 
darker—discourse of the omniscient, third-person narrator. This investment of an ostensibly 
displaced and disavowed subject with a narrative voice to counteract and cure the (monstrous) 
discourse of the third person narrative is authorized by and through Esther’s very liminality.  
 The twin forces of Esther’s illegitimacy and her disfigurement activate a marginalization 
that is both hereditary and ascribed, thereby encompassing two of Victorian England’s most 
39 
 
important paradigms: the competing theories of biological determinism and rational self-
actualization. As will be seen, Esther’s class mobility undermines both long-established 
hierarchical models of ascribed status as well as more contemporary, Darwinian-influenced 
paradigms of genetic predestination. Similarly, her scarification shatters preexisting social roles, 
casting her into transgressive, amorphous, and undefined spaces by rendering her unfit for 
traditional systems based on marriage and motherhood. Thus, Esther’s ability to operate 
productively, as exemplified most critically in the construction of her personal narrative, 
explodes established social orders and expands social understandings of the individual (and 
profoundly embodied) subject—her meaning, use, capacity, and value. As a result, Esther’s 
excessive corporeality enlarges the social field into which it comes, defining new standards of 
behavior, relationship, opportunity, and modes of being. 
  As a marginal figure, an unmarried woman trapped between social classes and conceived 
in an unlawful union, Esther embodies a paradox of potential mobility and predetermined stasis. 
As the one who is “set apart” and stigmatized by virtue of her illegitimate birth, her ascription to 
a position beyond the boundaries of acceptable society would seem to be both preordained and 
intractable. But her ascension from unwanted orphan child to beloved teacher to heart of an 
upper middle class household reflects a new paradigm of modern possibility and self-
actualization, the potential for class mobility that is born of financial prosperity. Foucault’s 
understandings of the modern body serving the needs of capital further posit an obliteration of 
previous social hierarchies. Relationships once entirely dependent upon lineage and birthright 
now give way to the classifications of labor and money. Capital invests bodies with the power of 
self re-creation, albeit within certain parameters of embodied form and functioning. Thus, within 
the standardizing and regulating paradigm of the gigantic city, there exists not only the potential 
40 
 
for the deformation of public and private bodies but also the possibility of progress, the hope of a 
reformation actuated and authorized by the privileges of capital. 
 Esther’s social mobility should not be ascribed entirely to the forces of a rapidly 
industrializing, money-based society, however. While it is true that Esther enjoys the 
empowering privileges of capital, these derive from her sponsorship by her wealthy guardian, 
John Jarndyce, rather than through the assimilability and productivity of her own body. On the 
contrary, Esther’s most potent instrument in the self-actualizing project is precisely that 
characteristic which renders her body wholly unincorporable: her disfigurement. As has been 
previously touched upon, the standardization which the modern subject undergoes in the process 
of discipline enables the virtual disappearance of the physical body. It is no coincidence that the 
mid-nineteenth century saw the advent of statistics as a primary instrument in the creation of 
social and scientific knowledge. Literally meaning “the science of the state” (Bashford, 
Introduction), statistics enabled the quantification of the population according to the ostensibly 
infallible laws of rational empiricism. Individual bodies gave way actuarial tables and discrete 
subjects were consolidated into the graph of a bell curve.  
 While the growing influence of statistics in this period would seem to reflect a 
constriction, the image of the social body whittled down to the swell of the bell curve, Bleak 
House is fundamentally concerned with the impact of the curve’s outliers, those figures who, for 
good or ill, defy assimilation into the homogenous cluster of the “average.” For Dickens, such 
outliers are characterized by an intractable singularity, particularity, and materiality that are 
dangerously embedded in (and against) ideations of the norm. Most important, emblematizing 
the interconnectedness and inter-penetrability that lies at the root of Dickens’ narrative, these 
outliers, in their irrefutable embodiment, both shape and are shaped by the social structure of 
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which they are apart. Simultaneously responsive to and disruptive of established systems, these 
extraordinary bodies reflect, revise, and—most vital to our purposes—expand the public body, 
its form and its function. 
 Dickens’ revisionist project in Bleak House, his effort to enlarge established 
understandings of embodied urban subjects, their potential, and their vulnerabilities, relies upon 
the stark corporealization of his characters. Esther’s disfigurement provides her with the same 
hyper-visibility that unassimilable bodies such as Jo’s carry. In the novel’s emphasis on her 
bodily suffering and disfigurement, Esther’s narrative may be read as a process of coming into 
corporeality. The novel’s early scenes do not just present Esther as a disembodied subject, they 
explicitly deny her an embodied existence. Indeed, in the first chapters of Esther’s narrative, 
Esther herself advances of a model of her existence as both subject-less and bodiless. In recalling 
childhood memories of playing with her doll, Esther notes feeling that the doll is “staring at 
me—or not so much at me, I think, as at nothing” (24) as the young girl tells the toy her secrets. 
This scene echoes a previous image of disembodiment invoked when Esther describes herself 
standing on tiptoe to peer in her godmother’s mirror while refusing to articulate what she sees 
there. As will be shown, Dickens’ intriguing formulation suggests a tension at the base of 
Esther’s narrative, a struggle to achieve an embodied subjectivity through narrative. 
 In a modernizing London intent upon producing an “average” subject amenable to 
normative measurements of bodily functioning and appearance, anomalous bodies were, also like 
Jo, radically unassimilable. For Foucault, exclusionary practices are grounded upon embodied 
individuation: “Individualize the excluded but use procedures of individualization to mark 
exclusion….Induce…a state of conscious and permanent visibility” (199, 201). In falling outside 
the bell curve, these subjects resisted the forces of incorporation and indifferentiation, retaining 
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bodily integrity even if through stigmatization. Thus the Esther whose body was overshadowed 
by the light of Ada’s ostensibly greater beauty and invoking no comment on its own becomes in 
the wake of her illness the repeated center of attention, the catalyst of speculation, validation, 
and, sometimes, rejection. Indeed, Dickens places great importance on these scenes of unveiling. 
More than once does Esther present her face as a sort of litmus test, her disfigurement enabling 
the examination of social and personal truths that would otherwise have lain hidden beneath the 
obfuscating protocols of custom, etiquette, and obligation. Again, Mary Douglas’ analysis of 
danger and pollution is helpful here, “When something is firmly classified as anomalous, the 
outline of the set in which it is not a member is clarified” (47). Once more, transgressive, 
prodigious bodies become the force and the manifestation of social truths, unearthing 
subterranean forces by superseding (and shattering) cultural limits, requirements, and 
expectations. 
Thus removed by virtue of her disfigurement from traditional marriage plots, Esther 
becomes the anomalous figure whose insistent embodiment and radical displacement helps to 
illuminate the system in which it has no place. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has argued in 
her analysis of nineteenth century American sentimental fiction, reformist novels operate upon a 
binary of dis/embodiment, as white middle class heroines achieve corporeal transcendence by 
problematizing and inflating the physicality of those for whom they provide care (Extraordinary 
Bodies 93). Esther’s scarring places her at the center of a recurring theme of sentiment and 
sympathy as the characters surrounding her manifest their true nature in reaction to her changed 
face. Replicating and expanding upon a scene in which Richard watches Ada weep over the body 
of Jenny’s dead infant, declaring the image “most beautiful,” Esther’s repeated unveilings clarify 
the extent of the other characters’ capacity for sympathy and sensibility, revealing Guppy’s 
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callousness while emphasizing the nobility of John Jarndyce and Alan Woodcourt (see also 
Holmes Stoddard, Fictions of Affliction). Thus, unable to accommodate established norms of 
female embodiment and no longer adequate to predefined female middle class roles within the 
marriage paradigm, Esther becomes the instrument and opportunity for those around her to 
demonstrate their moral and social worth. Her amplified physicality—her scars providing an 
inflated and intractable signification of her suffering—invites and legitimates these overblown 
expressions of sentiment and sympathy.  
 Transgressive, anomalous bodies enjoy this power to clarify the social structure by virtue 
of their analogousness to “normal” systems. Derived from eighteenth century natural philosophy, 
“freaks of nature” draw much of their fascination from the widespread belief that natural law 
may be discerned most clearly through the analysis of its aberrations. Crucial to this discussion is 
the extent to which Esther’s deviant status informs and is informed by the matriculations of her 
body in space. Her infection is the result of breached social, economic, and physical boundaries. 
The pestilential airs and dangerous bodies of Tom-All-Alone’s recognize and are contained by 
no demarcations of geography, gender, or class. Her body’s surfaces, having been breached, now 
carry the indelible marks of its transgression.  
Above all else, Bleak House is a monstrous text about monstrous bodies: similar to 
prodigious bodies like Daniel Lambert’s whose excessive corporeality materialize  a multitude of 
latent fears and desires—of consumption, expansion, and the limits and possibilities of power—
Dickens’ swelling text narrativizes a corollary clash of objects, anxieties, and agendas. Perhaps 
more important, Dickens deploys Esther’s scarred body to articulate obscure and disconcerting 
social truths. Like the Enlightenment freak of nature that illuminated the workings of natural law, 
Esther’s sickness does more than occasion the revelation of moral truths in those around her; it 
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also materializes hidden social machinations. Juxtaposed with Sir Leiceister’s “aristocratic” gout, 
Esther’s smallpox reveals the leveling influences operating in an environment of profound social 
change. Embodied hierarchies of pleasure and pain, exemplified by Sir Leicester’s inflamed leg, 
give way to the egalitarian infectiousness of smallpox.  
Dickens’ counterpositioning of these two taxonomies of disease articulates on the level of 
the body in pain new economies of social functioning. The scarifications of opportunistic, 
indiscriminate, infectious disease displace the identifying stigmata of diseases of hereditary 
opulence and leisure. More significantly, Dickens employs the equalizing effects of epidemic 
smallpox to enlarge and expand individual bodies even as it affirms the materiality of those 
bodies. Esther’s scars become eternal signifiers of the body’s vulnerability, permeability, and 
mutability. It literally “bodies forth” a profound transformation in the social structure, the 
embodied subject’s place within that structure, and the relationships of bodies with other bodies. 
 The transition from ascribed to acquired illness writes on the level of the flesh a new 
narrative of society—one in which both the body and its social role are mutable, less responsive 
to the preconditions of birth as in the patrician sufferings of gout than to the changing conditions 
of environment and circumstance. For Dickens, then, not only is the social body a reflection in 
large of the human body, but the human body also serves as a microcosm of the social, literally 
embodying on the level of the individual subject the reality of the public realm. Esther’s enlarged 
physicality, its capacity to absorb and reflect the social body, operates for Dickens as a form of 
collective self-disclosure, implicating social systems in the making and remaking of material 
bodies. In a moment informed by the general erasure of the body, its standardization, 
incorporation, and interchangeability within a mechanized industrial economy, such insistence 
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upon the flesh constitutes an important reversal of hegemony’s efforts to naturalize, obscure, and 
disavow the material effects of such social change. 
Significantly, however, as Alison Bashford has shown in her analysis of public health 
policies in Imperial Britain, the disfiguring scars of smallpox place infection survivors in an 
unprecedented social condition, that of the “safe but impure.” For Bashford, growing cognizance 
of the smallpox incubation period rendered unmarked bodies suspect, their seeming purity 
potentially belying a dangerous contagiousness. Vaccination and pox scars signal impurity, that 
the body’s borders have already been broken and its internal structures fundamentally and 
forever altered by the contaminating presence. However, only in the presence of such markers of 
contamination can the body’s benignity be assured. Bashford equates this “safe but impure” 
status with a corollary freedom of movement; the immune subject is not constrained by 
boundaries imposed by quarantine, class, or tradition. He may enter the infectious hospital; she 
may walk with impunity into the brickmaker’s hovel. Thus, disfigurement enlarges even as it 
transforms, expanding the scope of mobility, access, and capability beyond “normal” limits. It is 
within such a context, then, that Esther’s description of her illness as having grown too large is 
best understood: such transgression and excess cannot occur without the disfiguring of the body, 
placing it beyond the constraints of the structure which defines and limits the operation of the 
“normal.”  
Such unprecedented freedom of mobility occasioned by the transfiguration of the body 
through infectious illness is another vital factor in Dickens’ effort to revise understandings of the 
physical body, the social structure, and the embodied subject’s place within it. Sir Leicester’s 
suffering pivots upon a paradigm of bodily integrity: the boundaries of the body are secure, its 
destiny contained within it as a function of its birthright. This body is static, predictable, and 
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permanent, embodying a stable and stratified social system that no longer obtained during the 
breakneck industrialization and class mobility of Bleak House’s England. Conversely, Esther’s 
marked flesh memorializes the incorporation of exogenous forces within the confines of her 
body, affirms the permeability, excess, and expansiveness of that body, and authorizes that 
body’s continued refusal of antiquated social roles, standards, and functioning.  
 
Monstrous Singularity and Insistent Embodiment 
 The revelatory potential of the deviant body is not without its own power to conceal, 
however, and, for Dickens, it is in this complex interplay between assertion and obfuscation that 
the liberatory potential of embodied aberrance is maximized. Before her illness, Esther wears her 
aunt’s condemning words to her as a child, “you are your mother’s disgrace and she is yours” 
(26), like the veil with which her mother is synonymous. Each time that Esther sees her mother, 
she is stricken by a shock of recognition, as though she were “looking into a broken mirror,”  but 
it is a relationship she can neither recognize, acknowledge, or assert until any trace of that 
resemblance has been erased. Esther’s disfigurement precipitates Lady Dedlock’s confession of 
their relationship while simultaneously rendering such a confession harmless. Corporeal 
manifestations of physical relationships have given way to embodied singularity. Esther’s first 
thought upon hearing her mother’s confession is to feel “a burst of gratitude to the providence of 
God that I was so changed as that I never could disgrace her by any trace of likeness” (535).  
Esther’s fevered dreams presage and illuminate in important ways the reassuring 
singularity of appearance accorded to her by her illness, the transgression of her body’s 
boundaries activating an individualizing metamorphosis through corporeal transformation. At the 
height of her illness, Esther’ dream of a burning necklace, of which she is one of the beads (514), 
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and her fervent desire to be removed from the strand strikingly suggests a desire for 
individuation. Critics have long interpreted this dream to signify a maternal refusal, marking 
Lady Dedlock’s association with jewelry and Dickens’ comparison of Chesney Wold to a “world 
wrapped in jeweler’s cotton” (14). These interpretations are appropriate, since Esther’s 
disfigurement specifically distances her from the mother to whom she is a danger. An equally 
important understanding of this sequence, however, is the fact that such a loss of lineage frees 
Esther from infamy and activates a process of self-actualization. A bead which is removed from 
the strand no longer has instrumental value; having no predefined space and no proximal 
relationship with anything beyond itself, it exists solely as a function of its physical being.
18
  
Such also was the nature of prodigies of nature in Victorian culture (O’Connor 169, 175). 
Without a preexisting social role and possessing no instrumental value in a rapidly industrialized 
space not built for bodies such as theirs, they are dehistoricized and, in utilitarian terms, 
superfluous: their value and their subjectification reside in and derive from the fact of their 
embodied materiality, their capacity for objectification (Ibid.). Having evolved from a child with 
no reflection in the mirror, an invisible essence telling unheard stories to her doll, Esther’s 
singular embodiment manifests a unique subjectivity previously unavailable to her. Her repeated 
unveilings replicate in small the exhibitions of freaks and giants, whose fame and fortune resided 
solely in their ability to advertise themselves as unprecedented, wholly unique. More important 
still, as another famous Irish Giant, Patrick O’Brien (formerly Cotter), exemplified in changing 
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 While such processes of individuation play a vital role in Dickens’ project in Bleak House, these concerns do not 
undermine or disrupt the author’s primary concern, as will be shown, with interconnectedness. For Dickens, 
individuation appears to be a function of two related processes: the rejection of preexisting, constraining, and 
defunct classificatory systems (i.e. Esther’s ascription to the social margins based on her illegitimacy; the growing 
obsolescence of aristocratic taxonomies exemplified by Sir Leicester’s gout being subsumed by the “democratic” 
infectiousness of smallpox) and the refusal of the homogenizing forces of contemporary industrial society. For 
Dickens, the return to the materiality of the suffering, the desiring, the volitional, and the metamorphic body 




his name and fabricating a lineage deriving from an ancient mythological Celtic king, Brien 
Boreau, in erasing all traces of family resemblance and social origin
19
 the giant could create his 
own ancestral myth. Indeed, his success on exhibition tours frequently depended upon the 
creation of a sensational story
20
 (McHold 21-23).  
 While Esther’s disfigurement positions her as a singular figure, resisting modern forces 
of homogenization and departicularization, her intractable corporeality does retain important 
vestiges of her parental inheritance insofar as that body is associated with fleshly desire. 
Juxtaposed with the rational operations of the Enlightenment mind, Cartesian mind/body duality 
reads embodiment as the locus of irrational drives. Esther’s extraordinary and incorporable body 
marks her as pure flesh inasmuch as her disfigurements bring to the fore the reality of the 
ineradicable vulnerability, penetrability, and changeability of the human body. Attendant with 
this knowledge, however, is a more indecipherable message, communicable only to a select few, 
regarding the true nature of Esther’s parentage. Esther telegraphs the truth of her maternal 
lineage in a number of ways, not only in the natural development of her face but also in her 
practices of dress and movement. Esther’s ubiquitous veil mirrors, displaces, and remakes Lady 
Dedlock’s person into Esther’s own image. Similarly, in the marks of her illness, Esther carries 
the legacy of her father, in whom the disease originates. Thus, father and mother meet on the 
surfaces of Esther’s body, leaving permanent but largely untranslatable traces in the flesh of their 
child.   
                                                          
19
 Importantly, the erasure of origin typically did not extend to classifications of “race” and ethnicity. Giants and 
other so-called freaks were frequently subjected to prevailing racial and/or ethnic taxonomies. 
20
 As will be shown, this project of self-(re)creation relies in important ways upon access to language, however. Jo’s 
illiteracy, vagrancy, and poverty render him incapable of deploying socially authorized forms of language (hence 
the emphasis on Jo’s dialect) that would enable him to transform the prevailing paradigm of displacement-as-
destruction/death associated with him into the displacement-as-self-(re)creation as experienced by Esther. 
49 
 
 This tension between social readings of the deviant body as enigma and as revelation in 
Bleak House signals important shifts in the understanding and uses of human variation beginning 
in the 1850s. Operating upon Enlightenment suppositions of the instrumental value of the “freak 
of nature” in illuminating natural laws, the marks of lineage Esther carries on her body furthers 
empirical renderings of natural bodies as explicable and translatable. Significantly, this legibility 
is only available to those who possess a privileged corpus of knowledge derived either from 
personal intimacy or professional expertise. Even more important, however, is the fact that it is 
the professional men, Inspector Bucket and Mr. Tulkinghorn, who correctly decipher the 
language of Esther’s embodiment even before her loved ones do. Indeed, Tulkinghorn’s 
knowledge precedes even Esther’s self-understanding. This rendering of the body as both 
knowable and cryptic, a storehouse of information to which only a small body of specialists 
holds the key, anticipates the growing influence of professional discourses, particularly the 
medico-scientific, which distance the body from its relational context—thereby weakening the 
authority of individual, felt experience and the claims of the embodied subject’s intimate 
partners. Bleak House appeared at an historical moment in which individual bodies were 
increasingly co-opted into ostensibly impersonal, disinterested discourses that appropriated unto 
themselves the singular authority to define and direct the embodied subject.    
  Dickens resists the homogenizing and dematerializing forces at play in a rapidly 
industrializing England, however, by insisting upon the stark materiality of the human subject. 
The empathy with which he treats marginalized subject and the pains to which he goes to 
articulate their suffering on the level of wounded flesh imply a forceful rejection of burgeoning 
social Darwinist discourses which would advance a deterministic (and ultimately eugenicist) 
reading of corruption, degeneracy, and danger in these marked bodies. From the rendering of 
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Jo’s agonizing death throes as he succumbs to smallpox to the graphic illustrations of her 
husband’s violence on Jenny’s brutalized face, the bodily desecrations of Bleak House’s most 
pitiable characters are social, not natural, in origin. Thus, Dickens substitutes for the probing of 
the natural philosopher the scrutiny of the social scientist in order to advance a redemptive 
paradigm actuated through the curative forces of realist fiction.   
 The distinction between the competing agendas of social and natural science is critical to 
understanding Dickens’ multiform rendering of Esther’s body, its meaning, use, and value. As 
will be shown in greater detail later, Dickens’ act of granting Esther a narrative voice equal to 
that of the dispassionate, presumably objective, and ostensibly male third person narrator 
valorizes subject-centered discourse, undercutting the growing prestige accorded to increasingly 
subject-less empirical paradigms. Dickens’ insistence on a subject-oriented discourse places 
primary emphasis not upon biological and physical laws but upon the function of the individual 
within her social sphere, the machinations of social systems, and their impact upon personal and 
collective human bodies.  
 Bleak House’s dual narrative structure, therefore, seems to mirror the increasingly 
dualistic nature of social discourse, the bifurcation of narratological paradigms into discrete 
camps of disinterested, rationalist science and imaginative, subjective art. As Jason Daniel 
Tougaw has argued in his Strange Cases: The Medical Case History and the British Novel, such 
a dual structure has a long precedent in medical case history writing, which traditionally 
incorporated both the objective language of science and the emotive narration of literary fiction. 
However, Tougaw notes that, from the mid-century on, physicians, spurred by solidifying 
notions of “medical distance”, increasingly deployed objectivist writing strategies in drafting 
case histories. Private names, personal information, and patient self-reporting increasingly gave 
51 
 
way to a specialized discourse derived from the physician’s own reading of the patient’s body, 
his translations of the body’s signals according to an established lexicon of diagnoses, prognoses, 
signs, and classifications to which he alone has access. Thus, particularities of the patient—not 
only her name but, often, her unique articulation of the experience of her suffering—are erased. 
In their place are substituted a library of knowledge accumulated through the conglomeration of 
anonymous bodies amassed, examined, described, and discursively constructed by medical and 
scientific professionals. 
 Written at an historical moment when the separation between empirical/professional 
discourse and literary narration was not yet complete, Bleak House’s dialogic structure replicates 
this contest between subject-centered and objective/empirical discursive paradigms. Viewed 
from this perspective, then, the complex marriage plot with which Esther is involved assumes 
dramatic new resonance. Dickens not only supplies a subjective narrative to balance and often 
indeed to undercut the omniscient third person narrator, his choice of a woman who at the time 
of her coming to voice occupies a curiously hybrid position—she is a married woman 
presumably removed from the marital structure by virtue of her disfigurement—emphasizes the 
limits of abstract scientific generalizations, the failure of the rule of averages to reflect the full 
range of human variation and the enormous complexity of private individuation. Dickens’ 
deploys this ostensibly contradictory predicament in order to illuminate important truths about 
the material human body: not only is this body a vulnerable one, subject to the deformations and 
injuries inherent in an unjust social system, but this body is also volitional and desiring, 
responsive to but never wholly determined by external influences. For Dickens, the individual 




 As a love child, Esther is the result of an extra-legal union, the outcome of physical desire 
rather than of any marital reproductive imperative. That Esther may herself be cognizant of and 
perhaps receptive to such connotations is suggested in scenes of private self-observation. As 
Esther steels herself to confront her reflection in the mirror for the first time since her illness, she 
first lets down her hair, making a curtain through which she may observe her changed image 
piecemeal. Esther performs a similar action when important life events or critical decisions force 
her to reflect again upon her altered appearance, such as when she meditates on John Jarndyce’s 
marriage proposal. As Cecil Helman notes, hair is not only associated with sexual desire (and, in 
particular, with women’s desire and desirability) but also with animality: “At these outer fringes 
of human society, where humanity ends and the wilderness begins,” Helman argues, “men and 
animals seem to blur together, their coarse pelts woven into the same ancient, seamless texture” 
(ch. 5). Hair is both a link to and a reminder of humanity’s animal origins, a throwback to the 
pre-rational compulsions of the flesh. Esther’s hair not only metonymically recreates her status 
as the incarnation of extra-social desire, it also validates her ambiguous position. In her 
disfigurement and anomalous state, she is both pure (desiring) body and outcast from the system 
which regulates and authorizes the legal union of bodies. Helman’s analysis of the hybrid status 
of hair, its invocation of the union of the animal and the human, provides rich insight into these 
scenes; Esther’s flowing hair further marks her as not fully amenable to the ideals and the 
constraints of Victorian womanhood.  
As an emblem of the desire and desirability that exceed the boundaries of civilized 
conduct and explode the limitations of human sociability, these scenes operate in moments in 
which an insistent, desiring corporeality conflicts with moral and social imperatives and 
obligations. Specifically, Esther’s letting down her hair before first confronting her image is a 
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profound assertion of embodied existence in the midst of profoundly changed social 
expectations. She affirms the presence and the relevance of her body even as she acknowledges 
that that body no longer has a place within the social structure. Similarly, when she repeats the 
act before accepting John Jarndyce’s marriage proposal, she asserts the deviant body’s continued 
sexual desire (for Alan Woodcourt)—a transgressive longing she attempts to remediate by 
accepting the proposal. Thus, the double marriage plot serves two critical purposes here. First, it 
dismantles delimiting paradigms of marriagability which circumscribe desirability within a 
narrow limit of female embodiment. Second, it privileges even as validates the desires of 
“deviant” flesh. Significantly, the affirmation of Esther’s continued sexual desire in the face of a 
radically altered embodiment frustrates the natural and biological scientists who would read the 
subject’s internal reality through signs inscribed on the patient’s flesh, as well as Dickens’ own 
beloved social reformers, whose moral codes paradoxically predicate the same homogenized and 
dematerialized view of the human subject as that required by industrialization. In contrast to 
evolutionary theorists, social engineers, and interventionist scientists alike, Dickens proposes a 
dynamic, fluid, and multivalent relationship between embodiment and will, a complex inter-
penetrability of body and spirit, in which the one is incessantly constructing, dismantling, and 
restructuring the other. Esther’s continued sexual desire gives the lie to rational science’s 
presumption to know and to predict the subject’s nature and her capacities while also asserting in 
defiance of moral reformers an ineradicable yearning inherent in embodied subjects, the 
unpredictable longings of the flesh that cannot be contained or denied by the most advanced 
social systems. 
 This tension between fleshly pleasure and the cultural strictures which disavow it mirrors 
a pervading unease extant in mid-Victorian England, as Britons struggled to define themselves, 
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their role, and their responsibility within a vastly changed social structure. As the material, 
volitional, and capricious elements of an industrialized empire unprecedented in human history, 
Victorian Britons found themselves incorporated into the body of a social giant whose nature, 
purpose, and destiny were largely unknown and ungovernable. It is no coincidence, then, that 
Britons who were themselves so many constituent cells in a political and military body of 
monstrous proportions should find in the figure of the giant a fetishized and fascinating figure of 
their collective plight
21
, nor is it an accident that Bleak House, written at such an historical 
moment and manifesting both in its prodigious form and immoderate characters an equally 
intemperate disproportion, should mirror this obsession with the pleasures and privileges of 
excess.  As a character whose illness—during which she felt she had “grown too large”—
activates such an uneasy positioning, Esther presents a powerful fictionalization of the vexed 
figure of the monster of disproportion.  
 As Huff asserts, England’s giants paint a portrait of unbridled indulgence that is both 
alluring and threatening (38-46). The sumptuous materiality of an ungovernable flesh 
corporealizes a tension at the heart of Victorian society between the pleasures of the physical 
(signified for Huff in the delight in material consumption) body and the moral, financial, and 
physiological perils of eclipsing proper boundaries. Esther’s very existence embodies desire that 
transgresses social and moral limits, even as her disfigurement places her beyond the strictures of 
“normal” Victorian womanhood, the intrusive vulnerability of her inassimilable flesh exceeding 
the limits of proper bodily form and functioning. Likewise, the Victorian giant embodies a 
similar transgression, manifesting a hedonistic pleasure in shattering polite boundaries of 
                                                          
21
 As has been noted, the privatization of the body in the Victorian era, its accessibility only to those in positions of 
professional power (physicians and biological scientists, foremost, but also those possessing legal, juridical, and 
political power—the collectors of forensic evidence or the enforcers of public codes) was attended by a 
proportionate fetishization of deviant bodies. The somatization of cultural desires, fears, anxieties, and questions is 
a hallmark of Victorian England. 
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moderation and proportion. For giants of obesity, such as Charles Lambert, prodigious size, no 
matter the physiological cause, embodied the anxious desires of Victorians coming to grips with 
an abundance that had been unimaginable before modernization, British colonization, and global 
trade. Glutted not only on an superfluity of food, commodities, and leisure time but also on the 
heady surplus of economic, political, and military power, Britons struggled to strike a balance 
between enjoyment and excess, dreaming of the pleasure of limitless consumption while 
dreading the specter of Daniel Lambert, the terror of a desire that, once unleashed, knows no 
restraint except in its own hedonistic self-destruction. 
 
Contagious Narratives/Deforming Discourses 
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault asserts that the presence of an anomalous body 
activates a host of discursive practices bent upon the subjugation and disciplining of such bodies 
through their cooptation into the field of writing. Likewise, Athena Vrettos contends that illness 
is a fundamental catalyst to storytelling, instigating a narratological imperative that 
simultaneously domesticates disease and disorder and renders them contagious. Operating within 
the Victorian construct of “sympathy” auditors of such narratives are made vulnerable to the very 
sicknesses described to them by virtue of their emotional attachment. Such natural sympathy, 
therefore, invests those who write and speak about illness with a potent ability to alter not only 
the patient’s but also the social body.  
Viewed from this perspective, Bleak House may be read as an attempt to gain productive 
control over a monstrous narrative. As Tougaw has noted, a primary impetus of British fiction 
has been the diagnosis and cure of “diseased” texts. Comparing the medical case history with the 
modern British novel, he asserts that the nearly contemporaneous rise of the seemingly 
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antithetical genres reveals a complementary objective at stake in both: to model and advance a 
view of subjects (both fictional and real) that is at once informative—through Enlightenment-
based principles of observation and diagnosis—and humane, invoking Victorian paradigms of 
sympathy and fellow-feeling.  
Bleak House’s convoluted plot structure, which has received so much critical censure 
since the novel’s serialization, represents the sort of prodigious diegesis Tougaw describes. As 
has been noted, perhaps the most significant motive underlying the novel is the effort to discern 
and articulate the hidden connections between characters and events. For Dickens, the apparent 
fragmentation at play in the novel is a debilitating fiction which obscures the malignancies 
endangering the entire social body. Bleak House’s rhetorical question, “What connexion can 
there be between the place in Lincolnshire, the house in town, the Mercury in powder, and the 
whereabouts of Jo” (235), is of paramount importance to the text’s underlying motivations. As J. 
Hillis Miller has shown, Dickens’ text is primarily invested in demonstrating that the distance is 
negligible indeed.  
 Within Dickens’ reformist fiction, England (and particularly London) is both 
contaminated and contaminating, subject to a process of examination, diagnosis, and 
(narratological) cure. Esther’s narrative plays a vital role in mirroring such a project of national 
self-discovery and healing. The process of Esther’s coming into her body in the wake of her 
illness operates as a function of narrative-making. In effect, Esther writes herself into 
embodiment, revising the terms of Foucault’s disciplined body by herself defining the terms 
through which her body is constructed. By controlling the reader’s access to her body, Esther 
sets the limits and the terms of her self-disclosure, even as she uses the investigatory power of 
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her liminal social position and aberrant embodiment to diagnose the true nature of the social 
body and the individuals who both inhabit and construct it.  
For Mary Douglas, liminality enjoys a particular relationship on the boundaries between 
the articulate and the inarticulate, for, according to Douglas, liminal figures operate outside 
civilized space, in an extra-social realm that is beyond order and outside law. This is the fertile 
and dangerous space beyond language: “The man who comes back from the inaccessible regions 
brings with him a power not available to those who have stayed in control of themselves and of 
society” (118). For Douglas, the power with which such liminal spaces are invested is foremost a 
linguistic one. The transgressor brings from outlaw spaces a capacity to articulate the 
formlessness she encountered there, to create of the disorder new discursive, conceptual, and 
social paradigms which simultaneously illuminate and explode the old orders.   
Esther’s narrative effectively replicates the novel’s larger structure and informing motive. 
Bleak House deploys its own monstrosity—the disintegrating, contaminating, and disfiguring 
influences of the giant city—to write its own counternarrative. The effort to wrest hidden 
connections from the murk of the obfuscating fog, to make visible the natural body amid the 
obscurity of an all-encompassing mud, is simultaneously an effort of self-creation through 
narrative. In a lovely depiction of the view from Esther’s room at Bleak House, Esther describes 
the countryside as it comes into view from her bedroom window in the morning light:  
As the prospect gradually revealed itself and disclosed the scene 
over which the wind had wandered in the dark, like my memory 
over my life (during Esther’s illness), I had pleasure in discovering 
the unknown objects that had been around me in my sleep. At first, 
they were very faint in the mist….And that pale interval over, the 
picture began to enlarge and fill up so fast that at every peep I 




This process of bringing to light that which is hidden but omnipresent is key.  The gradual 
revelation of the landscape surrounding Esther, with its discrete but interconnected constituent 
parts, echoes the novel’s primary agenda in first undoing the twin processes of homogenization 
and departicularization attending industrial modernity and then identifying the necessarily 
interdependent relationships between disparate elements. This process affirms singularity and the 
integrity of individual forms even as it contextualizes them, placing them in a dialectical 
relationship which acknowledges the amorphous and environmentally responsive nature of social 
bodies and the overarching system they constitute. 
 In Bleak House, the imperative to define, differentiate, and acknowledge the integrity of 
discrete, material bodies is foremost an attempt to combat the novel’s most pernicious and potent 
social institution: Chancery Court.  Inspired by so-called “monstrous” cases receiving rampant 
attention in the years preceding the novel’s serialization, Chancery mirrors the prodigious and 
pernicious growth to which London as a whole is subject. Like London’s labyrinthine streets, 
being caught up in Chancery is to be embroiled in a discombobulating, deforming hell, one 
which takes the individual away from himself, transforming both his private self and personal 
relationships into perversions of their true nature.  
 The rift between John Jarndyce and Richard Carstone—as well as the latter’s tragic 
end—transforms the destructive forces of such gargantuan social institutions into a cautionary 
tale. Nameless spectators scrutinize Richard as he paces the courtyard of Chancery, on the alert 
for the inevitable physical alterations that signal the internal deformations wrought by the court, 
noting “the like bent head, the bitten nail, the lowering eye, the lingering step, the purposeless 
and dreamy air, the good consuming and consumed, the life turned sour…Chancery, which 
knows no wisdom but in precedent is very rich in such precedents” (582). Significantly, in 
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warning Esther not to condemn Richard for his degeneration, John Jarndyce invokes the 
language of contagion: “I would rather restore poor Rick to his proper nature than be endowed 
with all the money that dead suitors, broken heart and soul…have left unclaimed….(But) it is in 
the subtle poison of such abuses to breed such diseases. His blood is infected and objects lose 
their natural aspects in his sight” (517). In this instance, the homogenizing processes of Chancery 
engender and perpetuate the social ills they would presume to cure. Richard is just one in a 
succession of nameless “precedents,” diseased, deformed, and destroyed by the senseless 
momentum of an impersonal force.  
 Importantly, however, this force functions primarily through language, symbolized by the 
seemingly endless boxes of documents that simultaneously contain and perpetuate the 
inscrutable suit. Referring specifically to medical texts, Foucault describes such processes as “the 
formation of a whole series of codes of disciplinary individuality that made it possible to 
transcribe, by means of homogenization, the individual features established by the examination” 
(Punish 189). Similarly, Bashford argues that the production of documents of information 
enabled the creation of populations, the consolidation of groups into a discrete, measurable, and 
describable aggregate amenable to study, correction, and control:  
This ‘writing’ of the epidemic—its conversion and abstraction into 
information, statistics, a ‘natural history,’ maps, graphs, and 
figures, was one rationality of government which rendered the 
epidemic visible and apparently controllable. And it was but one 
technique for the constitution and management of population.    
(ch. 2) 
 
The relevance of Foucault’s and Bashford’s analyses of medical writing to Chancery Court 
derives from Foucault’s understanding of the interrelated mechanisms and purposes informing 
the rise of professional disciplines from the mid-nineteenth century. For Foucault, the disciplines 
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constitute a field of knowledge, constructed by and through discourse, in the service of 
power/knowledge. Thus, like the victims of the epidemic whose bodies are linguistically 
dematerialized and remade through the abstract markings of specialized, professional symbolic 
systems, Richard and the other Jarndyce suitors are similarly departicularized and abstracted, 
their embodied individuality transformed into the homogenizing, intangible language of 
Chancery Law.  
The laughter with which the ancillary players greet the settling of the Chancery suit is 
both absurd and disavowing, the ultimate barrenness of the suit disclosed in the revelation that all 
of the contested funds have been consumed in the process of litigation. Such a revelation 
exemplifies that novel’s assertion that Chancery exists only for itself. To sustain and legitimize 
its own incessant growth, it generates an unlimited and self-authorizing discourse, making and 
remaking itself in an endlessly circular process of argument and counterargument, suit and 
countersuit. The prodigious growth of the Chancery monster operates through a process of 
corporeal destruction. Like the fog and mud which erase individual identities and obscure the 
boundaries of discrete selves, embodied persons are consumed by a field of writing. Thus, Ms. 
Flite, with her omnipresent documents, may be seen withering away before Esther’s very eyes in 
her poverty, her anxiety, and her faithful attendance at court. Thus, Gridley can undergo a fatal 
physical collapse “within an hour,” bodying forth the havoc being wrought upon him by 
Chancery from within through the ultimate destruction of that body. Thus, Tom Jarndyce can 
make a performance of his self-annihilation, putting a bullet in his brain before a crowd of 
spectators at court. Thus, Richard Carstone, vomiting blood, gives up the ghost amid the 
encircling arms of loved ones, while Krook breathes fire and disintegrates into an inhuman goo.  
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The horror of Chancery rests in its capacity to transform the material bodies of subjects 
into the abstract discourse of a merciless, unstoppable, and inhuman power. However, Dickens’ 
unique dual narrative structure advances a view of language that is as redemptive as it is 
destructive. Within this framework, the simultaneously explanatory and recuperative powers of 
illness play a unique role. As Vrettos argues in her Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in 
Victorian Culture, sickness is inevitably attended by an interpretive paradigm that is both 
illuminating and potentially destructive. To speak of illness is always already a potentially 
transgressive act, for such articulations carry with them a strong capacity to alter the social and 
natural worlds in which they are spoken. Echoing Mary Douglas’ reading of liminality, Vrettos’ 
understanding of traditions of compulsory silence attending modern professional medical care 
derives from the belief that “to talk of diseases is…potentially and dangerously 
transformative….To speak of illness is to replicate, linguistically, the process of its transmission 
from one subject to another” (2).  
Contagion illuminates the paradoxical relationships of bodies in social space, for illness 
particularizes the subject in the individual, corporeal signs of his or her sickness while 
simultaneously emphasizing the body’s porosity: “Medical, social, and literary representations of 
illness reflect Victorian beliefs related to the self, the body, and its relationship to place, culture, 
and community….(Illness) highlighted the necessary publicity of the body” (Ibid., 3, 5; emphasis 
added). While Vrettos correctly uses this process to emphasize the deconstruction of embodied 
boundaries in contagion, the capacity of infectious disease to rescue embodied subjects from the 
fog of an interchangeable incorporeality operates as a form of social mapping, marking both the 
connections and the boundaries between bodies in the flesh of its subjects. Thus, in articulating 
contagion, the speaker simultaneously perpetuates it, launching a discourse of bodily and social 
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transformation that spreads from person to person like the virus of which they speak, infecting 
individual subjects with a transmogrified vision of the public body that fundamentally and 
irrevocably alters that body. 
It is no coincidence that Dickens chooses Esther to provide the second voice in Bleak 
House’s unique dual narrative. This multiple narrative illustrates Dickens’ attempt to 
conceptualize and define London, a city which transcends and frustrates any one perspective of 
it. In Bleak House, however, the impersonal and singular perspective is not only incomplete and 
erroneous, it is also a menace. Esther’s personal, highly subjective narrative, therefore, must be 
understood as an oppositional strategy deployed by Dickens to invoke a return to materiality and 
the body. If, in this formulation, Chancery is to be viewed as an infectious discourse, destroying 
health and home, then Esther’s narrative is invested with the potential to both restore and 
inoculate.  
The description is significant, for it is the insistent corporeality of her marked and 
compromised body that activates and legitimates her narrative. Like the smallpox victim and her 
vaccinated counterpart, Esther is authorized to enter social and narratological spaces which the 
“unmarked” cannot. Moreover, galvanized by a status that is always already superfluous, her 
consciousness from her earliest childhood of “filling a space in (her) godmother’s house that 
ought to have been empty” (27), Esther is the liminal figure to whom social strictures do not and 
cannot apply. Unimpeded by “polite” discourse, unencumbered by the structure to which she is 
excessive, Esther’s is a particularized discourse of the material body that restores individuality to 
bodies departicularized by the abstractions of Chancery. From the extra-social spaces of her own 
outlawed embodiment Esther draws a spectacularly physical language to counteract and destroy 
the monstrous abstractions of Chancery. 
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It is no coincidence, then, that Esther and Tulkinghorn are both associated with keys, for 
they are both invested with the authority and the capacity to enter spaces which are prohibited to 
ordinary persons. Significantly, Tulkinghorn’s keys grant access to drawers in which repose 
multitudes of Chancery documents. Esther’s keys, however, open doors, granting access to 
rooms in which physical bodies live, move, and have their being. It may be that Bleak House is, 
fundamentally, a novel about sound housekeeping. In a book obsessed with the physical structure 
of houses, their capacity to metonymically reflect and reveal the internal lives of those who live 
in and among them, the second Bleak House enjoys particular symbolic significance. It retains 
the physical aberrations manifest in the original Bleak House, replete with interlocking rooms 
and hallways leading nowhere, glorying in an irregularity that materializes both excess and 
interconnection. But the anomalousness of the second Bleak House is tempered; it is smaller than 
its namesake, exhibiting a proportion and moderation unknown to all things connected with and 
deformed by Chancery.  
For Dickens, the second Bleak House, with Esther as its mistress, offers a potent 
corrective to the deformations wrought by the pernicious influences of the prodigious city and 
the destructive abstractions of professional discourse. Galvanized by a view of England as 
entropic, merciless, depersonalized, and recklessly expansive, Dickens provides a hybridized 
domestic space that is responsive to changing social conditions without falling victim to them. Its 
carnivalesque architecture is restrained and rendered manageable by its reduced size, suggesting 
the delight and transformative potential inherent in a tempered transgression, the explosion of 
defunct systems mitigated by the imposition of relevant new boundaries. That the second Bleak 
House is a modest home situated within sight of the monstrous city affirms the vital 
interconnectedness of the vast social body and its discrete but nevertheless constituent elements. 
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 Critics have been skeptical of the seemingly pastoral ending, rejecting Dickens’ too easy 
substitution of an urban hell with the fragile Eden of a Victorian household headed by a wounded 
but unbroken angel of the house. When examined within the context of excess, transgression, 
infection, and cure, however, the novel’s resolution may be seen to do important work in the 
text’s informing impulse and narrative trajectory. If, as George Meredith suggests, London is a 
Daniel Lambertian city--ponderous, confounding, unprecedented, and powerful yet threatened by 
virtue of its own excess—it also retains the capacity of being an Esther Summerson, harnessing 
excess to create new modes of being, substituting a vital and desirous corporeality for the fatal 
abstractions of impersonal systems, and taming the profligate urbanization of the growing 
industrial empire through the moderating influences of a revisionist domestic space. Headed by a 
fully embodied, marked, desiring, and self-actualizing woman—the product of the infectious city 
and of the blending of social orders—the eclecticism of the home designed by and for her 
provides a model for the social body to which it is linked and from which it is derived. In a novel 
in which material dwellings metonymically reflect their inhabitants, the home’s paradoxically 
harmonious conjoining of irreconcilable elements mirrors the hybrid, incompatible, and 
rebellious body of its mistress, a body whose scarification emblematizes transgression as clearly 
as did Daniel Lambert’s prodigious size.  
Simultaneously, however, like the household accoutrements that continued to fascinate 
audiences long after Lambert’s death, the second Bleak House imposes order on chaos, 
materializing a functional, purposive, and thoughtful domesticity on a radically altered 
landscape. Thus arises a mode of being that recognizes, supports, and celebrates newfound truths 
of corporeal existence and the revitalized strategy of homemaking that they validate and 
authorize. In a period of unimaginable and rapidly accelerating industrialization and imperial 
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expansion, Dickens’ Bleak House presents an urgent call in the face of reckless growth: a society 
careless of the truths of its material existence and the consequences of its unchecked excess risks 
the fate of the man to whom it is compared.  
For Dickens, the only means to escape the ultimate fate of Daniel Lambert is a 
fundamental remaking of the social body, the acknowledgement of both the integrity and the 
inter-relationship of its subjects, the carving out of a useful space within the system for each of 
its discrete elements. The only way to keep the giant from crumbling beneath its own prodigious 
weight is to incorporate those irreconcilable elements—through education, through health care, 
and through progressive public policies that validate, honor, and uplift the physical as well as 
moral selves at home. Only in expanding and revising the social body through the affirmation, 
instrumentalization, and imposition of new (but thoughtfully bounded) orders on the material, 
individuated, multiform, and metamorphic bodies of its subjects can Imperial England—and its 






Unbounded Bodies/Unbridled Blood: 
Beasts Within and Beasts Without in Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 




There are mysteries which men can only guess at, which age by age they may solve only in part. 
Bram Stoker 
 
Anatomy is destiny. 
Sigmund Freud 
 
From Monstrous Cities to Monstrous Selves: Confronting the Unknown Other  
Chapter one of this study examined the extraordinary embodiments of so-called 
“monsters of proportion” as they functioned in the high Victorian era to represent prevailing 
concerns over the growth and, ultimately, the exhaustion and atrophy of the British Empire. The 
chapter focused on Dickens’ Bleak House, exploring the iconography of London as an urban 
landscape eluding, like the bodies of giants and the obese, physical boundaries. Furthermore, the 
chapter examined a parallel transgressiveness in the bodies of Dickens’ lead characters, 
particularly in Esther’s falling ill with smallpox, her infection symbolically requiring her body to 
exceed its social, class, and gendered boundaries. Esther’s illness, it was argued, enacts her 
body’s absorption of the malevolent influences of the city’s underprivileged centers, as she is 
exposed to and forever changed by threats and contaminants from which her socioeconomic 
status should have shielded her. In the process, by bearing the markers of her illness on her 
changed flesh, she paradoxically transcends and reaffirms demarcations of femininity insofar as 
her scars render impossible the attainment of a threshold of physical beauty required of women 
(particularly “marriageable” women), even as they reinforce paradigms of the female as 
wholesale physicality, a physicality which renders both the female subject and the social body of 
which she is a part exceedingly vulnerable to contamination.  
 This chapter will continue to examine the links between extraordinary bodies and cultural 
production. Here, particular attention will be paid to the role of the professionalization of the 
sciences in the ideological and discursive construction of extraordinary bodies. As in chapter 
one, this chapter will also explore the nexus between the novel, the extraordinarily embodied 
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subject, and the historical context into which they come.  As such, this chapter will focus on 
evolving social and scientific frameworks regarding conjoined twins and the pejoratively named 
“Hottentot” Venuses, focusing in particular on fin-de-siècle Gothic literature’s reaction and 
contribution to these paradigms. This chapter argues that nineteenth century fascination with 
“Siamese” twins parallels broader cultural concerns with the nature of identity and the integrity 
of human consciousness. This concern is exemplified most significantly in Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, whose eponymous character(s) would 
ultimately come to signify the ineradicable Other within. Thus, this chapter’s reading of 
Stevenson’s novella will be situated alongside representations of famous conjoined twins, 
including Millie-Christine McKoy and Daisy and Violet Hilton, who, in the prevailing 
interpretations of their extraordinary embodiments, reflect in living reality the questions over the 
nature of identity and the integrity of the subject-self which Stevenson’s novella fictionalizes. 
Likewise, the second half of this chapter will center upon Bram Stoker’s iconic gothic 
novel, Dracula, which, as this analysis will show, demonstrates a concomitant concern with the 
porosity of boundaries, the fear of the absorption of the Other from without. Questions of gender 
roles and, in particular, of the quantification and containment of sexuality which characterize 
Dracula find their true-life counterpart in nineteenth century paradigms of racial Otherness, for 
which black female bodies, such as that of Sarah Baartman, the so-called “Hottentot Venus,” 
were appropriated to signify widespread fears at the turn of the century of a cultural atavism, a 
terror of social and racial degeneration that was projected onto the purportedly “infectious” and 





The Other Within: Conjoined Twins, Double Consciousness, and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde  
 In early May 1871, North Carolina-born conjoined twins, Millie-Christine McKoy, began 
their triumphant European tour, which would last nearly eight years and would encompass 
hundreds of thousands of spectators, including notable dignitaries, ranging from heads of state to 
the era’s most eminent scientists and physicians. However, while it was the twins who were 
ostensibly on display, a telling account from The Liverpool Ledger describes the twins’ 
appearance from the perspective of the spectator: 
We can testify that no person of ordinary intelligence can be in her company for half an 
hour without yielding to the charm of her manner and the fascination of her double 
smiles. She has you on both sides. If you remove your head from one position you are 
immediately the victim of another pair of eyes, which fix you and, in fact, transfix you. 
We candidly admit that we were fascinated, and that we immediately lost sight of the 
phenomenon and became overpowered by the influence of this double brain. (qtd. in 
Frost 78)  
 
The author’s account of his encounter with what he terms the “remarkable freak of nature” 
(Ibid.) is instructive on multiple levels. The vacillation between the first person plural and the 
second person suggests the destabilizing of the authorial identity, with the lines separating writer 
from reader in constant flux, the authorial identity consistently merging with and separating itself 
from that of the audience. Significantly, even as the author presents a subjectivity distinct from 
that of the audience, the invocation of the first person plural suggests a composite identity, the 
author denying himself a singular subjectivity in the unsettling but alluring presence of those 
“double smiles.” 
 The rhetorical fluidity between singular and pluralistic identity here reflects a profound 
ideological undercurrent at play in the second half of the nineteenth century: the interrogation of 
the nature of identity and a growing belief in a multiplicity at the heart of human consciousness. 
For the professionalized sciences and the lay public at large, the nature of individual identity was 
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becoming the locus of increasing interest, investigation, and concern. With Freud’s growing 
body of work in the analysis of the human consciousness, not to mention the ever-expanding 
corpus of research studies conducted by scientific bodies as diverse as The Journal of Mental 
Science and The Society for Psychical Research, the nineteenth century’s attempts to quantify 
and qualify human consciousness paradoxically served to mystify human identity. The increasing 
awareness of and concern with subconscious processes gave rise to a defamiliarized psychic self 
in which the individual was increasingly estranged from his/her conscious mind.
22
 
 Not surprisingly, this burgeoning fascination with human consciousness, the troubling 
and tantalizing awareness of its amorphous and multitudinous nature, was precipitated by 
investigations into mind-altering practices, most notably hypnotism. Drawing upon Anton 
Mesmer’s explorations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century of suggestive states 
borne of what Mesmer termed “animal magnetism,” hypnotism as practiced in the fin de siècle 
represented an attempt by proto-psychologists to professionalize and medicalize the examination 
and exploitation of subconscious processes. The late nineteenth century saw the creation of an 
exhaustive body of work on hypnotic suggestion and its implications. Continental Europe gave 
rise to the most important figures of this movement, with the French schools of Nancy and 
Saltpêtrière leading the charge, though espousing competing viewpoints on the nature of 
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 As will be explored in greater detail below, a fascinating example of this are the increasing reports of so-called 
“double consciousness” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “Double consciousness” refers to the 
emergence of an alternate personality or a “second self” most often occurring following a head injury, particularly 
when accompanied by loss of consciousness, or a sudden fright. Victims might live out the lives of these alternate 
personalities for days, weeks, or months at a time before suddenly awakening to their primary personalities, often 
with little or no memory of the event. The phenomena of double consciousness provoked such widespread 
interest at the turn of the century that they would frequently appear as lead items in The London Times. Indeed, 
reports of these events became so widespread that they attracted the attention of leading politicians, physicians, 
and attorneys as they sought to define the nature of the self and the extent of individual accountability amid 
growing questions regarding the integrity of consciousness and the volition of will. Indeed, so vexed and numerous 
were these concerns that, as Eigen notes in his Unconscious Crimes: Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in 
Victorian Britain, both the Victorian legal system and the emerging science of psychiatry found themselves playing 
catch up to an increasing number of defendants claiming double consciousness as the source of their criminal acts. 
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suggestibility. With its preeminent leader, Jean Martin Charcot, adherents of the Saltpêtrière 
school denied susceptibility to hypnotism for most “normal” persons, maintaining that 
suggestibility is a symptom of hysteria. Saltpêtrière’s twinning of suggestibility and hysteria was 
refuted by Ambroise-August Liébault and the Nancy school, which held that not only were all 
human beings susceptible to hypnotism to some degree, but that hypnotic suggestion might 
provide an invaluable therapeutic aid for the treatment of an array of conditions, provided it were 
conducted at the hands of a skilled physician.
23
  
 The implications of the debate regarding the extent to which “normal” individuals may 
find themselves vulnerable to hypnotic suggestion were immeasurable, as physicians, 
psychologists, social scientists, and the public at large began to question the degree to which any 
one person could be expected to exercise control over his/her own mind. Such vexed questions 
led inevitably to the interrogation of the autonomous, self-possessed, and eminently self-aware 
Enlightenment subject. Founded upon the Cartesian split, the premise of a mind/body bifurcation 
in which the instrumentalized but ultimately “disembodied body” carried out the dictates of the 
rational mind, the Enlightenment subject, prefigured as a white, Euro-American male, literalized 
the Cartesian cogito, in which conscious (rational) thought became a synecdoche for personhood, 
simultaneously the reason for and manifestation of discrete identity. Margrit Shildrick notes that, 
according to this paradigm, 
To be a self is above all to be distinguished from the other, to be ordered and 
discrete, secure within the well-defined boundaries of the body rather than 
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 Questions of the nature and extent of human “suggestibility”, of course, were freighted with anxiety for many 
Victorian Britons, for whom the possibility of the relinquishing of self-control into the hands of another was a 
dangerous (if not somewhat seductive) possibility. As will be shown, it was cultural Others, particularly 
homosexuals, aesthetes, and decadents, who were thought to possess the most potent powers of suggestion. 
Within this framework, unsuspecting and upright Britons could easily fall under the influence of such charismatic 
leaders, particularly since, as the popularization of Freud’s theory of the tripartite nature of consciousness had 
made clear, even the most reputable of Britons could find themselves susceptible to an array of drives and urges of 
which s/he might never become consciously aware.   
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actually being the body. Although from time to time we may experience ourselves 
out of the body, what rarely happens—and then it is defined as a special type of 
madness—is that we should either inhabit the body of another, or find our own 
bodies shared—invaded, we would say—by another. (50) 
 
 The quest to demarcate the boundaries of suggestibility for the normal individual, as 
occurred in the conflict between the Nancy and Saltpêtèrie schools, reflected growing anxiety for 
the increasingly destabilized trope of the Enlightenment subject. The workings of the individual 
body and the polymorphous mind seemed to come under the growing power of unknown forces, 
whether these be the symptoms of a covert psychic disease
24
 or, perhaps more alarmingly, 
whether these were simply the natural processes of the “normal” human mind, whose 
“unconscious cerebrations,” to borrow Stoker’s famous phrase, were only just coming to light in 
the burgeoning field of psychological science. Stacey Abbott notes the shift in nineteenth century 
Gothic literature from a fear of terror from without to a fear of the terror within: 
While eighteenth century Gothic focused on the past’s intrusion on the present in 
the form of an external threat or monster, nineteenth century Gothic was 
increasingly defined by internal threats and anxieties. By the late nineteenth 
century, any external Gothic forms still present in the genre came to embody a 
psychological disturbance and suggested an increasing uncertainty around 
individual subjectivity. (19)   
 
 The passage quoted at the start of this chapter describing Millie-Christine’s visit to 
England, then, is set amid a rising concern with and terror of human subjectivity and, more 
precisely, its vulnerability both to its own multiplicity and to the compulsions of outside 
influence, which Thurschwell describes as “an anxious sense that someone or something might 
get inside one’s mind and control one’s actions” (37).  It is within this context that the author’s 
use of the language of hypnotic suggestion in regard to Millie-Christine takes much of its 
resonance. As Frost notes, the author of this passage positions himself (presumably) as object, 
not subject, of the double gaze, the unwitting (and, significantly, feminized) victim of an identity 
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 I use the contemporary term to denote what would now be considered mental illness or psychological disorders. 
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that defies Enlightenment parameters. That the author should couch his encounter with Millie-
Christine in the language of hypnotism, using terms like “transfixed,” “fascinated,” and 
“overpowered” to describe his experience, demonstrates the degree to which embodiments like 
Millie-Christine’s corporealized late nineteenth century concerns (some would say obsessions) 
with the nature of identity and, in particular, with the question of precisely how many selves 
actually make up the so-called singular Enlightenment subject. 
 As has been noted, the question of the integrity of the subject-self played an increasingly 
prominent role in the “Gothic” fiction of the end of the century as well, but the nexus between 
the rise of the professional sciences, particularly psychology, the exhibition of conjoined twins, 
and the literature of the era has been relatively unexplored. An interrogation of the Gothic fiction 
of the fin de siècle, however, presents invaluable insights into the ways in which the deviant 
bodies of “double monsters” like Millie-Christine served to manifest, authorize, and discharge 
anxieties regarding the nature of the discrete self. In her examinations of the biographies of 
Millie-Christine McKoy and the equally famous Daisy and Violet Hilton, Frost asserts that these 
women destabilized notions of subjectivity by presenting for display bodies and selves that 
delegitimize efforts at quantification. As Frost notes, while the Hiltons’ efforts to redefine their 
corporeality were vexed at best and torturous at worst, for their earlier predecessors, the 
McKoys, their extraordinary embodiment enabled an important rupture with identity paradigms 
to which a “normal” corporeality would have consigned them. Born into slavery in pre-
emancipation North Carolina, the McKoy sisters were always already Othered, excluded from 
the Enlightenment ideal by virtue of sex and, most importantly, race. Their extraordinary 
embodiment, paradoxically, instigated for the sisters and their family a level of autonomy 
virtually unheard of in the antebellum American south. Their biography reads like a nineteenth 
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century adventure tale, encompassing stories of kidnappings, rescues, and reunions with the 
beneficent white protectors to whom they would be forever indebted for returning them to the 
welcoming arms of a loving mother.  
While the veracity of these accounts leaves much room for skepticism, what is most 
telling here is the degree to which the McKoys’ story unsettles grand narratives regarding the 
black, female body in pre-Civil War America. In a social structure predicated upon the 
systematic dismantling of the black family and the perpetuation of oppression through financial 
and political disenfranchisement, the monstrous body of Millie-Christine catalyzed a dramatic re-
envisioning of the family narrative under slavery. In the McKoys’ narrative, it is the return to, 
not the rupture of, the family that prevails; further, the McKoys’ status as a “freak of nature” 
authorizes the twins’ display as a grand spectacle which undermines and dissolves established 
social frameworks and power structures. Their birth, for example, is narrated in quasi-messianic 
terms, a sort of second nativity scene, that rendered the sisters highly marketable, restoring value 
to the devalued black female body in pre-Civil War America. The irreplaceable body of the 
sisters, appearing as it did in a context contingent upon the standardization of the body (both 
within the slavery system and within the capitalist structure), provided for the twins an 
extraordinary measure of autonomy and self-determination.  
This emphasis on autonomy and self-determination in the McKoys’ narratives reiterates 
long-established principles, as was discussed in the previous chapter, regarding the 
simultaneously joyous and menacing uncontrollability of extraordinary bodies. Significantly, 
Stevenson’s novella also places such questions of liberty at the heart of the story. In Jekyll’s 
narrative of his first experiments with the strange elixir, he writes, “[I]t but shook the doors of 
the prisonhouse of my disposition; and like the captives of Philippi, that which stood within ran 
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forth” (55-56). In this framework, then, respectable identity functions as a punitive force, 
denying, deforming, and delimiting the self (or selves) that reside within. It is important to note, 
however, that, unlike the extraordinary bodies of nineteenth century “monsters,” for Jekyll, such 
liberty must be exercised only covertly, under the protection of the body of a foreign Other who 
would bear the scourge of Jekyll’s transgressions while preserving his social mask: 
Men have before hired bravos to transact their crimes, while their own person and 
reputation sat under shelter. I was the first ever that did so for his pleasures. I was 
the first that could plod in the public eye with a load of genial respectability, and 
in a moment, like a schoolboy, strip off these lendings and spring headlong into a 
sea of liberty. But for me, in my impenetrable mantle, the safety was complete. 
Think of it—I did not even exist! (Ibid.)  
 
Jekyll’s delight in his new-found capacity to disappear at will, to temporarily “not exist,” 
parallels both the McKoys’ and the Hiltons’ destabilization of identity in the fluid shifting in 
their autobiographies between the first person singular and plural: at will, the speaking voice of 
one sister gives way to that of her twin, while in the next moment, both voices fall silent and a 
new, composite self, combining the voices of both sisters, comes to the fore. Like Jekyll and his 
alter ego, Hyde, the Hilton and McKoy twins exemplified a plasticity of identity, a plurality of 
selves emerging and retreating at will, that served to institute and authorize new modes of being-
in-the-world and enabling, in their multiplicity, a seemingly unprecedented experience of 
self(ves)-determination and freedom. 
 Thus, Stevenson’s use of the prison metaphor is particularly significant in as much as it 
affirms prevailing orientations toward the extraordinary body in which the body’s flouting of 
“normal” codes of embodiment enables a concomitant rejection of social norms. The 
transgressive body is always already a body out of bounds, the breaching of the walls of the 
fleshly prison house a synecdoche for the rupturing of established codes of conduct. Just as the 
McKoy sisters’ extraordinary embodiment enabled and rationalized the dismantling of the 
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strictures imposed upon black female bodies in their era, so, too, does the exceptional body of 
Hyde authorize a new positionality in which the standards of moral and social respectability to 
which the upright Dr. Jekyll must adhere no longer apply. Moreover, Stevenson’s metaphor of 
imprisonment troubles long-standing paradigms which take the flesh as an index of the subject’s 
internal condition—the barometer of the quality of his/her soul, spirit, and intellect. Like the 
bodies of conjoined twins, which unsettle foundational premises regarding the singularity and 
integrity of the body, Jekyll’s body simultaneously conceals and bodies forth that which is 
internal. If the body is a prison house containing a secreted but omnipresent difference within the 
physical frame, then there is always the possibility for the escape—or the freeing—of this 
ineradicable other. Significantly, Jekyll finds safety in the original lack of corporeal identity 
between himself and Hyde, Hyde’s dwarfish and bestial frame belying his own intrinsic 
corruption while simultaneously distancing him from the graceful and earnest bearing of the 
good doctor. These markers of physical difference, like the singular embodiments of conjoined 
twins, enable and authorize the transgression of the boundaries to which the normate, in Garland-
Thomson’s phrase, must submit, but it is precisely this transgressive aberrance which renders 
extraordinary embodiments so dangerous. The freeing of the outlaw from his prison house 
signifies not only a joyous liberation but also the sweeping away of constraints, the dissolution of 
the moderating influences which the bonds of community, the concern for social status, and the 
fear of the law impose upon the subject to contain and control him. The absence of such 
restraining forces, like the absence of the singular and bounded body, gives rise to the possibility 
for a monstrous excess which threatens not only the integrity of the individual but also the 
community into which he comes and which depends for its survival upon the incorporation and 
cooperation of well-modulated, normative selves.      
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From Liberty to Licentiousness: Unleashing the Forces of Degeneration in a Decadent Age 
Parallels between the representation and autobiographical writing of conjoined twins and 
fin-de-siècle Gothic romances like Stevenson’s are instructive in underscoring prevailing 
questions, concerns, and desires at the turn of the century concerning the nature and quality of 
individual consciousness, as well as of the integrity and the health of the embodied self. The 
increasing popularity of Freudian theories of the unconscious combined with growing fears of 
rampant physical and moral degeneration, rendering the British body increasingly unstable, 
unpredictable, and unknowable. Thus, representations of extraordinary bodies, whether in the 
writings on and by real-life conjoined twins or in the nightmarish depictions of sinister second 
selves like Hyde, reflect the problematization and containment of inherent social anxieties, with 
novels in particular serving as a form of cultural diagnostic, defining and domesticating social 
ills through the familiar discourse of narrative. John Glendenning’s analysis of Max Nordau’s 
work on degeneration is significant here. Glendenning describes Nordau as a  
cultural physician: he systematically disciplines the tangled phenomena of 
degeneration in terms of “symptoms”, “diagnosis”, “etiology”, “prognosis”, and 
“therapeutics.” Most of [Degeneration] consists of case histories examining the 
degeneracy evidenced in the works of various debased authors, artists, composers, 
and in the enthusiasm of their misguided followers. (23) 
  
Nordau’s repudiation of the work of most of the great writers, artists, and thinkers of the late 
nineteenth century provides powerful insight into the function of cultural artifacts to represent 
and discharge the myriad anxieties of a global empire wrestling with the consequences of 
conquest, competition, expansion, and rapid socioeconomic change. The characterization of 
Nordau in medico-scientific terms attests to the extent of the medicalization of Victorian social, 
political, and aesthetic paradigms. Prevailing fears of collective degeneration position the era as 
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a whole as diseased, infectious, and dying, its productions bearing the stigmata of illness to be 
detected, diagnosed, and eradicated by the elite few thus far untainted by the forces of 
degeneration. Within this context, the heady pleasures and intoxicating optimism of the late 
Victorian era, in which British colonial domination and economic superiority seemed 
unquestionable and enduring, lapsed into a cultural malaise, a nausea borne of the recognition of 
the consequences of liberty, the ramifications of supremacy. 
  In a telling image near the conclusion of Jekyll and Hyde, Utterson and Poole catch an 
image of themselves and the room in which Jekyll’s dead body lies multiplied infinitely in the 
full-length mirror: 
[T]he searchers came to the cheval-glass, into whose depths they looked with an 
involuntary horror. But it was so turned as to show them nothing but the rosy 
glow playing on the roof, the fire sparkling in a hundred repetitions along the 
glazed front of the presses, and their own pale and fearful countenances stooping 
to look in. “This glass has seen some strange things, sir,” whispered Poole. “And 
surely none stranger than itself,” echoed the lawyer. (42) 
 
The multiplied selves projected in Jekyll’s mirror literalize what fin-de-siècle Britons were 
growing increasingly aware of: that a definable, predictable, and stable self was an 
Enlightenment fiction, an ideal rather than a reality. It is significant, then, that the body of the 
suicidal Jekyll and the images of both the respected attorney and the humble servant should find 
themselves infinitely reproduced in this space of disequilibrium: not only do the trio exemplify a 
subversive admixture of class and creed—the servant, the gentleman lawyer, and the erstwhile 
healer; the upright citizens and the immoral outlaw—which shatter the demarcations of status 
and propriety but the replication of the images echoes the multitudinous nature of each individual 
self, ultimately rendering the presumably discrete body of each unfamiliar, out of reach, and out 
of bounds. Such a destabilization of identity had previously been thought primarily to plague 
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only women and the lower classes, who, by their nature, were subject to a capriciousness that 
rendered them particularly vulnerable to disassociative states, from hysteria to epilepsy to double 
consciousness. Anne Williams notes that “the male…experiences his psychological boundaries 
as fixed and distinct, while the female’s feel more permeable, indeterminate, and problematic” 
(100). The scene in Jekyll’s lab, however, enables no comforting distance between either the 
middle and upper classes and the vulnerable classes or between genders, between upright men 
like Utterson and those whose identity could never be fixed, whose conscious, rational minds 
could never fully be wrested into the control of the will.
25
  
Stevenson notes that the room is adorned with all of the trappings of upper middle class 
domesticity, and even that the table by which Jekyll’s body lies has been set as if for afternoon 
tea: 
There lay the cabinet before their eyes in the quiet lamplight, a good fire glowing 
and chattering on the hearth, the kettle singing its thin strain, a drawer or two 
open, papers neatly set forth on the business table, and nearer the fire, the things 
laid out for tea; the quietest room, you would have said, and, but for the glazed 
presses full of chemicals, the most commonplace that night in London. (41)   
 
Stevenson’s care in locating this horrifying scene among the accoutrements of middle-class 
British gentility, down to the business correspondence which might be found in any bourgeois 
household, is significant here in dismantling any protective barrier of class, gender, or race from 
the participants of the scene and from the bourgeois reader. The encompassing of the living men 
and the dead man/men, along with the domestic wares of consumer culture, within the endlessly 
multiplied images of the cheval glass extends the threat of such a dangerous dissolution of 
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 Indeed, the porosities of boundaries between selves in this novel inflect not only social and economic 
demarcations but also, as will be seen, the frontiers of gender. Poole describes Jekyll/Hyde as being cloistered in 
his laboratory (not unlike the confinement of “hysterical” women), where he “weeps like a woman or a lost soul” 
(40). Likewise, the eminently respectable and self-controlled Utterson finds himself feminized and out of sorts, 
struggling to master his nerves and scarcely retaining control of his body as he prepares to enter by force Jekyll’s 
laboratory, startling nearly to the point of falling at sudden sounds, suggesting a corporeality exceeding rational 
volition and eluding the command of rational consciousness.  
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boundaries across all social classes. The finite and insular self is revealed in this image, and in 
the text as a whole, to be a fiction, echoing the at once disturbing and intriguing fascination with 
conjoined twins like the McKoys and the Hiltons that is at the same time also a fascination with 
and fear of the reader/spectator’s own multiplicity of selves. Moreover, in the promiscuity of the 
image, the containment within the frame of the glass incompatible persons—the servant and the 
professional, the moral and the immoral—the boundaries of Victorian stratification are breached 
and the classificatory systems by which the world is defined, ordered, and regimented collapse. 
The cheval glass thus functions as a microcosm of the profligate metropolis in which the 
commingling of disparate groups both reflects and intensifies the self’s internal chaos, 
galvanizing the disintegration of the insular self as influences without and influences within 
abrade the always already porous boundaries holding the individual self together, boundaries 
which, whether in the shocks of the clamoring city or in the blows of the multiplicitous psyche 
are continuously in danger of disintegrating completely.  
 Thus, the muddled, murky, and multifarious nature of identity, as exemplified both by the 
fame enjoyed by conjoined twins and by Stevenson’s iconic character, Mr. Hyde, encompasses 
another important element within late nineteenth century Victorian culture: the nature of the self 
in the crowd. Linda Dryden’s description of iconographies of the metropolis is instructive: 
The metropolis is presented here as a place of change and transformation, where 
social deprivation and overcrowded living conditions contributed significantly to 
literary representations.  The city is seen as a schismatic space that contains 
extremes of wealth and poverty, and where the poor are exploited by the rich, who 
are in turn deeply concerned by the anonymous and threatening nature of the 
metropolitan experience. Perceptions of the “beast within” and Gustave Le Bon’s 





Similar to the conjoined twin whose multiplicitous identity brings with it a requisite compulsion 
to cede control, voluntarily or otherwise, to the other within, the experience of the individual self 
in the crowded metropolis is of an ineradicable connection—and vulnerability—to the 
unpredictable other. The beast within, therefore, is manifold, signifying both the menacing 
stranger within the confines of one’s city walls, as well as the enigmatic force within oneself that 
such proximity to the Other threatens to unleash.
26
 A 1914 edition of The London Times cites the 
eminent theorist of human “suggestibility,” Dr. Boris Sidis: “Society by its very nature tends to 
run riot in mobs and epidemics. For the gregarious, the sub-personal, uncritical social self, the 
mob self, and the suggestible, sub-conscious self are identical” (qtd. in The London Times, June 
5, 1914). This equating of the self in the crowd with the subconscious and primal drives of the id 
is echoed in Stevenson’s situating of the bestial primitivism of Hyde alongside the moral 
respectability of Jekyll:  
I sat in the sun on a bench; the animal within me licking the chops of memory; the 
spiritual side a little drowsed, promising subsequent penitence, but not yet moved 
to begin….I began to be aware of a change in the temper of my thoughts, a greater 
boldness, a contempt of danger, a solution of the bonds of obligation. I looked 
down….I was once more Mr. Hyde….I have more than once observed that in my 
second character, my faculties seemed sharpened to a point and my spirits more 
tensely elastic; thus it came about that where Jekyll would have succumbed, Hyde 
rose to the importance of the moment. (62-63) 
 
Hyde’s heightened faculties, his vitality, and his optimized physicality reflect what LeBon had 
described as a defining characteristic of the crowd. For LeBon, the crowd, galvanized as it is by 
unconscious forces, assumes in its relinquishing of rational, conscious processes a capacity for 
physical dominance and domination that is akin to the powers of animals. The individual in the 
crowd, in effect, descends the evolutionary scale and returns to a primitive, bestial state in which 
                                                          
26
 As will be discussed below, the co-occurrence of two selves within one body threatens in particular the integrity 
of the Victorian family, destabilizing social, marital, and sexual norms even as it opens up avenues of sexual 
exploration unavailable to “respectable” Victorians. 
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survival hinges upon instinctive cunning and violent force. Thus, the instinct to both survive and 
to dominate which characterizes the crowd is formidably corporeal, manifesting through the 
flesh and by virtue of the flesh the will to live and to (over)power. The multiplicity of bodies, the 
excessive fleshliness, of crowds lulls the conscious and rational mind even as it awakens the 
physical senses. The physical pleasures of this sensation of loss of rational control and constraint, 
pleasures which lead the profoundly sensual Hyde to “lick the chops of memory” just before 
seizing control of Jekyll’s body, authorize and instigate the throwing off of the bonds of 
Victorian respectability, giving license to a glorification of the flesh through the anonymity of 
that flesh: the crowd enables the individual within it to for a moment become a purely, 
hedonistically physical self with neither a singular identity, nor the moral, social, and physical 
compulsions which attend such an identity. The individual in a crowd is, for LeBon, a cell within 
an organism, driven by unconscious forces and accountable to and cognizant of nothing else 
beside.    
The parallels between LeBon’s descriptions of the “group mind,” that is, the substitution 
of a collective for a singular identity, which he defines as characteristic of the formation of a 
crowd, and of contemporary representations of conjoined twins are clear. Accounts of the lives 
of conjoined twins are replete with references to the spirit of both submission and instinctive 
accord with the “second self” upon which harmony depends. In this formulation, it is not merely 
that conjoined twins negotiate with one another to reach conscious decisions on matters of day-
to-day living but that the inherent sympathies of their combined bodies enable them frequently to 
behave without conscious thought or explicit consent as if they in fact were possessed of one 
mind and one body only. Such a singular mind in a “double” body suggests that conjoined twins 
are exceptionally formidable, enjoying the heightened faculties and magnified vitality of two-in-
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one which also characterizes Hyde. Moreover, the alacrity and impunity with which Hyde 
assumes control of Jekyll echoes both LeBon’s formulation of the individual in the crowd as well 
as popular descriptions of the unanimity between conjoined twins: if the individual self is, in 
reality, a multitude of selves (i.e. an individual within an internal “crowd”), then it is the 
composite self which is, ultimately, the most powerful, ascending the throne of reason and of 
volition at will and supplanting the weaker forces of rational consciousness with the superior, if 
more primitive, strength of brute physicality. The individual in the crowd, whether external or 
“internal,” therefore, overturns Enlightenment hierarchies privileging mind over matter for it is 
here that excessive corporeality of “double-monsters,” crowds, and the atavistic body of Hyde 
himself not only shapes but determines and dominates the conscious mind. The Enlightenment’s 
life of the mind is vanquished by the life of the body(ies).     
In addition to representing prevailing anxieties concerning the dissolution or degeneration 
of the rational self in the presence of the primitive other, this scene provides important clues to 
another central concern in the Victorian era: the manifestation of the presence, and the irruption, 
of the submerged self through corporeal signs, as well as the “diagnosing” of the second self 
through a semiotic reading of its physical body. Hyde is described again and again in terms of 
the grotesque; he is figured as a shrunken, atavistic homunculus whose physical body is in and of 
itself extremely disturbing. Significantly, however, it is the observer’s inability to precisely 
define the body of Hyde that is most disquieting. Time and again, Hyde is noted as having an 
“air of deformity” though the nature of the defect is never satisfactorily quantified or understood.   
 An important indication of the source of Hyde’s menace appears early in the novel, in a 
perplexing scene in which the man tramples a young girl on the street. This is Hyde’s first 
appearance in the novel and here he is described by witnesses as “a juggernaut” which crushes 
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the child without hesitation, compunction, or apology. The key to this scene lies in its enigmatic 
nature. Stevenson is elusive in his descriptions, painting a hazy and troubling image of the 
collision of the child and Hyde. It is difficult to envision a solitary man, let alone one so 
frequently described as “dwarfish,” physically trampling a child to the point of causing her 
grievous bodily injury. Enfield’s description the collision is almost as if the child were swept up 
in and crushed by a massive tide or a great stampede, presaging the novella’s concern with the 
implications of the plurality of selves and foreshadowing the infinite reflections in the cheval 
glass at the novella’s end: “for the man trampled calmly over the child’s body and left her 
screaming on the ground. It sounds nothing to hear, but it was hellish to see. It wasn’t like a man; 
it was like some damned Juggernaut” (7). His description seems virtually impossible in even the 
most violent collision of two individual bodies. Thus, the description of the “juggernaut” holds 
the key, insofar as a juggernaut is an irresistible and crushing force. A juggernaut resists 
encapsulation within a discrete and singular body. As an irresistible force, it is massive but 
bodiless. A juggernaut may also take human form, in an irresistible impulse shared among a 
mass of people, such as Le Bon’s primal mob. The capacity of Hyde’s physical body to trample 
down this child in such a troublingly enigmatic way exemplifies its extraordinary nature; in its 
strength and force, it brings with it the power of a multitude, the energy of a massive force that 
far exceeds the corporeal shell that would seem to contain it. The significance of the scene is 
telling in as much as the pervasive inability to describe Hyde or to identify the disturbing 
element in his physiognomy does not negate the capacity of that physical self to manifest its true, 
internal nature. On-lookers may recoil at the sight of Hyde, but their failures to “diagnose” his 
deformity do not prevent the irruption of this inner defect, rising up to unleash its violence 
against the helpless child.  
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Indeed, such diagnostic failure is at the root of the threat posed by Hyde. As will be 
shown in this and subsequent chapters, the rise of the modern professional sciences in the 
Victorian era ensured the ascendance of the diagnostic paradigm through which latent and/or 
potential threats in the individual subject could be detected, defined, and addressed through the 
appropriate reading of corporeal signs. It is for this reason, for example, that extraordinary 
bodies, such as the bodies of conjoined twins, received as much, if not more, attention from 
scientists and physicians than from the lay public. It is also no coincidence that Lanyon, himself 
a physician, should be the first and only person to witness Hyde’s transformation into Jekyll. 
Significantly, the sight is one so troubling to the doctor that it leads rapidly to his death. Hyde’s 
deformity is beyond the scope of medical knowledge; it defies both the language and the 
capacity of the diagnostic paradigm. The result is a helpless and appalling silence in the presence 
of which the vitality of the threat itself flourishes. In an era in which empirical science in general 
and interventionist medicine in particular was increasingly lauded as the hope and promise of 
human progress, Lanyon’s death signifies the limits of positivist rationalism, the frontiers beyond 
which only the monstrous and the mad may go and survive.  
Thus, in Hyde’s first appearance in the novel, he embodies in himself the massive force 
that exceeds the boundaries of singular corporeal identity, like the bodies of conjoined twins 
which simultaneously fascinated and terrified Victorians. From this point on, Hyde will continue 
to manifest as the irresistible force within, growing in strength with his every excursion in the 
external world. Significantly, like the tea table at Jekyll’s death scene and the mirror which 
reflects with infinite repetition the images of the esteemed attorney, the working class servant, 
and the broken body of the once-respected physician, the juggernaut scene suggests the all-
encompassing nature of this irresistible force, the consuming drive that recognizes no boundaries 
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of class, vocation, or social position. The gentry’s comfortable distancing from women and the 
poor, which had been predicated upon a premise of immunity from their moral and psychological 
vulnerabilities are undermined in Hyde, the juggernaut, which, like a tidal wave, brings into itself 
all that stands in its way, without discrimination or mercy.  
That Hyde should manifest in the body of the beloved physician, Jekyll, is, of course, the 
novel’s most significant attempt to revise classist assumptions regarding the invulnerability of 
the affluent to the moral, psychological, and physical depredations of women and the poor. It is 
telling, then, that with each effort at experimentation, at each instance in which Jekyll attempts to 
elicit Hyde, Jekyll grows increasingly certain that the fundamental nature of all human beings is 
multiple rather than singular. Jekyll describes his experience with his alter ego: 
Though so profound a double-dealer, I was in no sense a hypocrite; both sides of 
me were in dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside restraint and 
plunged in shame, than when I laboured, in the eye of day, at the furtherance of 
knowledge or the relief of sorrow and suffering. And it chanced that the direction 
of my scientific studies…reacted and shed a strong light on this consciousness of 
the perennial war among my members. With every day, and from both sides of 
my intelligence, the moral and the intellectual, I thus drew steadily nearer to that 
truth…that man is not truly one, but truly two….and I hazard the guess that man 
will ultimately be known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous, and 
independent denizens. (52-53) 
  
This is a discovery that Jekyll at first embraces with joy and a kind of savage pride, seeing in the 
free play of his dual nature the unprecedented liberty to indulge in the free reign of his desires 
while simultaneously preserving the social mask that would deny them. Furthermore, Jekyll 
describes this as process through which he “learned to recognise the thorough and primitive 
duality of man” (Ibid.), which he describes in terms of conjoined twins: “It was the curse of 
mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus bound together—that in the agonised womb of 
consciousness, these polar twins should be continuously struggling. How, then were they 
dissociated?” (Ibid.) At the time of Jekyll’s publication in 1886, physicians across Europe were 
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concentrating on the nature of hysteria and the influence of what would come to be known as 
subconscious drives upon it. Most notably, a young Freud was working in Paris with the 
preeminent expert on hypnosis, the neurologist Jean Charcot, laying the groundwork for what 
Freud would later define as the tripartite theory of human consciousness.  
Jekyll’s appearance, then, coincided with an important moment in the social 
understanding and representation of human psychology, as consciousness began to be 
increasingly defined as amorphous and polyvalent. It was within this context that reports of 
“double consciousness” across Europe became ubiquitous, as individuals of all walks of life 
began to report incidents of missing time and secondary identities. Indeed, Jekyll’s narrative 
suggests an initial joy in the recognition of this second self: 
I was conscious of no repugnance, rather of a leap of welcome. This, too, was 
myself. It seemed natural and human. In my eyes, it bore a livelier image of the 
spirit, it seemed more express and single, than the imperfect and divided 
countenance I had been hitherto accustomed to call mine. (55) 
 
Of greatest significance here are the efforts of physicians, psychologists, scientists, 
attorneys, and the lay public to “read” indications of a secondary self on the physical body. 
Though the depravity of Hyde’s character remained inexplicable to the observer, efforts to locate 
his (moral and physical) “deformity” through corporeal signs continued, with characters as 
diverse as the rational Utterson, the dreamy-eyed chambermaid, and the outraged upper class 
mothers defending the injured child all reporting a revulsion in Hyde’s physical presence that 
was also an attraction, insofar as the body, for them, represents a troubling mystery to be 
resolved and, by extension, contained. Mighall argues that, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
“physiology became the index to the ancestral or racial past, the place to locate anachronistic 
vestiges of a long-buried antiquity” (qtd. in Dryden 77). Attempts to locate and classify Hyde’s 
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deformity, then, would situate him within racial, ethnic, and/or class-based taxonomies that 
would domesticate this troubling figure and dismantle his disruptive powers. 
Despite the observers’ inability to, at last, tame Hyde’s atavistic body through a form of 
collective diagnosis of its physical signs, Hyde’s body reveals itself as the narrative unfolds to be 
increasingly uncontainable, affirming the fatal influence it would have on Dr. Lanyon and thus 
symbolizing the “death” of medical wisdom and potency in the presence of the enigmatic 
monster. Jekyll’s initial hubristic delight in his belief that the second self would serve for him as 
an alternate embodiment that he could put on and take off at will as readily as any other 
adornment, as easily as any other social mask, soon gives way to terror in the intransigence of 
Hyde. Indeed, Jekyll’s suicide is precipitated by the increasing awareness of his powerlessness to 
control Hyde, his acknowledgement that soon he, Jekyll, not Hyde, would be the second self. 
Greenslade situates Hyde’s indeterminate and threatening presence within the context of fin de 
siècle paradigms of the secret sharer: 
The secret sharer was emblematically figured for post-Darwinian audiences as the 
beast in man. Fear of the hidden presence of a ‘monstrous’ and disruptive energy 
was experienced and articulated as the surrendering to that influence. Age-old 
hierarchies, which had assumed unquestioned relations of authority and 
subordination—civilized and brutish, higher and lower, mind and body, reason 
and instinct—were under pressure as never before. The fear of atavism, of 
regression to a lower state, offered the perfect medium for the expression of these 
worrying questions. (qtd. in Dryden 9) 
 
 
This turn of events is significant insofar as it parallels with what many critics and social theorists 
have identified as an obsession at the turn of the century with the physical body and, in 
particular, with the search for corporeal signs of inward disease and disorder. From the pseudo-
sciences of phrenology and craniology to the comparative anatomists and early neurobiologists, 
positivist science provided the rationale for and instruments and methodologies through which 
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the cultural fixation on the body and its signs could be enacted. Bernheimer argues that this sense 
of “instability brought out in the degenerationists an urge to master the social and political 
anxieties it generated through objective scientific classification and preventative methods of 
social hygiene” (141). Therefore, the collective efforts to detect and define Hyde’s deformity, 
efforts in which, significantly, persons of all classes and creeds engage at one time or another in 
the text, reflect not merely morbid curiosity but also and perhaps most importantly an 
interventionist paradigm informed by the rise of modern professional medicine. Within this 
framework, diagnosis and intercession, particularly by recognized experts into whose hands such 
responsibilities were increasingly placed,
27
 was a collective obligation informed less by concerns 
for the individual’s welfare than by the desire to protect, preserve, and/or restore the health of the 
social body.    
As Stevenson’s novel illustrates, the interrogation of the nature of human identity was a 
matter of obsessive cultural concern. Furthermore, this was an interrogation that took place, 
preeminently, on the surfaces of the human body. The intertwining of the psychological, moral, 
and somatic, once again, is evidenced in Jekyll’s narrative of his experience with the strange 
elixir: 
I not only recognised my natural body from the mere aura and effulgence of 
certain of the powers that made up my spirit, but managed to compound a drug by 
which these powers should be dethroned from their supremacy, and a second form 
and countenance substituted, none the less natural to me because they were the 
expression, and bore the stamp of lower elements in my soul. (53-54) 
 
                                                          
27
 This is not to suggest that the lay public washed their hands of such obligations. As can be seen, persons from all 
walks of life were invested in “diagnosing” Hyde and redressing his crimes. As the sciences, and medicine in 
particular, became increasingly professionalized in this era, however, the emergence of the expert authority 
opened a rift between public and professional knowledge, a gap which the public at large was increasingly 
obligated to acknowledge and to which it was required to defer. Thus, it is the professional men, such as Lanyon 
and Utterson, representing the related fields of medicine and law, respectively, into whose hands the burden is 
placed to understand and deal with Hyde. The lay public, represented by Poole and his fellow servants, may detect 
certain bodily signs that might aid in this diagnostic process, but only to report them to learned experts, who alone 




That Hyde’s presence would manifest itself with increasing clarity and frequency, despite 
Jekyll’s best efforts to contain him, exemplifies what was taken as rote at the fin de siècle: that 
inner deformations would reveal themselves at last, if not in the body of the subject, then 
certainly in the bodies and behaviors of his children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren.  
As a result of prevailing concerns over any potential link between disease and heredity, 
efforts to locate the signs of an inward “deformity,” whether this deformity should manifest in 
criminality, insanity, addiction, promiscuity, or another “disease,” would come to be linked 
strongly in this era both with sexuality and with controlled reproduction. In a 1907 edition of The 
Journal of Mental Science, Dr. E. Stansfield is quoted as follows: 
There is a floating mass of degeneracy in the population which is constantly 
augmented by the victims of social vice and its satellites, syphilis and drink, and 
from this mass we derive the bulk of our asylum population, fill our prisons, and 
supply our “unemployable” and that this is increasing at a faster rate than the 
normal population is, I think, indicated by the statistics of the Lunacy 
Commission….I believe that one important factor in the disproportionate increase 
is the lowering birthrate of practically all classes except these degenerates. (qtd. in 
“Asylum Report” 203) 
 
Stansfield seems to follow his description of this “floating (and fertile) mass of degeneracy” with 
a recommendation for the selective sterilization of this undesirable population. In Stevenson’s 
novel, such presumptions of the greater fertility of so-called “degenerate” populations can be 
seen in the superior vitality of Hyde. Despite his dwarfish and atavistic appearance, Hyde is 
physically stronger than his genteel counterpart and his strength grows exponentially with every 
moment of freedom. Indeed, a few short months of “life” are sufficient to strengthen Hyde to the 
point that he is able to overtake Jekyll at will and, ultimately, to force Jekyll’s hand in suicide to 
prevent Hyde for assuming complete and continuous control of Jekyll’s body. 
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 Hyde’s appalling and seemingly boundless vitality, outpacing as it does the vital force of 
the “respectable” Dr. Jekyll, illustrates the widespread fear discussed by Dr. Stansfield above 
over the reproductive capacities of “undesirables” and, especially, the implications of this for the 
future health and integrity of the race. As a result, the large-scale measures encouraging 
controlled reproduction that were implemented in this era as a result of such fears parallel and in 
many respects are authorized and advanced by efforts to quantify and contain the extraordinarily 
embodied. Attempts to fix the identity of conjoined twins, to define the boundaries between the 
self and the other, and to detect and domesticate any “Others” within, extend the larger social 
project which would alleviate the widespread anxiety that individual identity was inherently 
unstable, that the self was unfixed and porous, amenable to corruption both from without (i.e. the 
primal mob and/or the cultural other) and from within (i.e. the forces of heredity). Within this 
framework, the fame of conjoined twins like Chang and Eng, Millie-Christine, and the Hilton 
sisters can be readily understood, as these transgressive bodies came to signify vexed 
understandings of human identity at all social levels, from the lower class laborer whose body 
and mind have been corroded by the noxious urban environment in which he lives, to the 
bourgeois gentleman frightened into a second identity by the sound of a train whistle and the 
unremitting stresses of business life, to the learned man of science, tempted by hubristic faith in 
his own powers of self-control to foolishly unleash the beast within. Indeed, it is Jekyll’s 
inherent vulnerability to this impish figure that most terrorizes Utterson, whose own imagination 
Hyde has so intractably “enslaved.” Utterson’s fears for his friend are described in evocative 
terms: 
[H]e would see a room in a rich house, where his friend lay asleep, dreaming and 
smiling at his dreams; and then the door of that room would be opened, the 
curtains of the bed plucked apart, the sleeper recalled, and lo! there would stand 
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by his side a figure to whom power was given, and even at that dead hour, he 
must rise to do its bidding. (13) 
 
The medical examinations to which conjoined twins were subjected in this era play an 
important function here. In an era increasingly fixated upon pathology and, in particular, upon 
the inscription of inner physical, psychological, and moral deformities on the surface of the 
body, the medical examination of conjoined twins served a vital role in attempts to define the 
boundaries of the body. In their memoir, the Hilton twins write of the ubiquitous presence of the 
physician in their lives: “ ‘Siamese twins’… ‘cut apart’… ‘doctor’ are the first words we seemed 
to remember. They stood for fear and created our longing [to] remain joined by our birth-bond of 
flesh and bone” (qtd. in Frost 34) Medical records reveal that conjoined twins were subjected to 
a battery of tests in order to determine, first, whether the subject could be defined as a single 
person or as multiple persons, and, second, to ascertain (and, more importantly, to fix) the 
borders between individuals, to draw lines of “ownership” across the frontiers of the twins’ 
bodies. In this effort, the bodies of twins would be palpated to determine sensation. Twins would 
be made to ingest various substances and the output of their bladder and bowels compared. Most 
significantly, they would be subjected to intrusive physical examinations, with the medical gaze 
serving to define, ascribe, and discursively stabilize bodily structures, determining the 
proprietary rights of the flesh through a required submission to expert authority. Dr. William 
Pancoast’s case history of the McKoy twins, which he wrote for the purposes of “the description 
and diagnosis of special forms of double monsters” (qtd in Frost 99) is particularly instructive 
here. In his summary, Pancoast notes the twins’ reluctance to submit to a nude photograph, 
which showcased the location of their physical connection as well as the genital abscess for 
which the doctor was originally summoned:  
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After great persuasion and the kind assistance of Dr. F.F. Maury…the 
accompanying photograph of them was taken. They clung to their raiment closely, 
as may be seen, and it was only by earnest entreaty that they were willing to 
compromise by retaining the drapery as photographed. (Ibid.) 
 
This scene is followed quickly by a chilling description of an even more intrusive physical 
examination of the twins’ bodies, which suggests the underlying function of the nude photograph 
and the doctor’s emphasis on a visual and narrative record of the twins’ sex organs. Pancoast 
describes his examination of the twins in clinical terms: “I passed a female catheter into each 
urethra, and could distinctly recognize a partition between the two bladders. I passed then two 
metallic catheters, one into each bladder; they did not touch each other” (Ibid., 103).   
Just as lower, middle, and upper class Londoners sought to diagnose Hyde’s mysterious 
deformity, medical surveillance of and intervention on the extraordinary body constitutes, 
foremost, an effort to domesticate the body, to bring it within acceptable boundaries. Thus, the 
diagnosis-prognosis-treatment paradigm uses pathology as a means of both classification and 
control, rendering extraordinary bodies natural and predictable through cooptation into the 
biomedical regime. Such intervention is necessary because extraordinary bodies are, by their 
nature, dangerous, their transgression of traditional taxonomies and required embodied practices 
presaging the dismantling of the social, cultural, and familial structures into which they come. 
Kunst describes the precarious position of the monstrous in the modern era: 
On the one hand, the monstrous is becoming instrumental and invisible (in the 
sense that it becomes an object in a laboratory): a functional object of science. On 
the other hand, the monstrous is restaged on the political stage: due to its tricky 
and pretentious nature, it is endangering a political order. As a result, all future 
explanations of its nature will lead to attempted domestication. (213) 
 
Frost’s analysis of the life-writing surrounding the Hilton and McKoy twins, for example, 
hints at the role that the threat of transgressive sexualities plays in the understanding of and 
reaction to the twins’ embodiments. She cites a telling example from the Hiltons’ autobiography 
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of the sisters’ shared pleasure when one twin holds the hand of her suitor: their physical 
connection enables her twin to excite in the sensation of the touch of her sister’s paramour. Such 
a shared bond would later be fictionalized in a kiss shared between Violet and her on-screen 
fiancé in Tod Browning’s Freaks. Frost argues that  
it is this shared sense of sexual intimacy that Allison Pingree argues shows us 
how the doubling of the twins’ sexuality and female force were part of a larger 
conversation of the newly independent and resourceful “New Woman” and all 
that she promised—and threatened. (31)  
 
This concern is reiterated in earlier writings by both medical and ecclesiastical authorities 
concerning the McKoy twins’ fitness for marriage and motherhood. Following a thorough 
physical examination, it is concluded that there are in fact no physiological barriers to marriage 
and childbirth, but that the “moral” barriers are large and, presumably, insurmountable (Frost 
24).  
Attempts to define and contain the excessive embodiment of conjoined twins may 
therefore be understood as an attempt to preserve the integrity of the family, a preeminent 
concern in the Victorian era, in which rapidly shifting social, scientific, and economic paradigms 
threatened to undermine the stability of the Victorian home, casting into question established 
paradigms of male/female relationships and “appropriate” sexual behaviors. Hetero-normative 
networks which would insist upon and naturalize sexual exclusivity between one “male” and one 
“female” body cannot accommodate sexuality in bodies that defy quantification, as do the bodies 
of conjoined twins. The debate over the nature of the twins’ identity, questioning whether such 
twins constitute one or two selves, challenges monogamous marital structures. The twins’ 
embodiments and, perhaps more significantly, their sense of self(ves), frustrate any attempts to 
reconcile traditional paradigms of the Victorian family with those extraordinarily embodied 
subjects whose self-concept(s) structure(s) around an ideal of identity that is at once singular, 
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duplex, and tripartite. Thus, the impossibility of enumerating extraordinary bodies such as these 
places marital/sexual relations likewise on a shifting frontier between the sanctioned and holy 
and the prohibited and unsanctified. A marriage to one sister, in her singular state, affirms and 
protects the boundaries of traditional practice, but such a marriage is also one that is already 
polygamous insofar as her body’s unboundedness, the excessiveness that denies singular 
integrity, both invites and necessitates the inclusion of an other, a third self that makes the 
marital/sexual union a perversion according to traditional paradigms. Shildrick argues that  
the supposedly excessively sexuate nature of women is an implicit 
assumption….And even where maternity is seen as the salvation of potentially 
wayward women—as it was for much of the Victorian period and the twentieth 
century—there is no guarantee that women’s social and familial recuperation is 
secure. Like other women, mothers, as a highly discursive category, have often 
represented both the best hopes and worst fears of societies faced with an intuitive 
sense of their own instabilities and vulnerabilities….Given their necessary 
reproductive access to male bodies, women represented a deadly threat in the 
struggle between the forces of progress and primitivism. Although a woman 
properly controlled and contained in a reproductive relationship in which she was 
otherwise passive was welcomed as the mother of race purity, it was only the 
most superior and continent of men who could hope to achieve such a union. (30) 
 
It seems significant, then, that the McKoy and Hilton twins were denied both by expert authority 
and cultural assumption the right to marry and rear children when perhaps the nineteenth 
century’s most famous conjoined twins, Chang and Eng Bunker, exercised such rights amid great 
interest and enthusiasm from the public at large. Gender roles seem to have played an 
instrumental function in shaping both the McKoys’ and the Hiltons’ marital prospects, 
principally due to the female’s rootedness in the physical body.  
Post-Enlightenment paradigms of subject-formation would situate the male as pure mind, 
an almost disembodied figure whose corporeality was profoundly utilitarian, enabling him to 
bring to fruition the mandates of his rational mind but otherwise disappearing. The male body is 
the compliant body, enabling the male subject to perform as he wishes without intruding itself 
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and, most importantly, without contaminating the pure and rational mind with the body’s 
vulnerabilities or its desires. Frost’s comments on medical experts’ tendency in America to 
equate the bodies of black women, in particular, with the limits and boundaries of their sex 
organs could apply equally well to imperial England, with its long established history of “freak 
performance:”  
[I]t is blatant evidence of the sexual economy of slavery and the pornographic and 
sexual appropriation of black women’s bodies that were foundational not just to 
slavery or the racist terrorism that followed its demise but also to institutions of 
popular entertainment like the freak show. (22)  
 
Within this schema, all women, and particularly black women, are the profoundly and 
intransigently embodied. In their capacity to menstruate, to give birth, and to nurture children 
with their physical bodies, theirs is a subject-self inextricably rooted in the flesh. Therefore, the 
inability to demarcate the boundary-lines of the flesh of female conjoined twins magnifies their 
excessive/transgressive identity, making marriage/sexuality within the traditional frameworks an 
impossibility. If males are pure mind, then the extraordinary bodies of male conjoined twins have 
(relatively) little impact on a male subject-self presumed to be constituted fundamentally of the 
disembodied reason, the rational mind. Shildrick argues that “the masculine has been associated 
with the limit, the female with the limitless, where the latter implies a failure of the proper, an 
unaccountability beyond the grasp of instrumental consciousness” (31).  
The troubling questions regarding gender roles, marital relationships, and “appropriate” 
sexuality raised by conjoined twins find themselves reflected in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, with 
the dangers posed by Jekyll’s duplicate self rooted fundamentally in its transgression of hetero-
normative behaviors. The instability of Jekyll’s character leads to a marked feminization not only 
of the good doctor, but, as was previously noted, of his respected associates as well, who find 
97 
 
themselves swooning and near hysterics in the face of the psychological disturbances he 
engenders. Jekyll himself describes the laboratory in which he concocted his potion as the site of 
a suffering so intense that it is “unmanning.” The unmanning of Jekyll is reiterated by the 
servant, Poole, who tells Utterson of the hours Jekyll spends “Weeping like a woman or a lost 
soul” (40). Jekyll’s feminization in the face of his horror extends itself to the friends who reach 
out to care for him. In reaching the laboratory where Jekyll has cloistered himself in the face of 
his crisis, Utterson temporarily loses control of his physical faculties, as the body (long equated 
with the female) momentarily rebels against the supposed sovereignty of the rational (male) will: 
“Mr. Utterson’s nerves, at this unlooked-for termination, gave a jerk that nearly threw him from 
his balance” (36).   
Even more important, perhaps, are the limits of authorized sexual behavior that Jekyll 
transgresses in the form of Hyde. Significantly, these behaviors are never explicitly characterized 
in the novel and Jekyll himself is even seen to minimize them: “The pleasures which I made 
haste to seek in my disguise were, as I said, undignified; I would scarce use a harder term. But in 
the hands of Edward Hyde, they soon began to turn toward the monstrous” (57). This devolution 
from the “undignified” to the “monstrous” is crucial, insofar as it reflects latent Victorian 
anxieties concerning the self’s unexplored and presumably uncontainable transgressive potential. 
Just as conjoined twins emblematized in this era the transgressing of presumptively insuperable 
boundaries, from the bounded integrity of the individual self to the sanctified and requisite 
monogamy of the marital relationship, in Jekyll and Hyde, the duplex character of the upright 
physician serves, foremost, to radically destabilize and undermine behavioral norms. Most 
importantly, as the text demonstrates, after the breach of such boundaries comes the flood, 
unleashing a torrent of excess that rapidly transforms the undignified into the monstrous.  
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It is for this reason that Hyde quickly comes to represent the uncontainable force, which 
appears with little warning and, ultimately, completely without Jekyll’s consent or control: “I 
began to spy a danger that…the balance of my nature might be permanently overthrown, the 
power of voluntary change be forfeited, and the character of Edward Hyde become irrevocably 
mine” (59). That Jekyll describes his initial encounters with this alter ego in the language of self-
discovery is no coincidence, however, for this uncontainable alter ego is the self without 
knowledge of whom complete self-awareness is an impossibility. Jekyll asserts that in meeting 
Hyde, “I knew myself, at the first breath of this new life, to be more wicked, tenfold more 
wicked, sold a slave to my original evil” (54).  
Thus, the multitudinous nature of the self that conjoined twins literalize and that 
Stevenson’s gothic romance metaphorizes is a polymorphic self that is dangerously present in all 
individuals, as frequent references made by Jekyll’s friends and associates make clear. It is 
significant that Stevenson’s secondary characters should represent society’s most esteemed 
figures, practitioners of valued professions, from law to medicine, insofar as these professional 
men, according to post-Enlightenment paradigms, would seem to be immune from the 
temptations and corruptions of the flesh. Stevenson consciously and consistently reiterates that 
such immunity is, above all, a fiction. Of the eminently respectable Utterson, Stevenson writes: 
[T]he lawyer…brooded awhile on his own past, groping in all the corners of his 
memory, lest by chance some Jack-in-the-Box of an old iniquity should leap to 
light there. His past was fairly blameless; few men could read the roles of their 
life with less apprehension, yet he was humbled to the dust by the many ill things 
he had done, and raised up again into a sober and fearful gratitude by the many he 
had come so near to doing yet avoided. (17) 
 
Stevenson’s text suggests that if Utterson, arguably the text’s most moral character, should find 
himself so desperately mortified by the prospect that his transgressions be publicized, how much 
more salacious and appalling must be the misdeeds of the average man, for whom the bonds of 
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uprightness weigh less heavily. Moreover, the fact that Utterson must cast about in his memory 
for “iniquit[ies]” long forgotten reaffirms models of the secret sharer, of the self as unplumbed 
mystery. Utterson’s capacity, then, to empathize and identify with Jekyll’s plight mirrors the 
fascination with which conjoined twins were met, a fascination which, tellingly, often centered 
upon the realities of these twins’ domestic lives, and, in particular, of conjoined twins’ inevitable 
disruption of sexual norms related both to monogamy and to heterosexuality. 
That even the most upright of Stevenson’s characters should so strongly identify with 
Jekyll’s plight implies that the concurrent fear, shame, uncertainty, and attraction of the hidden 
and largely unknown self are intrinsic to the human experience.
28
 Such an empathic universality 
is reiterated throughout the novel and most tellingly in the conflicting attitudes toward social 
authorities. Early in the novel, Utterson’s cousin, Enfield, describes a long and lonely journey 
through the nighttime streets of London: “At last I got into that state of mind when a man listens 
and listens and begins to long for the sight of a policeman” (7). This sentiment is taken up again, 
and, significantly, reversed, in the thoughts of Utterson: “he was conscious of that terror of the 
law and the law’s officers that sometimes assails the most honest” (22). Such scenes affirm and 
extend prevailing Victorian concerns regarding the unknown self, the secret sharer and beast 
within that simultaneously threatens and attracts. The yearning for the protection of the law that 
is simultaneously with the fear of the law’s proscriptions signifies the ambivalence through 
which normative codes of civility contend with the allure of lawlessness. Furthermore, as we will 
see in the next section, such alluring lawlessness is frequently imaged as an exotic other who 
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 It is this capacity to identify with the sufferer which lends to the abject other such power. As leading disability 
theorists, including Lennard Davis and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, have argued, the disavowal of the non-
normative body derives most often from the conscious or unconscious recognition of oneself in the abject body of 
the other. Both the fear and the power of the extraordinary body, therefore, may be ascribed to the recognition 
that, unlike racial, ethnic, or gender differences, the normate is vulnerable to becoming the abject other and that, 
indeed, insofar as the body of the normate is a mortal body, the processes of disease and debility by which the 
normate becomes the “abnormal” are always already in progress.  
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serves at once to mirror the secret sharer within while also actuating its domestication, enabling a 
catharsis through which the inner and unknown self is materialized and expunged through the 
corporeal presence of the exotic stranger. 
  
The Other End of the World: Darkest England in the Heart of London 
While Hyde may be said to manifest in physical form the drives and desires secreted in 
the unconscious of the eminent Dr. Jekyll, it is nevertheless no coincidence that the embodied 
life of the physician’s dark alter ego should be profoundly rooted in a geographic space that is in 
itself laden with significance, a rhetorically and ideologically-charged locus of all that is sinister, 
primitive, and sensual in the great city, a sort of collective unconscious in which the impulses 
and the drives of the metropolis itself lurk. Within this context, Stevenson’s introduction of Hyde 
is particularly telling. Enfield recounts his first meeting with Hyde, stating that it occurred when 
he (Enfield) was “coming back from the other end of the world” (6). Enfield’s description is 
informative on multiple levels. First, it exemplifies what authorities of this time period have 
identified as the “Darkest England” paradigm. In this image, England is itself configured as a 
sort of Siamese twin, the body of the nation divided into two seemingly incompatible but 
inseparable parts. The “first” England is that of respectable Victorian society. It is the idealized 
image of the body politic, an amalgamation of respectable, industrious citizenry dedicated to the 
perpetuation of an upright British civilization both at home and abroad. The reverse image and 
inextricable counterpart is the “second” England, the England from whence Enfield has come as 
from the other end of the world.  
Like the British colonial territories which serve to both reflect and undermine the British 
colonial self-image, this second England is one which functions as a sort of synecdoche of the 
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British psyche, most notably the subconscious and the drives of the Id. From Whitechapel to 
Soho where Hyde keeps his apartment, the second England is the site of poverty, deprivation, 
and depravity. The seedy undercurrents of British life flow here, hidden and unacknowledged, 
but nevertheless a real and present danger to the righteous British imago to which it is 
ineradicably bound. Stevenson’s text is replete with images of a multiform and amorphous city 
that defies qualification and quantification. This is a London in which “the buildings are so 
packed together…that it’s hard to say where one and another begins” (6); this is a London in 
which 
The fog still slept on the wing above the drowned city, where the lamps 
glimmered like carbuncles; and through the muffle and smother of these fallen 
clouds, the procession of the town’s life was still rolling in through the great 
arteries with a sound as of a mighty wind. (26) 
 
The hidden but thriving life of the city, like the extraordinary bodies of conjoined twins and the 
irrepressible body of Hyde, resists containment, irrupting at unforeseen moments into 
consciousness and life. Indeed, it is within this context that the more oblique implications of 
Enfield’s description come to the fore in as much as Enfield, himself a respected gentleman and 
cousin of the morally stalwart Utterson, is, “conjoined” with peoples and spaces ostensibly 
incompatible with himself and the position which he occupies within his society. That he should 
find himself returning “from the end of the world” affirms that he has for a time occupied this 
space of lawless boundlessness, venturing into the physical spaces through which the riotous 
forces of the unconscious play and in which elite Britons like Enfield are stripped of the 
trappings of civility which both define and constrain them. Furthermore, Enfield’s formulation 
suggests that he is both a voluntary and frequent sojourner to this outer/other world, a world in 
which the compulsions of the material body usurp the control of the rational mind, dethroning 
the rational, Enlightenment subject as easily as Hyde overwhelms Jekyll.   
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Enfield’s implication that his travels to the outer edges of the (“civilized”) world of the 
First England not only affirms the Two Englands model, but it also further entrenches the 
paradigm through which duality enables, actuates, and rationalizes the dissolution of the discrete 
self, a dissolution exemplified so readily in late Victorian readings of the bodies of conjoined 
twins and further illustrated in the increasing fascination with the phenomenon of double-
consciousness. Enfield’s forays into the sensual “unconscious” of the city, the nothingness at the 
end of the world, presage the breakdown of the identity paradigms through which Imperial 
England defines, sustains, and perpetuates itself. Hierarchical taxonomies of race, class, and 
gender fall away in the primitive and undifferentiated physicality of this Darkest England, where 
aristocrats solicit the affections of impoverished prostitutes and bourgeois Londoners chase the 
dragon in drug dens populated by addicts of all races, colors, and creeds.  The intoxicating and 
sinister amorphousness that rings the heart of the great empire is illustrated most pointedly in the 
image of Utterson’s nightly search for a glimpse of Hyde: “he had grown accustomed to the 
quaint effect with which the footfalls of a single person, while he is still a great way off, 
suddenly spring out distinct from the vast hum and clatter of the city” (14).  
Thus, the analogy of the two Englands theory to conjoined twins derives from the 
recognition of the symbiotic relationship between the two spheres. Stevenson’s cursory 
acknowledgment of Enfield’s apparently habitual frequenting of London’s disreputable areas (he 
refers to them with the cryptic but casual tones of a familiar) illustrates the porous boundaries 
between the two worlds. Enfield, like his friend and cousin, Utterson, is a man of social standing, 
a young professional in an era in which the status of the professions was in ascendance, rapidly 
eclipsing the aristocracy that had for so long been at the apex of the social hierarchy. Hyde first 
appears in the novel at second-hand, as Enfield tells the story of his encounter with the man as he 
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(Enfield) returns to his fashionable home from the debauched and derided locales that are, 
presumably, his frequent haunts.  
However, the symbiotic relationship of the Two Englands, their inextricable connection, 
is suggested not only by the apparent ease with which Enfield habituates himself to these dark 
realms but also by the equal proficiency through which Hyde accommodates himself to the 
affluent sectors of the city, penetrating the civilized spaces of the First England as easily as 
Enfield enters its darkness, if not more so. Enfield’s story suggests that the initial encounter 
between Enfield and Hyde takes place not in these outer realms, but near Enfield’s own 
neighborhood. Thus, Stevenson’s introduction of Hyde, the dwarfish, fiendish, hedonistic being, 
takes place not in these compromised quarters of the second England, but among the lavish 
luxury of respectable society, among the well-kempt streets and houses that Enfield calls home.  
Just as Bleak House establishes a corollary anxiety of an England grown beyond its 
capacities with a fascination and repugnance for transgressive bodies, both Enfield’s and Hyde’s 
positioning in this scene suggest similar transgressions: here, the bourgeois body of the 
respectable English gentleman has found itself in the filthy enclaves of Darkest England, while 
the deformed animalism of Hyde stalks the manicured neighborhoods of the gentry. Mary 
Douglas has noted that dirt is “matter out of place,” but here are bodies out of place, and the 
discordance between the men’s social and geographical positioning resonates with an 
imaginative construction of England as simultaneously duplicate and singular. The existence of a 
second England, a subterranean Britain that paradoxically undermines and upholds the first, 
informs a pluralistic understanding of the realm.  
At the same time, however, Hyde’s and Enfield’s capacity to move seamlessly between 
the two Englands exemplifies the porosity—or even the nonexistence—of true boundaries 
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between them. This is significant insofar as the boundlessness which characterizes the outlaw 
and otherworldly spaces of Darkest England is echoed in an intrinsic amorphousness at the 
perimeters of the great city, an amorphousness, indeed, which may even be an extension of this 
nether-world itself, the spread of a contagion against which even the hygienic borders of 
civilized modernity provide no quarantine. Linnaean taxonomies have no power in these liminal 
spaces because, as was shown in the analysis of miasma theory and of the ideological symbology 
of infectious disease in Chapter One of this study, the fluidity of bodies breaks down systems of 
classification and categorization. Enfield’s encounter with Hyde so early in Stevenson’s novel 
sets the stage for a depiction of late Victorian England in which the comforting boundedness 
upon which imperial modernity rests collapses beneath an ambiguity of bodies, selves, and 
spaces, an ambiguity that enables beasts in human form to prowl the heart of the metropolis, 
trampling over innocent girl children and elderly aristocrats alike, while in the polluted and 
depraved streets of Soho, slatterns, addicts, and criminals cavort with the elite, the affluent, and 
the aristocratic, as law and lawlessness, quite literally, collide.   
 
Infection in the Modern Vein: Venuses, Vamps, and Stoker’s Dracula 
If, as was shown in chapter one, the bodies of giants were appropriated into British 
iconographies of growth, splendor, and power, conjoined twins operated to somaticize an 
increasing recognition of the destabilization of social categories, particularly in the late Victorian 
era. As has been shown, the inability to draw the boundaries of the body, to differentiate between 
singular and plural selves, literalizes the implications of the two Englands theory, which renders 
impossible any separation of the two halves of the national body and mocks all efforts to erect an 
insuperable border between them. In the analysis of Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
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and Mr. Hyde, late Victorian readings of the bodies of conjoined twins were invoked to 
underscore contemporary anxieties regarding the nature of the individual self. Such anxieties 
reflect growing questions concerning both the integrity and the decipherability of identity, 
questions driven in large measure by the emerging field of psychoanalysis and the growing 
influence of Freudian theories of the unconscious. 
Thus, gothic romances like Stevenson’s parallel the concerns often displaced onto the 
material bodies of conjoined twins regarding the inherent ambiguities of the inner self, the 
ambivalent awareness of an other within, of a self that is neither fully singular nor wholly 
knowable. As the remainder of this chapter will show, however, prevailing anxieties at the fin de 
siècle concerning the presence of the secret sharer within are linked in important ways with an 
equally potent fear of the external other, the simultaneously menacing and alluring threat from 
beyond the heart of empire (i.e. from Enfield’s “end of the world”) which no frontiers can 
contain. If Freudian theories of the unconscious played a particularly powerful role in 
destabilizing identity categories and calling into question presumptions of the rational 
Enlightenment subject as a stable and predictable subject position, the vexed position of the 
British Empire at the end of the nineteenth century served in equal measure to inflame anxieties 
over the integrity of the social body, over the health and longevity of the British “race.”  Low 
argues that in his London Labour and the London Poor, Henry Mayhew’s seminal 1861 analysis 
of urban poverty, the author had 
already begun to enmesh social practices with physical and cultural 
characteristics by situating his study within the disciplinary 
paradigm of contemporary anthropology. In his attempts to 
enhance the scientific status of his work, Mayhew’s comparison of 
London’s ‘wandering tribes’ to the Bushmen and ‘Hottentot 




Low goes on to describe narratives of a pathological infectiousness deployed to marginalize the 
urban poor, even as they insist upon the immunity of the middle and upper classes from these 
terrors. Describing the work of Andrew Mearns, Low argues that Mearns “draws on the rhetoric 
of bodily contagion and moral contamination which sets apart the slum dwellers from the middle 
class “reliable explorer” and his readers” (Ibid., 14). Significantly, however, the premise of the 
complete separation, on the one hand, between the two Englands and the rampant physiological 
and moral contagiousness of “Darkest England” on the other is, in late Victorian England, not as 
stable as Low would seem to suggest here. Pervasive fears of degeneration, particularly 
degeneration related to race, powerfully inform Victorian iconographies of self and other. 
Among the most important aspects of this derives from prevailing theories which posited a 
profound link between environment and race. Such a link marks racial boundaries as porous and 
indeterminate, much like the unstable bodies of Millie-Christine, the Hilton twins, and 
Jekyll/Hyde. Indeed, Low herself notes that 
Degeneration taps into a vein of writing on environmentalism and 
race….Racial environmentalism details a paradigm in which 
external forces (such as climate) mould the racial character and 
physical differences of the various groups. Acclimatisation leads to 
racial traits over time. (Ibid.) 
 
The destabilization of racial categories and attendant fears of degeneration are crucial concerns 
here. If England is an indeterminate, multiform, and amorphous social body, like the bodies of 
conjoined twins and the Jekyll/Hyde alter egos which mirror them in ostensibly “normative” 
bodies, then the body is doubly vulnerable, threatened both from within and from without. 
Environmental determinism in regard to race reifies the porosity of the body’s boundaries, its 
capacity to absorb and, ultimately, be transformed by external forces. Thus, if Stevenson’s text 
speaks to the threat of the other within, then, as will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, 
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Bram Stoker’s Dracula may be seen to deploy prevailing concerns over race, heredity, 
environment, and moral and physiological contagion, to problematize Victorian fears of the other 
without.  
In Stevenson’s Jekyll and Hyde, Enfield’s declaration that he encounters Hyde at a 
moment when he is “returning from somewhere at the end of the world” carries with it another 
important implication insofar as it situates the irruption of the unpredictable, irrational, and 
dangerous within a geospatial context. Presumably, Enfield’s sojourn in this undefined space, 
this space without name, place, or time, ties with his encounter of the other within. Enfield is 
seasoned for Hyde’s arrival by his evening spent in this “other” space; Enfield’s encounter with 
Hyde, then, is less significant than where this encounter takes place. It is not in the back alleys of 
Soho or the opium dens of Whitechapel, from whence Enfield has just come. The shock, as was 
touched upon in the last section, is in the appearance of Hyde where he does not belong, a 
denizen of darkness in the fields of light.  
The permeability of boundaries, the bleeding of the two Englands into one another, as has 
been argued, parallels the era’s interest in bodies which refuse to be bounded—such as those of 
conjoined twins. Stevenson’s emphasis here on the geographical context, his focus on place, 
resonates in important ways with other fin de siècle concerns, most notably with the elasticity of 
England’s physical, social, and cultural boundaries, the ever-growing threat that the Other 
without can and will become the Other within. The preoccupation with the Other beyond the 
boundaries of the body and of the body politic imagine and configure the Other as a mobile 
agent, one capable of penetrating the porous defenses of the self and the state, irredeemably 
altering the body through the absorption of that which is foreign to it. Such concerns are manifest 
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in two of the era’s most important figures, Bram Stoker’s iconic image of horror, Count Dracula, 
and Saartjie (Sarah) Baartman, also known as the Hottentot Venus. 
By the time Dracula was published in 1897, Sarah Baartman had been dead for more 
than 80 years, her skeleton, brain, and genitalia on display at Paris’ Musée de l’Homme after an 
adult life spent on exhibition across England and Continental Europe. Before her death in 1815 at 
the approximate age of 25, Baartman was brought as a slave from her native South Africa to 
serve as an object of scientific and public curiosity due to what was defined in the era as specific 
physical anomalies intrinsic to African women in general and to those of Baartman’s tribe in 
particular. Of particular importance is the fact that these presumptive “racial” traits were 
regarded both within the lay community and among the emerging disciplines of modern, 
professional science as indicative of the purported sexual voracity of persons
29
 of color. 
Europeans regarded what they saw as the enlarged buttocks and labia of Baartman as a physical 
manifestation of the sexual and reproductive capacity of Khoisan
30
 women.  
The stigmata of a rapacious sexuality, according to the medico-social paradigms of the 
day, positioned Baartman as an iconic image of the gendered and racial Other, even as it reified 
her status as scientific and medical object. Prior to her death, Baartman endured intense pressure 
from medical authorities to submit her body to scientific observation, description, and display. 
Like the McKoy twins, Baartman ultimately succumbed to anatomists’ particularly intense 
demands for the examination and sketching of her genitalia, which after her death would be 
dissected from her body and publicly exhibited. As Peter J. Bloom notes, the exhibition of 
Baartman’s genitalia coincided with intensive scrutiny into the biological and attendant 
                                                          
29
 Women of color were defined as particularly sexually voracious, even more so than the ostensibly exceptionally 
virile black male. 
30
 The Khoisan were widely known in Europe in this era as the now pejorative “Hottentot” tribe, a term derived 
from the Dutch for “stutterer” in reference to European attempts to understand and imitate the Khoi language. 
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sociological implications of such purported anatomical differences, citing the work of the 
eminent naturalist Georges Cuvier, who dissected and preserved Baartman’s genitalia after her 
death, as an example:  
Though Cuvier’s conclusions from the presence of the genital flap 
were both erroneous and preposterous, they were part of a shift 
toward a polygenist anthropological paradigm asserting the static 
nature of certain non-European races, who could not be “civilized” 
and thus entered a phase that Paul Broca called “phyletic 
exhaustion”….this schema subsequently gave moral license to acts 
of brutality undertaken in the name of colonial conquest. (158) 
 
Broca’s model of “phyletic exhaustion,” whereby specific races were not only differentiated 
from one another through the presumptive “detection” of a host of physical stigmata but also 
through the gradations in evolutionary potential revealed by these stigmata, is helpful here 
insofar as these classificatory regimes authorize the brutalities to which Bloom refers. In other 
words, according to the anthropological paradigm, when the physical stigmata of race ostensibly 
reveal
31
 an absence of civilizing potential among specific races, eradication is the only recourse, 
particularly when such phyletic exhaustion is combined with a sexual voracity which renders 
uncontrolled reproduction a threat to the “civilized” races.  
The equating of the racial and gendered Other with sexual voracity, then, is already 
deeply entrenched by the publication of Dracula in 1897. Furthermore, the geospatial component 
of this equation had been so long established that it operates almost without articulation or 
question, as when Stevenson’s Enfield asserts that he has just returned from the end of the world. 
“The end of the world” that was Baartman’s native home and Dracula’s fictional domain was the 
breeding ground of sexual monsters, the loci of luxuriant but pernicious insatiability that, in the 
porous boundaries of self and state, threatened to infect the upright British Empire with a 
                                                          
31
 Quotation marks are used throughout this section to acknowledge the blatant racism of the ideologies prevailing 
in this period and of the terminology used to express them.  
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Dionysian wantonness contrary to Anglican codes of morality and industry. It is for this reason, 
as Shildrick argues, that the attempt to define and contain the racial other, particularly at the most 
intimate of bodily sites, assumes such force:  
Racial difference too often has been reduced to a focus on the sites 
of the body where there is an open intersection between inside and 
outside. The attention given to the forms of the mouths, noses, 
breasts, and genitalia may well speak…to an eroticization of the 
racial other, but I would suggest….as breaches in the body’s 
surfaces—points of vulnerability for us all—such sites, in their 
evident or supposed difference, mark an uncertainty about the 
putatively self-contained human being. (52) 
 
Not only do these interstitial spaces, these points of ambiguity between the body’s insides and its 
outsides mirror the same ambivalence regarding bodily integrity that conjoined twins materialize, 
but they also inscribe on the purportedly singular body prevailing fears for the security of 
frontiers of the social body for which the citizen’s body is a metonym.  
Shildrick goes on to describe the attempt to analyze, document, and categorize the racial 
other through the quantification of somatic difference, citing Susan Stewart’s assessment of the 
function of “freak display” in its various forms: “On display, the freak represents the naming of 
the frontier and the assurance that the wilderness, the outside, is now territory” (25). Stoker’s 
novel, therefore, strikes a resonant chord with Britons already consumed by the ever-present 
threat of the outside Other, the forces that encircle and threaten to penetrate the heart of Empire. 
Thus, the title of this section, “Infection in the Vein,” derives from Brian W. Aldiss’ powerful 
reading of Dracula, which situates the external Other as an infectious agent: 
In this great transitional novel, we are not to remain among ancient 
things, whose distance brings comfort along with terror. The 
strength of Stoker’s novel is that his evil Count, for all the world 
like a disease that cannot be checked, arrives in London. A barrier 





In an iconic scene in Stoker’s novel, the Count defines himself as an invasive and contagious 
force, asserting his wish “to go through the crowded streets of your mighty London, to be in the 
midst of the whirl and rush of humanity, to share its life, its change, its death, and all that makes 
it what it is” (26).  In this image, the Count has not only already penetrated the frontiers of the 
empire, but has infiltrated the heart of the colonial center itself. The contagion has spread from 
the periphery to the core, changing through infectious contact the social organism itself. 
Dracula’s program here is particularly telling, suggesting the mechanism through which a virus 
alters the very structure of a cell
32




While the novel echoes in important ways contemporary insights in the field of late 
Victorian biological science, concerns regarding the preservation of the body (and, in particular, 
of the blood) from infection are attended by highly political valences. The racial models which 
authorized the display of Baartman’s body and galvanized the “scientific” study of others like 
her were deployed in the name of a project of cultural sanitizing in which the boundaries of the 
social body might be inoculated from the infections presence of the racial and the ethnic other. 
Indeed, scholars have long situated Stoker’s novel within the context of the Eastern threat, 
identifying Count Dracula as emblematic of Western Europe’s dread of the Ottoman East.  
                                                          
32
 The parallels between Dracula’s life-change-death triad and the cellular changes associated with viral infection 
are striking. A virus infects the host body by first infiltrating the cellular boundaries (i.e. Dracula’s moment of 
“be[ing] in the whirl and the rush”), affixing itself to the core structures of the cell, and then reprogramming the 
cell so that the ordinary processes of the cellular lifecycle (Dracula’s premise of “change”) are grotesquely 
transformed: the host cell is forced to reproduce at an extraordinary rate exact replicas of the viral agent while its 
own reproductive capacities are destroyed, ultimately resulting in the death of the healthy cell.  
33
 While the exact mechanism through which cellular alteration occurs in the presence of a virus did not begin to 
be traced until the advent of the electron microscope in the 1930s, biologists had begun to identify infectious 
processes as early as the mid-1800s, with French, Dutch, and Russian scientists performing increasingly 
sophisticated work by the fin de siècle in the field of germ theory. Work in this field helped to popularize at the 
turn of the century insights into the role of microorganisms in causing disease through the infiltration and 
conquest of healthy bodies, imagery which captured the popular imagination and whose influence can be seen 
throughout the corpus of late nineteenth century British literature.    
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Though it seems undeniable that Dracula’s status as an ancient Romanian aristocrat plays 
in important ways on the specific and deeply engrained fears of the Ottoman Empire and the 
spreading influences of Eastern Europe, Dracula is, at heart, a cipher, an enigmatic figure of 
indecipherable origins. The Count expresses his wish for anonymity in the same scene in which 
he describes his intention to revel in the teeming life of London: “I am content if I am like the 
rest, so that no man stops if he sees me, or pauses in his speaking if he hears my words, ‘Ha! Ha! 
A stranger!’” (Ibid.). The diagnostic paradigms on which fin-de-siècle England relies would find 
such efforts to evade detection horrifying, the absorption and assimilation of the Other 
instantiating the infection which would irredeemably corrupt the social body in as much as the 
conquest of the social body, like the virus’s conquest of the cell, depends first upon a false 
assimilation, the host’s voluntary absorption of foreign agent, whom it wrongly believes to be 
akin to itself, only to discover the ineradicable and lethal difference when it is too late. 
 That Dracula’s castle should appear on no known maps, that, to access it, one  must 
leave behind the known world and enter a space seemingly without names, time, or laws, 
strongly parallels Enfield’s “end of the world” imagery. In his first journey to Castle Dracula, 
Harker notes, “I was not able to light on any map or work giving the exact locality of Castle 
Dracula, as there are no maps of this country as yet to compare with our own Ordnance Survey 
Maps” (10). The sentiment is redoubled in a startling echo of Enfield’s words when Van Helsing, 
recounting the vampire hunters’ approach to the Count’s domain, writes: “For we are going up 
and up, and all is oh so wild and rocky, as though it were the end of the world” (315). As such, 
Dracula may rightly be viewed as the paradigmatic geographical Other, his outsider status 
erasing and eclipsing all specificity, subsuming all demarcations of class, ethnicity, or gender 
beneath the blanket of Other/Outsider in this place where, van Helsing says, “Nature seem to 
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have sometime held her carnival” (Ibid.). Indeed, van Helsing’s choice of words is instructive, 
recalling as they do Bakhtin’s formulation of the carnivalesque in which hierarchical taxonomies 
dissolve in a lawless riot that respects no boundaries of power, order, or rationality. It is no 
coincidence, then, that in the Bakhtinian carnivalesque, it is the monstrous, the grotesque, and 
the transgressive which hold sway, the excesses of their corporeal bodies mirroring the new 
natural order which, like the profligate nature of Dracula’s homeland, knows no order.  
Van Helsing’s description of Dracula’s native country as the site where nature runs riot 
affirms Victorian evolutionary environmentalism, which would link moral, intellectual, and 
physiological attributes with environmental exposure. Like the riotous natural world of Romania 
in Van Helsing’s descriptions, Dracula exemplifies a plasticity, an amorphous and 
uncategorizable nature, that enables him to operate on a multitude of representational levels, 
encompassing a host of collective anxieties, from fear of an encroaching religious threat (Islam) 
to concerns over economic systems (capitalism versus feudalism). Increasingly, however, 
Dracula has come to be recognized as a menace to established gender norms and hierarchies, and 
it is in this capacity that the character’s relationship to Sarah Baartman carries the most 
resonance. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a myriad of literary theorists 
have begun to identify Dracula as a female character, noting everything from his association with 
nature and the phases of the moon to his transport on the Demeter and the Czarina Katherine as 
signs of this (Williams 123). 
While such readings of this iconic figure are certainly thought-provoking and plausible, 
the significance of such insights for the purposes of this study lies in what the popularity of this 
novel reveals about deeply-entrenched anxieties concerning the female body and, especially, the 
body of the female outsider—the foreigner, the threat that lies in wait at “the end of the world.” 
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As Dikstra notes, “racial, sexual, and political prejudices converged during this period to make 
the sexual woman into one of the most terrifying human monsters of all time” (qtd. Shildrick 30). 
If sexual women were, as Dikstra notes, “the most terrifying human monsters of all time,” then 
the threat posed by women in whom the sexual drive is magnified (i.e. “ethnic,” especially 
African, women) simply cannot be quantified or contained. 
Containment, however, was no mean feat, particularly in an England ruled by a powerful 
Queen, an England whose survival depended most immediately upon the sexual bodies of its 
mothers. The defining and the containment of the female body, and, especially, of reproductive 
female bodies, was predicated upon the identification and eradication of threats, both internal 
and external, to the sexual morality of the female subject. In the late nineteenth century, 
physicians and early psychologists began to take women as their primary source of study into the 
nature of the psyche, and, in particular, into mental illness. As was discussed early in this 
chapter, early practitioners of hypnotism concentrated their most intensive efforts on female 
patients deemed to be suffering from hysteria, which, according to the common medical wisdom 
of the time, was preeminently a “female” malady. An excerpt from the Journal of Mental 
Science is particularly telling here:  
The great excess of the female sex under the heading of the 
degenerative disorders is in accordance with general 
experience….There can be no doubt that the urinary and vaginal 
discharges of the insane are highly toxic….It is usually said that 
menstrual periods are accompanied by an exacerbation of insanity. 
That is by no means the rule according to my observations. 
(Urquhart 286) 
 
It is important to note, however, that though these physicians and scientists were operating upon 
largely intangible systems—the conscious and the subconscious—the nineteenth century 





 as R. M. Bache argues in his 1891 essay, “Double Consciousness and 
Duality of the Mind:” “It is certainly conceded by all who come in general estimation within the 
category of thinkers, that psychology, as formerly studied, without basis in physiology, was 
fruitless” (362). As a result, the brain, blood, and organ systems of deceased asylum inmates 
were studied with rigorous scrutiny, while the behaviors (particularly those deemed to be 
pathological) of living patients were charted with an intensive eye toward attendant physical 
signs, with Dr. Urquhart asserting in the same article from The Journal of Mental Science that 
“the blood of the insane is the dernier cri of the modern investigator” (236). However, despite 
Dr. Urquhart’s assertions to the contrary, among the most significant of the physical signs of 
degeneration, many physicians noted, was a perceived correlation between the onset of 
menstruation and mental illness in female patients. This nexus is articulated most poignantly in a 
mid-nineteenth century study of mesmerism and hysteria by Dr. William Davies, which 
describes the experience of a young female patient: 
 Some reaction (of the nature of which we are quite ignorant) 
exerted by the uterine on the nervous system is probably the cause 
of hysteria in nine cases out of ten; this influence acting on persons 
untrained in self-control has for them an actuality to which their 
feeble and ill-regulated wills offer but little resistance, and they 
become the prey to their sensations….Hysterical phenomena are 
not common before the age of puberty. In this girl, analogous 
symptoms were produced at an earlier period….On the occurrence 
of menstruation for the first time—a period when hysterical 
affectations are always likely to occur, this anormal state, which 
had been produced artificially formerly, returned of its own accord. 
(315) 
 
Psychologists and physicians of the era wrote extensively on the purported exacerbation of 
pathological behaviors with menstruation and found in menstrual blood and vaginal secretions 
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 Such a turn toward physiology is not at all surprising since, as has been discussed, fin de siècle Britain was 
assailed by fears of threats to the physical and the social body. Degeneration theories imaged both the individual 
citizen’s body and the British racial body as imperiled by threats whose greatest powers lay in concealment. The 
first and best recourse within this paradigm was, of course, detection. 
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heightened quantities of “pathological indicators,” cells and structures identified as hallmarks of 
mental illness. Low argues that within this context, female sexual anatomy was always already 
defined in terms of the atavistic and/or the pathological: 
Whereas the faculty of reason and the use of language 
distinguished men from apes in the great chain of being, female 
sexual physiology became the border territory between the humans 
and simians. Men were taken as iconic representations of race and 
women were defined primarily as sexual beings. Studies by [18
th
 
century scientists] Johann Blumenbach, a biologist, and Georges 
Buffon, a naturalist, aimed at differentiating female humans from 
animals concentrated on…menstruation, the clitoris, the breasts, 
and the hymen….The case of Sarah Baartman illustrates the fine 
dividing line between woman and primitivity, as the black woman 
became a symbol of regressive sexuality and sexual 
promiscuity….[indicative of] a racial trajectory of gender where 
atavism, degeneration, disease, and corruption are embodied signs. 
(21) 
 
By defining the body and blood of the female as the central locus of pathology, physicians and 
psychologists in one fell swoop positioned not only all females but also those “feminized” Others 
within the purview of medical science and punitive social authorities. That Dracula should 
increasingly be read by contemporary theorists as female is no coincidence within this paradigm, 
as the binary oppositions upon which European Imperialism operated at this time functioned 
primarily according to a gendered duality, with colonized and “non-Western” spaces functioning 
as the “female” counterpart to imperialist, Euro-American masculinity. As such, the “non-male” 
figure, which included not only biological females, but those excluded from the white male 
hierarchy (including racial, ethnic, sexual, and economic “others”) were positioned as the 
intrinsically diseased, subject to a dangerous and, importantly, a communicable pathology.  
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Within this context, John Glendenning’s focus on Dracula’s “preoccupation with 
contemporary medicine” (126) becomes particularly instructive. Glendenning argues that the 
victory of the vampire hunters will depend on their 
identifying the source of internal decay as an invasive foreign body 
to be isolated, expelled, and irrevocably destroyed, a process of 
surgery and disinfection. The movement is from recognition to 
resistance to counterattack. Thus progress as an idea and an 
historical process can, it appears, be saved, first because its enemy 
is alien, not really a part of itself, and second, because its 
identification and isolation as primitive Other makes it vulnerable 
to modern capabilities. Opposition to Dracula builds up in a 
manner that mimics the organizational, scientific, and 
technological development of the modern world and thereby 
appears to reconfirm its ascendancy. (Ibid.) 
 
Furthermore, as indicated by the association of this pathology with menstrual blood and female 
sex organs, the disease which the vampire hunters must eradicate is deeply rooted in female (and 
“female”) sexuality. The gendered, racial, ethnic, and economic “Other” is fundamentally a 
sexual monster, operating in contradistinction to the sexually frigid, because preeminently 
“disembodied,” Enlightenment male subject. Dracula, then, can easily be configured as 
interchangeable with the female insofar as each represents an embodied and rapacious sexuality 
that simultaneously devours and infects its victims. In his Married Life and Happiness, Victorian 
social theorist W. J. Robinson differentiates between the abstemious and the profligate wife: 
 [wives] who are satisfied with occasional relations—not more 
than once in two weeks or ten days—may be considered normal, 
but there is the opposite type of woman who is a great danger to 
the health and even the very life of her husband. I refer to the 
hypersexual woman, to the wife with an excessive sexuality. It is 
to her that the name of vampire can be applied in the literal sense. 
(qtd. Cavallaro 182) 
 
Such a correlation of moral, psychological, and physical degeneration with the embodied 
signs of the female, and, in particular, of the sexualized female, lies at the heart of Dracula. Time 
118 
 
and again, indications of vampiric infection are read through corporeal indicators centering most 
often on the exacerbation of feminine attributes: swollen and ruddy lips, pale and luminous skin, 
and soft and silky voices make the vamp exceedingly beautiful and irresistibly sexual, with the 
most stalwart of men falling prey to their charms, as does Arthur when asked for a kiss by Lucy 
in her vampiric trance and when Van Helsing is mesmerized by the beauty of Dracula’s wives, 
whom he has come to kill. 
The association of the sexualized female body with infection—and with vampirism—is  
an important one, and literary critics are paying increasing attention to an unexpected 
consequence of the encounter with the sexual female vampire: the “feminization” of  the male. 
Each of the male vampire hunters suffer emasculation at the hands of the vamps, an emasculation 
that most often manifests in hysterical breakdown. Though physicians and psychologists, as has 
been stated, found hysteria to be an almost exclusively female ailment, fin-de-siècle Gothic 
novels, in particular, featured upright British gentlemen succumbing to the forces of hysteria. 
This is evident in Dracula, in which each male character, from the aristocratic Holmwood, to the 
responsible businessman Harker, to the learned men of science, Van Helsing and Seward, at one 
point or another fall prey to hysteria in the face of unimaginable circumstances. But such effects 
can also be found in Stevenson’s infamously male-oriented novella, in which Jekyll weeps and 
shrieks like a woman or an animal (also associated with the female), in which the working class 
Poole struggles to maintain his masculine fortitude and self-command, and in which the earnest 
Utterson must marshal all of his self-command to maintain control of his own body and stop the 
trembling of his hand.  
This feminization of the British male, regardless of class, profession, or lineage, 
exemplifies a crucial concern at the end of the nineteenth century: the collapse of British 
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masculinity under the infectious influence of the female (or “feminized”) Other. In positioning 
pathology within the body of the female, and particularly at the site of the sexual organs, social 
engineers and medical experts alike sought to identify and to contain infection at its origin, for 
example through the regulation of prostitution via the Communicable Disease Acts. It is within 
this context that Baartman’s treatment by both the public at large and by the scientific 
community can best be understood. If the sex organs of the female were a significant locus of 
disease and if sexuality were a vital form of transmission, then the body of a woman who bore 
the physical stigmata of such pathology, who corporealized the rapacity and uncontrollability of 
female sexuality, would naturally serve to fetishize both the danger of female embodiment and 
the requirement to monitor, contain, and regulate it.  
Importantly, however, as Dracula reveals, such regulatory projects are, ultimately, futile. 
Dracula’s mutable and unpredictable nature renders any efforts to define and direct him 
impossible. As has been noted, the vampire hunters, through their “powers of combination” 
harness all of the resources of the modern British Empire in order to combat their foe. From the 
industry of the British man (and woman (Mina)) of business and the learned rationalism of the 
scientist, to the hardy masculinity of the adventurer and the immeasurable resources of the 
aristocrat,  Dracula’s foes wage a state-of-the-art battle against an ancient enemy and are, at least 
temporarily, victorious in their attempts.  
The qualifier above is important, however, in that the binaries between self and Other 
upon which the victory of British modernity depends are porous and unstable. Indeed, the 
greatest power and the greatest threat of Dracula and his ilk lie in their adaptability. In his 
analysis of Victorian evolutionary science in late nineteenth century gothic fiction Glendenning 
argues that Dracula undermines prevailing tenets juxtaposing regressive primitivism with 
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progressive evolution insofar as Dracula is seen to exhibit a Darwinian capacity for adaptation 
and survival, evolving into the image of the bourgeois Victorian gentleman even as the vampire 
hunters devolve into criminality (for example, in their breaking and entering into Dracula’s 
London homes). 
 If, as this essay has argued, fears of degeneration inform fin de siècle gothic literature 
and are problematized by the era’s representation of extraordinary bodies and the questions they 
provoke concerning the integrity and stability of the self, then the symbiotic and parallel 
relationships between the vampire hunters and the vampires themselves is particularly important. 
As Glendenning argues, in evolutionary literature, the process of progress is neither predictable 
nor unidirectional. Just as Dracula, like the virus he symbolizes, increases in strength through a 
process of intelligent environmental adaptation, the vampire hunters, in combatting their enemy, 
become like him. In an era in which criminality was linked in fundamental ways to primitivism 
and atavism, the vampire hunters’ thwarting of social, moral, and judicial law blurs the 
boundaries between the civilized and the primitive. While Dracula assumes the habits of the 
bourgeois gentleman, amassing a prodigious library and relying more on money than force in his 
matriculation through London, the vampire hunters lie, trespass, and murder. Van Helsing 
situates their methods in the terms of both a Crusade and a patriotic duty:  
It is that we become as him, that we henceforward become foul 
things of the night like him, without heart or conscience, preying 
on the bodies and the souls of those we love best. To us forever are 
the gates of heaven shut, for who shall open them to us again? We 
go on for all time abhorred by all, a blot on the face of God’s 
sunshine, an arrow in the side of Him who died for man. But we 
are face to face with duty, and in such case, must we shrink? (209) 
 
In this instance, van Helsing’s reference to “the bodies and souls of those we love best” can only 
be a reference to Mina and to the trope of the British “good woman” for which she stands. 
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Encounters between Dracula and the vampire hunters revolve most pointedly around the quest 
for the control of the female body. When the hunters discover Mina feeding on Dracula beside 
the unconscious body of her husband, the Count boasts of his victory before eluding the hunters’ 
grasp: 
You think to baffle me, you with your pale faces all in a row, like 
sheep in a butcher’s….You think you have left me with no place to 
rest, but I have more. My revenge is just begun! I have spread it 
over centuries, and time is on my side. Your girls that you love are 
mine already. And through them you and others shall yet be mine, 
my creatures, to do my bidding and to be my jackals when I want 
to feed. (267) 
 
The forces of modernity, like the advances in medical science which seek to ferret out the germs 
of pathology threatening the British race, are mocked by Dracula in this scene, situating the 
contest between the hunters and the Count as a conflict between civilization and regression, 
between progress and primitivism.
35
 Significantly, Dracula’s conquest is through the 
reproductive capacities of the sexual woman. Rendered vulnerable already from within by the 
pathology of “female blood,” exposure to the infectious agent of the extrinsic other catalyzes the 
corruption latent within the female body, unleashing in particular the potent and uncontrollable 
forces of the sexual female. The unconscious and, in its helpless passivity, feminized body of 
Mina’s husband, lying vulnerably as it does in the presence his wife’s betrayal reflects the 
                                                          
35
 The Count’s description would have been particularly chilling for Britons in the late Victorian era for whom the 
powerful influence of degeneration theories called into question any certainty in progressive evolution. At best, 
the march toward ever-higher stages of evolution was a fond hope; at worst, it was a fading dream amid what 
were taken to be growing signs of the triumphant forces of de-evolution, of the regression to more primitive states 
exemplified by what was taken to be the superior vitality and fecundity of the pathological and the degenerate. 
This is a sentiment echoed in van Helsing’s description of the Count” “In him some vital principle have in strange 
way found their utmost. And as his body keep strong and grow and thrive, so his brain grow too” (278). In other 
words, the intrinsic capacity for survival which is characteristic of such pathological beings combines with 
Darwinian adaptation and, just as evolution had once enabled the “desirable” creatures of the earth to endure 
through accommodation with their environment, this same adaptive capability, when found in a stronger being, 
will ensure the continuation and, ultimately, the conquest of his species—the triumph of force and cunning over 
effete civility.   
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emasculation of all male bodies in the presence of the desiring female. It is a role reversal which, 
as the Count’s threats reflect, destroys the Victorian family structure not just in the moment
36
 but 
in perpetuity. Through the fertile body of the (pathologically) sexual woman, husbands, wives, 
and their off-spring are forever changed, driving the atavism through which men become 
“sheeps” and “jackals.”    
Thus, despite the van Helsing’s disavowal of any resemblance between themselves and 
the reviled Other, however, and contrary to their assertions that such an identification would 
constitute a moral and social death, the nexus between the hunters and their enemy is vast and 
far-reaching. The hunters not only “become as him,” after all, in their methods, but in a context 
in which the blood truly is the life, the foundational force of both survival and of corruption, the 
hunters’ iconic image of ideal Victorian motherhood, Mina, gives birth to a child of supernatural 
and polygamous lineage: he bears in his veins the blood of four fathers, two mothers, and that 
undefinable third force that eludes quantification, prediction, or control. Thus, the expulsion 
fantasy which the novel’s second half endeavors to enact is significant in this regard in as much 
as the expulsion, ultimately, fails. Not only has Dracula’s immortality enabled him to spread his 
infection across centuries, finding sanctuary, “places to rest,” throughout the globe, but in his 
brides, the cherished ones the hunters would redeem, he creates the vectors of his infectiousness. 
As Mina’s pregnancy demonstrates, the only means to stop the spread of the Count’s disease is 
to end the women’s reproductive and/or physical lives, an imperative that Mina herself invokes 
as the hunters pursue the Count to Romania. In seeking to persuade in particular Harker to take 
an oath to end her life when it became apparent that redemption, purification of the vampire’s 
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 The scene is not only polygamous and adulterous but also androgynous, with the Count seeming to breastfeed 




“unclean” influence, is impossible, she couches her appeal in the language of the protection of 
the community through the preservation of the woman’s body: 
Think, dear, that there have been times when brave men have 
killed their wives and their womenkind, to keep them from falling 
into the hands of the enemy. Their hands did not falter any the 
more because those that they loved implored them to slay them. It 
is men’s duty toward those whom they love, in such times of sore 
trial! (287-288)   
 
The shift here from “wives” to “womenkind” is instructive in that it reaffirms the communal 
nature of the reproductive female body. “Womenkind” is the collective upon whom the integrity 
of the social body depends. Significantly, as the novel approach its climax and van Helsing and 
Seward, the physicians, read the embodied signs of Mina’s deterioration, the pledge to end her 
life recurs to them in the increasingly medicalized term, euthanasia. For Seward, the invocation 
of the medical term is a comfort, sanitizing the act by couching it in the language of 
compassionate care. In his journal, Seward states, “‘Euthanasia’ is an excellent and a comforting 
word! I am grateful to whoever invented it” (291).  
As will be seen in the final two chapters of this study, the turn toward professional 
medicine and its discourses after the turn of the century that is foreshadowed in van Helsing’s 
use of the word euthanasia poses an increasing challenge in orientations toward and 
representations of extraordinary bodies. Thus, the second half of this study will center upon two 
masterpieces of modernist literature, James Joyce’s Ulysses and Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. 
Dalloway, to explore shifting and often ambivalent perspectives of the extraordinary body in 
which the ascendance of professionalized medicine in the early decades of the twentieth century 
plays a particularly significant role. The extraordinary body in the high Victorian era and in the 
fin de siècle is a profoundly visible one, one whose material difference is both unassailable and 
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tangibly present—in the freak shows of the countryside, the drawing rooms of the elite, the 
museums and operating theatres of the scientists, or in the unstable body of the citizen self. After 
the turn of the century, however, the preeminence of medical discourse achieves what the 
domesticating influences of the second Bleak House, the self-slaughter of Jekyll/Hyde, and the 
expulsion of Count Dracula could not: the material erasure of the singular body through its 





Discursive Monsters/Monstrous Discourse:  






The body is sung about, ranted about, abused, cut about by doctors, but never talked about. 
Wyndham Lewis 
 
[T]his monster, the body, this miracle, its pain, will soon make us taper into…the raptures of transcendentalism. 
Virginia Woolf 
 
From the Victorian to the Modern: Untamed Matter into Unruly Discourse 
To this point, this study has concerned itself with representations of extraordinary 
embodiment in Victorian and fin-de-siècle Britain. As has been shown, these eras are 
characterized by a fixation on the somatic, a near obsession with the verities of the material body 
in its myriad forms. Within this context, then, the material body in the high Victorian era and the 
fin de siècle is an omnipresent entity, yoked to, invoked by, and deployed for the symbolic 
manifestation and the collective problematization of prevailing cultural anxieties, questions, and 
concerns. As was seen in the analysis of Dickens’ Bleak House in the opening chapter of this 
study, the excessive corporeality of the British giants on wide-scale display on exhibition tours 
and freak show circuits manifests the disproportionality that figured so predominantly in Esther 
Summerson’s “having grown too large” during the incipient stages of her smallpox infection. 
This infection, as was noted, would leave indelible marks of the transgressiveness of Esther’s 
body in the scars etched into her flesh, denoting the material presence of this upper-class woman 
in prohibited spaces—the slums and shanties of the “second” London where contagious illnesses 
reign—and aligning her with such celebrities as Daniel Lambert, who, more than four decades 
after his death, continued to embody in the memory of his 700lb frame the image of John Bull, of 
imperial England, and, in particular, of London itself. Esther’s illness-ravaged face, like the 
lethal excessiveness of Daniel Lambert’s flesh and the prodigious growth of the British Empire 
which he came to symbolize, corporealized the private and the public body as unmindful of 
boundaries and as unimpeded by limits.  
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 Likewise, the second chapter of this study centered upon the gothic romances of the fin 
de siècle and the interrogation of bodily and psychic integrity as materialized in the bodies of 
conjoined twins and “Hottentot Venuses” and fictionalized in the writings of R.L. Stevenson and 
Bram Stoker. This chapter argued that Stevenson’s and Stoker’s iconic monsters, Hyde and 
Dracula, problematize ubiquitous turn-of-the-century concerns over the health of the British
37
  
body, the solidity of the English mind, and the security of the English race. Furthermore, like the 
mid-century’s fascination with “monsters of disproportion,” by the turn of the century, freakery 
and freak performance had settled more firmly on the extraordinary bodies of conjoined twins 
and ethnic and racial
38
 others. The Hilton and McKoy sisters would perpetuate and amplify the 
British fascination with conjoined bodies that Chang and Eng Bunker, the eponymous “Siamese 
twins,” inaugurated earlier in the century. Likewise, Sarah Baartman, whose premature death in 
1815 at the age of 25 proved no barrier to the cult of celebrity that would grow with the attendant 
medicalization of sexuality and the crystallization of eugenics-inspired racial theory, would 
herself continue to embody the centuries-old imago of the “Hottentot Venus.” Through the 
strategic display of her dissected body—and more, particularly, medical drawings, descriptions, 
and carefully preserved “specimens” of her genitalia, including the “apron” which would come 
to signify the pathologized sexuality of both her gender and her race—Baartman would come to 
exemplify extraordinary embodiment as socio-cultural construction, the defining and elaboration 
of the boundaries of the normal and the normative through a fetishistic appropriation and display 
of the body, or, more significantly, of its parts.  
 The texts and the historical figures with which the texts have been aligned in the 
preceding chapters signify nineteenth century Britain’s preoccupation with material corporeality, 
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 This is particularly true of the English body, which is conceptualized as being simultaneously a public and a 
private body.  
38
 This is a focus that was trained especially upon those racial and ethnic others who were also female. 
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a preoccupation reflected, interrogated, and reimagined in the social reform novels of the high 
Victorian era and in the gothic romances of the fin-de-siècle. The remainder of this study, 
however, will theorize and problematize an identifiable break with traditional modes of 
representing the extraordinary body, modes derived, as has been discussed, primarily from the 
Enlightenment era and informed by Linnaean principles of empirical observation and taxonomic 
classification. The Enlightenment ethos of “dare to know” inspired throughout the nineteenth 
century the taxonomical impulses which mandated the up-close analysis and description of the 
material body, illustrated most notably in the voluminous writings of physicians and anatomists 
in this era.  
In the remaining two chapters of this study, we will turn our attention to two masterpieces 
of high modernism, James Joyce’s Ulysses and Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, in an attempt to 
locate and problematize a definitive shift in orientations toward the extraordinary body in this 
era. As will be shown, the ascendance of the medical model, derived from clinical practice and 
representing the triumph of the professionalization of scientific modes of medical practice, 
around the turn of the century troubled traditional representational paradigms through which the 
visibility of the material body was linked in powerful ways to programs of collective identity-
formation, with singular bodies, in their gross materiality, were made to signify, in the tangible 
form of flesh, the anxieties, questions, and concerns of the Imperial body. By the fin de siècle 
and the early twentieth century, however, the dominance of the professional, clinical medicine 
had rendered the extraordinary body at once pathological and discursive. The triad of diagnosis-
prognosis-treatment enabled the domestication of the singular body through its cooptation into 
the medical model. Through this pathologizing of the extraordinary body, as Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson notes, what once had been prodigious has now become predictable, the product of a 
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disease process accessible to and comprehended by medical experts alone. Thus, in rendering the 
prodigy pathological, authority over and responsibility for him/her shifts away from the 
collective
39
 and into the hands of the specialist; the prodigy’s province moves from the drawing 
room exhibition tours of Europe to the closed doors of the clinic. The freak and the wonder 
become the patient and the pathology.  
This chapter’s study of Joyce’s Ulysses, however, will highlight the contentiousness of 
the medical model’s struggle for ascendancy. Indeed, as will be shown through the analysis of 
what Andre Cormier has described as Joyce’s “disability consciousness: that is, a capacity to 
understand and react to the injustices of living with a condition that is almost universally 
misunderstood and traduced” (204), Ulysses’ preoccupation with both the reality of the material 
body and, above all, with its representation, signifies Joyce’s own struggle with the growing 
dominance of medical discourse in shaping the understanding, representation, and treatment of 
the embodied subject. While Cormier locates Joyce’s “disability consciousness” in the latter’s 
own experience of near blindness and of the bouts of illness with frequently left him bedbound,
40
 
the corporeal bodies which populate and consume Joyce’s iconic novel exemplify the myriad 
forms that flesh may take, its unsettling and intractable instability, and the inherent insufficiency 
                                                          
39
 This is not to valorize the condition of the “prodigious” above that of the “pathological”, nor is this to suggest 
that absolutism is meant to be inferred here. The appropriation of the singular body in the era of freak shows and 
exhibition tours was an often abusive process, the hallmark of the exploitation to which the extraordinarily 
embodied individual was subject. The appropriation of the embodied “other” by the collective and for the purpose 
of community identity-formation restricts and often wholly denies the agency and autonomy of the extraordinarily 
embodied subject. Nevertheless, as has been shown, the material presence of the singular body carries with it a 
subversive potentiality unequaled within the diagnostic paradigm. As Robert Bodgan has argued, the freak show, 
by its very nature, threatens prevailing hierarchical structures and normative modes of being insofar as the freak, 
in the moment of display, possesses the power to talk back to the spectator. It is for this reason, then, that 
absolutes are untenable here: the “appropriation” of the freak performer is never all-encompassing. Likewise, as 
will be shown in this chapter, the hegemony of medical discourse is similarly and inevitably only partial. The 
extraordinary subject is never fully prodigious, nor is s/he ever wholly pathological. The intent of this study, then, 
is to demonstrate the processes by which the singular body functions as construct and as social signifier.    
40
 To be certain, Joyce’s own extensive medical training as a once-aspiring physician informs as much as any 
“disability consciousness” his concern with medical discourse and its effects.  
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of discourse to represent it. For Joyce, the empirical language of medical discourse, like the 
ostensible realism of Victorian novels, deforms and defamiliarizes that which it would 
domesticate and illuminate, cloaking an oppressive and dictatorial fiction beneath the fabric of a 
false verisimilitude. The fractured, frequently crude, and often disturbing discourse of Joyce’s 
“epic of the cycles of the body” (qtd. in Brown 11) signify the author’s attempt to contend with 
the amorphous and enigmatic flesh through the cultivation of a representational strategy seeking 
to rescue the material body from the hegemonic abstractions of clinical discursive practice, 
restoring the disruptive flesh that exceeds, shatters, and defies the diagnostic paradigm and 
refuses containment within the medical model.
41
 
Within this context, then, this study can usefully be conceived as divided into two distinct 
sections: the Victorian/Edwardian and the Modern. This bifurcation is foregrounded within this 
study to identify and problematize a recognizable shift in orientations toward material bodies that 
occurred between the Victorian and Edwardian eras and the modernist period,
42
 a shift which, as 
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 It must be noted, however, that the ascendance of the clinical medical model was by no means complete or 
uncontested. Though modern professionalized medicine, as it is practiced today, began to emerge in earnest in the 
eighteenth and, especially, the nineteenth centuries, the clinical model has never been without its detractors. Even 
as the modern medical model began to dominate the field in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
powerful counter-movements actively sought to refute and check its power. Among the most important of these 
were the antivivisectionists, who protested against the use of animal subjects in laboratory testing, upon which the 
clinical model, rooted in scientific experimental practices, is based. Other significant factions opposing the 
ascendance of the clinical medical model were various social reform movements which sought to secure the public 
health through the development of social programs and organizations benefiting the poor, the sick, and the 
exploited. Such groups also endeavored to improve legislative practices, including the repeal of what they deemed 
to be oppressive laws targeting impoverished women (prostitutes in particular), including the Contagious Disease 
Act and the various Poor Laws.  Organizations advocating for the rights of midwives also sought to contest the 
growing power of clinical medicine, which would expel female practitioners from what had for centuries been 
deemed a “woman’s” field: the facilitation of childbirth. By the late nineteenth century, legislation such as the 
Poor Laws and the Contagious Disease Acts had placed legal and political authority in the hands of physicians who, 
with their superior capacity to “read” the body’s physical signs, were alone capable of assessing the efficacy of 
these reforms, ensuring their enforcement, and recommending strategic modifications as needed. Opposition from 
the camps of the vivisectionists, the midwives, and others provided potent counter-narratives to the ascension of 
the clinical medical model.  
42
 For the purposes of this study, we will locate this rupture as occurring around 1910, the year in which, as Woolf 
famously declared, “human character changed” (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” 320). The assignation of a 
definitive date is, nevertheless, a problematic and vexed proposition, insofar as the first shadows of literary 
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will be explored in this chapter and the next, begins to reconceive the material body less as 
corporeal substance and more as discourse. This shift, as Kevin Bell argues, signifies literary 
modernism’s concern with the failures of denotation, the recognition of a simultaneous material 
and discursive lack which modernist experimentation seeks at once to interrogate, to mask, and 
to remediate. Bell writes,  
Modernism is distinguished by this incessant thematization of its 
fundamental disengagement from strict designation—by its 
ongoing encounter with the presences of its own 
nothingness….Indeed, modernism’s notoriously difficult figurality 
always generates multiplicity of longing gestures toward gesture’s 
opposite—substantiality. (9)  
 
As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, discourse, and, in particular, 
experimental discourse intervenes in and endeavors to remediate crises of representation that are 
occasioned by crises of substantiality—namely, by the emergence of the monstrous, unlivable
43
 
body. As will be seen, however, literary modernism’s efforts to contend with the corporeal body 
avail themselves less of the freakish bodies which inhabit Victorian and, especially, fin de siècle 
Gothic literature. While, as this analysis will show, disabled bodies populate Joyce’s’ Ulysses, in 
literary modernism, the conditions of material embodiment are configured as increasingly 
problematic, regardless of how proximal such bodies may appear to be to the normative ideal. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
modernism can be detected as far back as the 1880s and 1890s. Nevertheless, as Woolf’s declaration shows, a 
myriad of pivotal cultural, political, and ideological developments occurred in 1910 which precipitated a 
recognizable turning away from Victorianism and helped to usher in a definitively modernist aesthetic and 
ideological orientation. In 1910, King Edward VII died, leading to what Peter Stansky in his On or About December 
1910: Early Bloomsbury and its Intimate World has described as an increasing political fractiousness in which 
shared allegiances under the auspices of the monarchy, a core tenet of Victorianism, no longer were assumed or 
dominant. At the same time, the modernist aesthetic which had prevailed across continental Europe for years 
began to take belated root in Britain as a result of Roger Fry’s famous exhibition, “Manet and the Post-
Impressionists”, which featured the works of Gauguin, Cezanne, van Gogh, Matisse, and Picasso, and which 
ultimately toppled the reign of Victorian verisimilitude in the arts.   
43
 I use this term within the context of Judith Butler’s theories of the abject body, that body which, in its 
transgression of the norm, simultaneously reaffirms and enforces that norm. The “unlivable” body, within this 
paradigm, is one whose expulsion from the community, the social body, is authorized by its subversion of “natural” 
laws and orders, those implicit and explicit codes which render the body livable and for which transgression 
constitutes a social, if not a physical, death. 
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Indeed, from the turn of the twentieth century on, the “normate” body is increasingly configured 
as fictive, a state of perfection at once unattainable and insisted upon in an increasingly 
medicalized modernity that is coming to recognize health as a collective responsibility and 
obligation. Within this context, Quetelet’s figure of  l’homme moyen (qtd. in Davis, “J’Accuse!” 
38) arises to haunt modernity’s experience and representations of corporeal embodiment, 
rendering all bodies pathological and all embodied subjects monstrous. 
 As Christopher Lawrence notes, it is in the nineteenth century that the medical case 
history, based upon clinical examination and the deployment of a theory of the “normal” derived 
from the emerging field of statistical population analysis, began to assume priority in medical 
practice, ultimately solidifying the links between the physical body and the analysis and 
description of the observing expert, the physician. It is also in this period that, as Lawrence 
further argues, the estrangement of the patient from his/her medical narrative began to emerge, as 
patient self-reporting began to be usurped by processes of clinical observation: 
By the end of the nineteenth century, diseases, even when regarded 
as engendered by self-neglect, were being designated specific, 
often isolable, biological processes, pathological deviations from 
normal physiological processes as a whole….Correspondingly, 
diagnosis was no longer a preliminary act, it was now the most 
significant and difficult clinical skill. Ideally, diagnosis was 
defined as going beyond the symptoms to the identification of the 
biological process that was common to all who suffered from the 
disease…. . For, in the bacteriology laboratory, disease processes 
were accounted reproducible in experimental animals, away from 
the ward and outside of the body of any particular sufferer. (ch. 3) 
 
To be sure, patient narratives continued to be an expected and important component of the 
medical encounter, but the pride of place once reserved for the patient narrative diminished in the 
face of the development of the SOAP (subjective/objective/assessment/plan) method upon which 
modern clinical  medicine is largely based and through which only the first of the quadripartite 
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process incorporates the patient as the active agent and  narrator of his/her own embodied 
experience. Further, the SOAP paradigm exemplifies what Foucault has identified as the 
cooptation of the patient into discourse, the transmutation of the patient’s body into the field of 
medical writing: “It is (clinical) description, or, rather, the implicit labour of language in 
description that authorizes the transformation of symptom into sign and the passage of patient to 
disease and from the individual to the conceptual” (The Birth of the Clinic 114). From the 
objective analysis of the patient’s body by the medical authority comes the insertion of the 
patient into the diagnostic paradigm whereby individual embodied experience is subsumed into a 
rubric of medical description upon which the present (diagnosis) and the future (prognosis and 
treatment) of the material body are inscribed.  
Joyce problematizes this shifting orientations toward the material body in the Hades 
episode, as Bloom reflects at the graveside of Paddy Dingham: 
Your heart perhaps but what price the fellow in the six feet by two 
with his toes to the daisies? No touching that. Seat of the 
affections. Broken heart. A pump after all, pumping thousands of 
gallons of blood everyday. One day it gets bunged up: and there 
you are. Lots of them lying around here: lungs, hearts, livers. Old 
rusty pumps: damn the thing else. The resurrection and the life. 
Once you are dead you are dead. That last day idea. Knocking 
them all up out of their graves. Come forth, Lazarus! And he came 
fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then every fellow mousing 
around for his liver and his lights and his traps. Find damn all of 
himself that morning. Pennyweight of powder in a skull. Twelve 
grammes one penny weight. Troy measure. (89) 
 
Bloom’s musings on the body of the corpse are significant here in that they reflect the 
substitution of an empiricist orientation for a romantic and theological one. The passage begins 
and ends with the invocation and rejection of traditional paradigms of the transcendental body, 
from the idealized image of the heart as the “seat of affections” to the allusion to the resurrection 
of the Christian body. In the place of these images comes an orientation toward the body that is 
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highly clinical: the heart is described as a “pump,” while the decomposition of the postmortem 
brain can be measured with the accuracy of a medical examiner.
44
  
Even as Bloom’s reflections echo the discourse of the clinic in their descriptions of the 
heart pumping its “thousands of gallons of blood everyday,” his formulation nevertheless 
establishes and affirms a strong distinction between himself and the expert clinician. The fatal 
ailments to which the heart is vulnerable are described by Bloom in the slang of the lay person. 
His casual use of the phrase “bunged up” to refer to a constellation of conditions for which only 
the expert may use, or even know, the proper term situates him outside of the scope of medical 
knowledge and its discourse, making the body and its condition foreign, a stranger whose 
language Bloom does not speak. Indeed, as Judith Butler notes in her analysis of hate speech, the 
nexus between language and action is intimate and insuperable:  
[R]acist epithets not only relay a message of racial inferiority, but 
that “relaying” it the verbal institutionalization of that very 
subordination. Thus, hate speech is understood not only to 
communicate an offensive idea or set of ideas but also to enact the 
very message it communicates: the very communication is at once 
a form of conduct. (ch. 2)    
 
Within the context of Butler’s theory of linguistic performativity, the tension demonstrated in 
Bloom’s use of scientific (the heart as a “pump”) and non-scientific (the heart is “bunged up”) 
terminology reflects a failure of discourse that estranges Bloom from the body of his friend. 
Moreover, as Butler’s theory suggests, this halting language functions as a mode of conduct 
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 Joyce’s deployment of the language of currency is significant here, however, in implying a link between the 
empirical quantification of the material body and the assignation of its economic value. Lennard Davis has argued 
that the relative “value” of the physical body derives from its capacity for economic production; hence, according 
to Davis, the recuperability and, therefore, the “worth” of the disabled body is defined by the expert’s estimation 
of the probability of such a body’s return, after therapeutic intervention, to an adequate measure of productive 
viability. Davis writes that this value-laden rehabilitative model is one driven by “an industrial mentality that saw 
workers as interchangeable and therefore sought to create a universal worker whose physical characteristics 
would be uniform, as would the result of their labors” (Disability Studies Reader, Introduction) 
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through which the use of language enables, authorizes, and performs Bloom’s deference to the 
medical authorities which alone can define the maladies by which this mysterious “pump” gets 
“bunged up.” That Bloom’s linguistic codes are not absolute, however, is significant in as much 
as they demonstrate that the pathologizing of Dingham’s body is, itself, not absolute. Though 
Bloom’s deployment of a medicalized discourse is impartial and inexpert, it is not wholly 
inaccessible to him as a lay person. Likewise, Bloom’s juxtaposition of specialized discourse 
with folk colloquialisms is nevertheless effective in communicating his ruminations on the 
material body of his friend; the result is an idiosyncratic and highly personal discourse of the 
body that unsettles the hegemonic aims of medical discourse.  
In addition to the clinical encounter’s appropriation of the patient body into the field of 
medical discourse, such an encounter also effects a radical reconstitution of the physical body 
under the auspices of the medical paradigm. If modern medicine not only enacts the isolation of 
the disease from the individual, it also alienates the constituent parts of the body from the whole 
self, including, in particular, requiring the estrangement  of the “pathological” element from the 
ideally “normate” subject. This fracturing of the patient body into discrete loci of the expert’s 
attention and intervention constitutes a profound departure from traditional forms of medical 
practice. Lawrence notes that “In the eighteenth century, the illness which followed 
irresponsibility was, patient and doctor agreed, a deviation from the sufferer’s own natural state. 
At any moment, the disease was the whole condition of the sufferer, inseparable from him” (ch. 
3). 
The emergence of the SOAP method is an important illustration of the ascension of the 
modern professionalized medical paradigm which, as this study suggests, powerfully impacts the 
conceptualization and representation of the human body and, in particular, of those bodies 
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traditionally configured as extraordinary and/or aberrant. Though the famous Oxen of the Sun 
episode has been widely recognized as a tour-de-force cycle through the history of English 
literature, the episode’s problematizing of this discursive medicalization of the body has received 
relatively little attention. A passage early within the episode, however, is helpful here, as Joyce 
mocks the obfuscating power of medical discourse even as he reflects on its growing reach 
across modern Ireland: 
It is not why therefore we shall wonder if, as the best historians 
relate, among the Celts, who nothing that was not in its nature 
admirable admired, the art of medicine shall have been highly 
honoured. Not to speak of hostels, leperyards, sweating chambers, 
plaguegraves, their greatest doctors…have sedulously set down the 
divers methods by which the sick and the relapsed found again 
health whether the malady had been the trembling withering or 
loose boyconnell flux. Certainly in every public work which in it 
anything of gravity contains preparation should be with importance 
commensurate and therefore a plan by them was adopted… 
whereby maternity was so far from all accident possibility 
removed that whatever care the patient in that all hardest of woman 
hour chiefly required and not solely for the copiously opulent but 
also for her who not being sufficiently moneyed scarcely and often 
not even scarcely could subsist valiantly and for an inconsiderable 
emolument was provided. (321) 
 
The passage refers specifically to Mina Purefoy’s three days’ labor at the National Maternity 
Hospital but suggests the ascendance of clinical medicine, a growing dominance which inflects 
even that which had traditionally been regarded as distinct from medical practice: childbirth. 
Joyce’s assumption of both the “opulent” woman and the woman “not…sufficiently moneyed” 
under the paradigms and practices of obstetric medicine represents a definitive shift from 
Victorian praxis insofar as the all-encompassing reach of the maternity hospital subordinates 
once-dominant identity markers
45
 to that imposed by the medical model itself. Prior to the turn of 
the century, childbirth had been excluded from the purview of medical practice, often considered 
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 These include the demarcations of class and ethnicity.  
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a private matter to be attended only by (female) midwives, who were often illiterate and 
possessed no training beyond the passing on of folk methods from woman to woman. Moreover, 
modalities of childbirth were profoundly inflected by class and social status. While lower class 
women sought the care of midwives or other female attendants, elite women, particularly by late 
century, would be cared for by accoucheurs, 
46
 who often would have received at least some 
degree of training in the field of obstetrics. The proliferation of maternity or “laying in” hospitals 
in the final decades of the nineteenth century was driven chiefly by the demand for improved and 
more accessible care for working and lower class women, while the affluent continued to deliver 
at home, attended by accoucheurs or by “gentlemen physicians.”
47
 Joyce’s assertion in the final 
lines of this passage that the maternity hospital in which Mina Purefoy lies is one which shelters 
wealthy and impoverished women alike exemplifies the increasing power of the clinical model, 
as class and status demarcations are subsumed beneath the paradigm of “patient,” rendering 
pregnant bodies uniform, interchangeable, and pathological. 
 Moreover, this uniformity of the “pathologically” pregnant body is accomplished by and 
authorized through medical writing. In this passage, it is the “plan,” authored by the eminent 
physicians so admired, according to Joyce, by the Celts, which homogenizes the diverse female 
bodies seeking care within the confines of the maternity hospital. The methods by which the 
delivering woman will be treated are defined in advance, for the sake of safeguarding her from 
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 Such professionals were also often referred to as “male midwives.” 
47
 As Terrie Romano notes, by the mid-nineteenth century, medical practitioners were largely divided into two 
camps, the “gentlemen physicians” and the clinicians. The gentlemen physicians were largely from the upper 
classes, had received a classical education (usually at Oxford), were members of the Royal Colleges, and served as 
consultants in London and surrounding areas. Clinicians were general practitioners who derived from the middle 
class, were frequently licensed by the Society of Apothecaries and members of the College of Surgeons. Unlike the 
classical training of the gentlemen physicians, clinicians had received a more rigorous scientific education, one that 
frequently included experience in the dissecting rooms and experimental laboratories shunned by the Oxford-
trained consultants. While the gentlemen physicians attended to the London elite, frequenting the homes of the 
wealthy and the affluent, general practitioners served the working classes and the poor in the growing numbers of 
hospitals and clinics in and around the major cities. 
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“all accident possible.” In doing so, her body is surveilled, described, and defined within the 
clinical triad,
48
 illustrating once again the estrangement of the once-familiar body through its 
cooptation into medical discourse.  
Nevertheless, Joyce’s mock heroic tone within this passage provides another salient 
example of the author’s attempt to advance a viable counter-narrative to the growing dominance 
of the medical model and its pathological discourse. Neurological disease is referenced through 
the antiquated term, “the trembling withering,” recuperating and reaffirming the powers of the 
lay person to detect and to describe disease. Likewise, the reference to the “loose boyconnell 
flux” in the same sentence to refer to severe diarrhea not only enacts a similar prioritizing of the 
colloquial but it also serves a leveling function: “trembling withers” and “loose boyconnell flux” 
are rhetorically placed on a par with one another, both are the province of medical practice, and, 
significantly, both are subject to recurrence. Indeed, the invocation earlier in the sentence of the 
often infamous history of medicine in the figures of the “hostels, leperyards, sweating chambers, 
and plaguegraves” emphasize the limits of medical expertise, the trial-and-error modalities which 
exemplify the transgressions of the patient’s material body, the intractability of illness, and the 
inevitability of mortality. 
 As leading disability theorists such as Lennard Davis, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and 
Tom Shakespeare have shown, it is the reality of the inherent vulnerability of the material body, 
its inevitable capitulation to death and disease, which has precipitated the frequently obsessive 
and occasionally violent fixation on the human body and, in particular, on singular bodies, a 
fixation of which the modern medical model is only one example.
49
 By the turn of the twentieth 
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 This triad is the prognosis-diagnosis-treatment paradigm of the modern medical model. 
49
 Without a doubt, the modern clinical medical model, as the work of disability studies scholars has shown, is the 
prevailing modality in the twentieth and twenty-first century for grappling with the fragility of the material body, 
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century, medicalized discourse, predicated upon a notion of essential lack and/or intrinsic 
vulnerability, galvanized a growing belief in the inherent aberrance of all living human bodies 
(even insofar as such aberrance exists in a potential rather than actual state), rendering 
embodiment virtually intolerable and thereby necessitating and authorizing medical surveillance 
and intervention. As a result of this “enfreakment” of the “natural” body, extraordinary bodies--
those which by virtue of deformity, accident, or disease already manifest an inappropriate 
deviation from the normative ideal (and therefore dangerously exemplify the fallibility to which 
all human bodies are heir)--become not merely intolerable but unimaginable and even 
unspeakable. It is for this reason that even materially-minded modernists like Woolf would, at 
times, situate literature within a paradigm which presupposes, if not advocates, the erasure of the 
body: “literature does its best to maintain that its concern is with the mind; that the body is a 
sheet of plain glass through which the soul looks straight and clear” (qtd. in Gordon 1). 
Moreover, Woolf not only identifies literature with the dematerialization of the body, but asserts 
this process as a point of privilege within the project of literary modernity itself when she writes, 
“for the moderns…the point of interest lies very likely in the dark places of psychology” (qtd. in 
Gordon 19). This is not to suggest, however, that literary modernism and Woolf’s oeuvre in 
particular aligns with, affirms, or perpetuates the Cartesian mind/body duality in which the first 
is the privileged (and, indeed, often the only recognized) term. Indeed, as will be shown in this 
chapter and the next, literary high modernism not only takes the Cartesian duality as a point of 
departure within its program of, as Bell terms it, “difficult figurality” but it also deploys 
experimentalist techniques in an effort to recuperate the absent and the unspeakable, restoring the 
missing term in the Cartesian binary by problematizing representation itself.      
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but, as this chapter in particular has also shown, clinical medicine’s authority has always been challenged by a 
myriad of counter-discourses seeking to reimagine, redefine, and re-value the body. 
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The vexed program of modernist experimentation, as Peter Brooks asserts in his iconic 
study Body Works, operates in response to an inherent crisis of representation at the heart of 
modernist art and literature (cited in Brown 12-14). Taking Gauguin’s and Freud’s work as 
emblematic of this crisis, Brooks argues that modernism’s recognition of the failures of mimesis 
constitutes the definitive break from the Victorian and Edwardian periods, with their 
foundational assumptions of representationality and the orientation toward somaticization 
authorizing such efforts at representation. At the core of modernist experimentation as 
exemplified by modernist art is the interrogation of the modes of embodied being, modes which 
in their very nature are pluralistic, concurrent, and contradictory, rendering representation as it 
had been traditionally conceived and enacted impossible. In applying Brooks’ studies to Ulysses, 
Richard Brown describes modernity’s project of endeavoring to re/conceive of and re/present the 
body in a new form that 
at least since Nietzsche and since Freud, can partly be defined in 
terms of an attempt to think beyond the subject-object 
distinction….This distinction, in different ways across the different 
intellectual disciplines which conceive and govern the body, may 
be thought to tend to objectify and control and to see the body in 
terms of its diseases or to “pathologize” it in ways that make our 
modern civilisations modern but at the same time may make them 
uncomfortable or even potentially uninhabitable environments 
cultural environments for our full bodily selves. (14) 
 
Modernism’s foregrounding of this representational crisis, its situating of mimetic skepticism at 
the heart of its ideological program, both necessitates and authorizes the aestheticizing of 
representation. Indeed, in his essay, “Body Works”, Brown takes Picasso’s iconic Desmoiselles 




A paradigmatic work like Picasso’s 1907 Desmoiselles d’Avignon, 
with its multidiscursive array of differently figured women’s 
bodies seems to declare that there is no longer one representation 
of the body but that the body may, as it were, intrude through and 
into the conventions of representations by insisting on the 
necessities of modality and of difference. (110)  
 
The represented object is now the aesthetic object, co-opted into a paradigm of artistic 
experimentation designed to illuminate the creative/representational process itself. Even more 
significant, the reality of embodied difference necessitates, compels, and authorizes this 
aestheticization. The intrusion of the reality of the material body into the representational 
paradigm requires the construction and imposition of an experimental discourse which at once 
absorbs, defamiliarizes, and transforms the body’s unsettling corporeality. This aestheticizing 
process in turn exemplifies and interrogates the constructedness of both subjectification and 
objectification, the formation of the subject and the object, the observer and the observed, 
through ideologically-infused creative acts and, most especially, through the act of discourse. In 
continuation of his analysis of literary modernism’s efforts to resist this binary structure of 
representations of embodiment, Brown argues that Joyce’s project in Ulysses and, in particular, 
within the “Penelope” episode may “emerge as an ‘ontological’ project: one of being the body” 
(14) in contradistinction to Cartesian epistemologies of knowing the body only. 
 
Ethics and Ethos of Otherness: Knowing, Being, and Speaking the Extraordinary Body 
Within the context of the problematizing of representation in an effort to discover new 
modes of knowing, being, and speaking the embodied other, then, literary modernism’s 
experimental program can best be understood as a mechanism through which the constructedness 
of discursive representation, and the ideological paradigms (or, as Foucault would term them, 
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“power/knowledge structures”) which inform them can be replicated and problematized. Marian 
Eide asserts that the metafictional investments of literary modernism exemplify an essential 
ethical commitment long denied literary modernism, one in which the united acts of creation, 
reception, and interpretation constitute a procedure of ethical exchange in which both parties are 
reconstituted in the act of ethical interpretation, the endeavor to understand and to be understood 
from a position of fundamental difference (4). 
While the efforts of these scholars to approach literary modernism through the lens of 
ethics provide promising and profitable new insights into canonical modernist texts, relatively 
little attention has been given to the implications of modernist experimentation in the 
representation of bodies defined by their fundamental difference. The aestheticizing of 
representation in literary modernism takes on an important resonance, however, when directed 
toward the gross materiality of extraordinary bodies, adding new valences to the metafictional 
program insofar as the discursive orientations of modernist experimentation simultaneously echo 
and investigate the appropriating forces of medicalized discourse. Thus, literary modernism 
occupies an uneasy liminal position within the context of medicalized modernity in that it at once 
may be seen to constitute a problematization of the discursive paradigms seeking to construct 
and maintain modern identity paradigms through processes of normalization and pathologization. 
Simultaneously, however, and insofar as literary modernism seeks to reify the embodied subject 
through aesthetic (experimental) discourse, it activates the same estrangement from the material 
realities and subjective experience of the body as does the medical discourse it interrogates. 
Perhaps no modernist work better exemplifies this tension between the manifestation and 
the erasure of the material body than Ulysses. Joyce famously declared his high modernist 
masterpiece to be an “epic of the cycles of the human body” (qtd. in Brown 11) and the 
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ascendance of body studies in late twentieth and early twenty-first century criticism has inspired 
voluminous writings on the novel’s representations of embodiment. Indeed, literary theorists, and 
especially those working within the context of disability studies, have begun to note the 
remarkable numbers of disabled characters which populate the text, particularly (and not 
coincidentally) at its margins.  
Despite the immense critical attention that has been paid to representations of 
embodiment in general and disabled embodiment in particular in this novel, however, relatively 
little focus has been placed on the implications of the novel’s aesthetic/experimental investments 
in regard to the representation of the grossly material body. Nevertheless, a closer look at the 
novel’s application of experimental discourse to its extraordinarily embodied characters 
constitutes an important project within this work of highlighting, questioning, and challenging 
medicalized modernity’s appropriation of the corporeal body into language even as it perpetrates 
a similar cooptation in the absence of viable alternatives. As Cormier argues, Joyce’s own 
struggles with visual impairment and the physical illnesses which would at times leave him 
bedbound rendered him acutely sensitive both to the vulnerabilities of the material body and to 
the subsuming of that body into the language of pathology (204). Insofar as Ulysses, then, can be 
articulated as an epic of the body, its author joins a chorus of modernist voices, from Woolf to 
Lewis, calling for a new language of the body. Nevertheless, the extraordinarily embodied 
characters which circle the periphery of Joyce’s text attest to the impossibility of articulating the 
body in that representation, whether through the pathologizing paradigms of medical discourse 
or the aestheticizing forms of experimental discourse. Thus, the experimental techniques of 
literary modernism echo the dangers of medical discourse itself, a discourse which substitutes he 
sign for the signifier: the word for the character; the pathology for the patient. Van Boheemen-
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Saaf describes the “Penelope” episode as the moment in which the text finally and absolutely 
“favors style over message, textuality and code over a referent, the sign over the body” (42), 
replacing the material presence with the immaterial word.  
The challenge of representation within literary modernism, particularly in its efforts to 
discover new modes of speaking the body, however, is to differentiate its program from the 
clinical discourse of medicalized modernity which it so closely parallels. Indeed, in The Birth of 
the Clinic, Foucault situates the clinical encounter within a complex interdynamic of seeing and 
speaking: “[C]linical experience represents a moment of balance between speech and spectacle. 
A precarious balance, for it rests on a formidable postulate: that all that is visible is expressible, 
and that it is wholly visible because it is wholly expressible” (115). The connection Foucault 
draws here between recognition (visibility) and representation (expressibility) is crucial to the 
project of literary modernism insofar as the clinical encounter itself monopolizes and mediates 
the capacity to see and to speak. Foucault writes,  
One now sees the visible only because one knows the language; 
things are offered to him who has penetrated the closed world of 
words….Description, in clinical medicine, does not mean placing 
the hidden or the invisible within the reach of those who have no 
direct access to them; what it means is to give speech to that which 
everyone sees without seeing—a speech that can be understood 
only by those initiated into true speech. (Ibid.) 
 
In Foucault’s formulation, the clinical encounter institutes an interdynamic of sight/speech that is 
in itself a totality, constituting (by speaking) the subject/object in the instant of clinical 
recognition. Within this paradigm, there is no remainder, no excess which can be reconstituted 
through discursive experimentation outside of the clinical encounter: what is seen is (clinically) 
spoken; what is not (clinically) spoken cannot be seen, and what is neither spoken nor seen in 
medicalized modernity does not exist. Thus, within this framework, those uninitiated into the 
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discourse of “true speech” are rendered both mute and blind until the language of the clinic 
intervenes to discursively construct the subject and thereby to call it into existence.  
At the heart of such a program, then, is the lack which Brooks and others have located 
within literary modernism’s crisis of representation. This lack is, fundamentally, a discursive 
void encircling the perimeters of medicalized modernity which forbids the recognition and 
representation of the material body without recourse to the language of normativity and 
pathology insofar as it is this pathologizing language with enables, authorizes, and compels the 
construction of the material body in the first place. In Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of 
History, van Boheemen-Saaf situates the process of transmuting the signified into the signified 
within the colonial context, arguing that Joyce’s oeuvre as a whole and Ulysses in particular 
articulates the scene of colonial trauma. For van Boheemen-Saaf, the novel represents the 
endeavor to express, discharge, and compensate for this fundamental lack that lies at the heart of 
the colonial process, a process which in itself relies upon the construction of pathologized 
“colonial” bodies. She writes: 
[Joyce’s] projection of a traumatized discursivity encapsulating the 
life-in-death of Irish experience, his syncretic manner of 
representation, his paradoxical approach to Irish nationalism, his 
complex attitude to language and cultural memory anticipate 
insights which we are only beginning to grasp at the end of the 
century. Joyce, an Irish Catholic born in 1882, grappled with the 
realities of colonial experience and the hegemony of the English 
language; and this struggle entailed an engagement with the 
evaporation of the presence of the material, and the devaluation or 
dissolution of art and truth….Joyce’s encrypting of the experience 
of destitution in the material location of his text opens up a new, 
intersubjective realm of communication which may help to make it 
possible to work out the heritage of the past and transform the 
ghostly uncanniness of the “death instinct” into full discourse. (1) 
 
As Irish-born subjects of the British crown, Stephen and Bloom, like their creator, suffer the 
traumas of colonial history which would compel them to manifest in the language of the 
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oppressor an oppression that defies signification insofar as the representation of colonial 
dominance requires an articulation of a (politically) embodied experience in a language 
repudiated and erased by the discourse of the master. The result is the endeavor to articulate the 
void upon which the othering of the colonized body is predicated and by which it is authorized. 
For van Boheemen-Saaf, then, the experimentation which lies at the heart of Ulysses is an 
articulation of an unspeakable and inarticulate trauma, an effort to speak of a politicized 
embodiment which can know itself neither in sign nor substance as a result of the politics of 
erasure upon which colonized subjectification and domination are built.  
 
A Queer Idea: The Transcendental Blind Stripling and the Language of Blindness  
Van Boheemen-Saaf’s insights on colonialism are useful within the context of this study 
insofar as the colonized body links in many respects with the disabled body through the 
programmatics of othering. As Cormier notes, Joyce maintains both a colonial and a disability 
consciousness in his sensitivity to the politicized processes whereby material bodies are 
inscribed, constructed, and contained for the purposes of building and/or maintaining 
power/knowledge structures (204). Within this framework, then, the disabled bodies which 
populate the peripheries of Joyce’s text may be seen both to reflect and to comment upon the 
colonial regime increasingly scrutinized and resisted in Ireland at the moment of the text’s 
publication. For Cormier, the “transcendental blind stripling” constitutes an especially potent 
example of the critical function of the extraordinarily embodied other. While, as Cormier notes, 
the equating of blindness with exceptional insight or even “second sight” is centuries old, a 
longstanding cliché by Joyce’s era, blindness holds an innovative position in Joyce’s text in so 
far as it situates the stripling outside of the economies of the colonial gaze (209-210). The 
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stripling cannot participate in the visual indoctrinations of the colonial enterprise. The visible 
proofs of British colonial power that populate turn-of-the-century Dublin (the thoroughfares, the 
shops showcasing wares from every corner of the British Empire, and above all the monuments) 
have no impact on the stripling. Indeed, Bloom’s meditations on the stripling’s perceptions 
suggest the possibility of an extraordinary, if not potentially subversive, consciousness in the 
stripling’s non-normative modes of perception:  
See things in their foreheads perhaps: kind of sense 
volume….Wonder would he feel it if something was removed. 
Feel a gap. Queer idea of Dublin he must have, tapping his way 
round by the stones. Could he walk in a beeline if he hadn’t that 
cane? (152)  
 
Bloom’s musings on the stripling’s experience imaginatively transform both the city and the 
stripling himself into phantasmagoric entities: the city is metamorphosed into a fantastical place, 
populated by the stones that serve at once as obstacle, threat, and navigational tool. Likewise, the 
stripling is also changed in Bloom’s imagination, becoming simultaneously more and other than 
human: he is at once a cyclopean monster, with his vision in his forehead, and an industrious 
insect, capable of achieving extraordinary feats of navigation through the superhuman powers of 
his body. This apotheosis of bodily power, however, manifests itself only once the accoutrements 
of civilization—the cobblestones of the Dublin street and the cane used to enable the stripling to 
negotiate them—are removed. In Bloom’s imagination, the stripling’s powers can be unleashed 
because his extraordinary embodiment has already situated beyond the trappings of Irish national 
culture and the medicalization upon which modernity rests.  
Such romanticized notions of the subjective experience of extraordinary embodiment do 
more than potentially subvert prevailing perceptions of both the city and of the embodied 
subjects which inhabit it. For Bloom, the stripling activates a recognition and questioning of the 
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objectification of the subject, of the constitution of the self through the awareness of oneself as 
object. This is particularly important within the context of van Bohemeen-Saaf’s and Cormier’s 
analyses of the text as an interrogation and critique of the colonial enterprise.  The stripling in his 
blindness operates outside of the reciprocal and mutually interdependent mechanisms of the 
colonial gaze which, as Foucault argues in his doctrine of discipline through self-surveillance, 
depends as much on the subject’s awareness of and response to himself as object as it does on the 
presence of any outside force objectifying the subject.  
Always already doubly othered by his disability and his Irishness, the stripling 
matriculates through the streets of Dublin unencumbered by sight, deconstructing the materialist 
discourses upon which the colonial enterprise operates and replacing them with highly 
individualized and intensely subjective constructs of material reality. That the stripling enjoys 
this capacity to resist and revise hegemonic discourse and its operations through the 
subjectification and objectification of the colonial other is evident in Bloom’s reactions 
immediately after leaving the stripling. As Bloom begins to imagine sexual intercourse without 
the sense of sight, his thoughts quickly transition from the question of perceiving one’s sexual 
partner to the question of perceiving oneself. In the process, he begins to explore the feeling of 
his body beneath his hands, as the blind might explore a book in Braille: “Walking by Doran’s 
publichouse he slid his hand between his waistcoat and trousers and, pulling aside his shirt 
gently, felt a slack fold of his belly. But I know it’s whitey yellow. Want to try in the dark to see” 
(153).  
It is significant, however, that Bloom’s efforts to understand and to place himself in the 
position of the stripling immediately compel him to revert back to the position of sightedness and 
to the validation of empirical truth through the affirmation of sightedness: “I know it’s whitey 
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yellow.” Lennard Davis argues that this process of imaginatively positioning oneself within the 
context of disability in fact reaffirms normative paradigms, rather than undermining them: 
The average person imagines what it would be like to be blind, 
deaf, or lame by the simple act of closing one’s eyes, stopping 
one’s ears, or walking with a limp. After a few seconds of this 
deprivation, one generally rushes back to the comfort of 
“normality”. This process creates in reality not understanding, but 
an “us-them division” which also neatly reinforces the hegemonic 
demands that one be “normal.” (J’Accuse! 36) 
 
It is no coincidence that immediately following this moment of empathetic understanding that 
Bloom returns to the paternalistic discourse with which the scene began: 
Poor fellow! Quite a boy. Terrible. Really terrible. What dreams 
would he have, not seeing? Life a dream for him. Where is the 
justice in being born that way? All those women and children 
excursion beanfest burned and drowned in New York. Holocaust. 
Karma they call that transmigration for sins you did in a past life 
the reincarnation met him pike hoses. Dear, dear, dear. Pity, of 
course: but somehow you can’t cotton on to them someway. (Ibid.) 
 
Bloom’s panicked reaction to this moment of empathic understanding rehearses both ancient and 
contemporary discourses of the extraordinary body until an ultimate affirmation of normativity is 
achieved through the disavowal of the blind other. Bloom transitions swiftly from pity, to 
moralistic blame and retribution, to an economy of cost/benefit rationalization that gestures 
toward eugenics: why must the “desirable” children and women (in whom the perpetuation of 
more “desirables” rests) die so tragically, when this pitiful one for whom life is merely a dream 
continues to endure?   
Thus, the stripling’s presence at the periphery of the text certainly seems to provide the 
context for alternative modes of perception and representation, a possibility for the construction 
of a critical consciousness which may stand in opposition to the hegemonic discourses of 
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medicalized modernity and imperialism. Nevertheless, critical analysis of the stripling and of the 
novel’s other extraordinarily embodied characters expresses a triumphalism that perpetuates 
long-standing essentialist paradigms of the disabled body as the occasion for and instrument of 
moral revelation and reclamation. Moreover, this revisionist reading of the novel’s disabled 
characters is unsupported by the text itself, which presents a far more complex and nuanced 
portrait of extraordinary embodiment. Cormier’s analysis echoes Eide’s argument that Joyce’s 
aesthetic project is fundamentally ethical, deriving from an ethos of difference, which Levinas 
would later situate in  the inherent particularity of the other, is preserved with full recognition of 
its incommensurability and incomprehensibility. Within this framework, as has been suggested 
earlier in this chapter, the process of recognizing the other in its fundamental difference activates 
an ethical evolution in the subject confronting this difference, leaving both subjects—the self and 
its “other”—forever altered.  
Such readings of the novel’s disabled figures from the perspectives of both ethics and 
colonial resistance offer profitable insights into the potentiality of extraordinary embodiments as 
loci of change, of the “monstrous” subject as change agent. Nevertheless, such readings fail to 
fully account for the complicated ideological and discursive webs in which aberrant bodies are 
constructed and compelled to function (or not). Critics have frequently interpreted Bloom’s 
reaction to the blind stripling as he assists him across the busy Dublin street as indicative of both 
Bloom’s desire for a lost paternity and as the falling back into traditional paternalistic discourses 
in the absence of viable alternatives. Underlying these readings is an assumption of the benignity 
of Bloom’s responses that are not borne out by the text insofar as Bloom’s stance toward the 
stripling perpetuates and leaves unproblematized turn-of-the-century paradigms of disability. 
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Bloom’s “lost paternity” as it is enacted in a moment of nurturing for the stripling co-opts 
the man into the role of surrogate for the son Bloom has lost, the stripling’s aberrant body both 
prompting and authorizing a display of care that is simultaneously paternal and paternalistic. 
Inasmuch as the stripling is without an individual identity,
50
 his body becomes rife for the type of 
substitution Bloom achieves here, discharging the performance of a fatherly obligation to care, to 
guide, and to protect through the now instrumentalized body of the stripling. Thus, the stripling, 
insofar as he is made to act as surrogate for the lost son, performs a long-standing function of the 
disabled body as the locus of the wish-fulfillment of the “normate,” the “normal” subject and as 
the occasion for the display of the normate’s moral virtue.  
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the alternative realities envisioned by Bloom 
are his own. The text offers no insight into the stripling’s manner of perceiving Dublin; in a 
novel informed by the free-floating narrative voice slipping into and out of its primary and 
tangential characters like a mist, the doors to the stripling’s consciousness are locked. In the 
presence of this inscrutable otherness, Bloom inserts his own narrative of alterity, drawing, not 
coincidentally, upon familiar tropes of disability, paradigms which range from infantilization and 
exoticism to hyper-sexualization and perversity. At the root of this discursive network, however, 
is a pathologization that leads, ultimately, to a disavowal of the other linked to the construction 
and the affirmation of the self. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the stripling himself does not 
speak at all in this scene, nor is it by chance that the stripling receives aid that he never solicited. 
The same paradigms which lead Bloom to assume the stripling’s need, borne of medicalized 
modernity’s rhetoric of the intrinsic lack of all bodies
51
 and, in particular, of always already 
                                                          
50
 It is significant that Bloom doesn’t wonder what the stripling’s name is but if he has a name. 
51
 The rhetoric of intrinsic lack derives from the premise of the vulnerability of material bodies to death and 
disease, a premise upon which the ascendance of the modern medical model is based and from which it derives its 
power. The material body, as vulnerable object, requires and authorizes continuous monitoring and regulation 
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pathological (disabled) bodies, presupposes the stripling’s sense of such a need, his desire for 
intercession, and his gratitude for this ultimate act of benevolence. Within this context, the 
stripling’s silence is both expected and authorized: both men follow a script of disability, as is 
evident in Bloom’s profound sensitivity to his own speech when approaching the stripling: “Say 
something to him. Better not do the condescending. They mistrust what you tell them. Pass a 
common remark” (151). Bloom’s assertion of the stripling’s mistrust of language simultaneously 
suggests the possible existence of an alternative discourse which would speak to the stripling’s 
“[q]ueer idea(s),” even as the stripling’s ultimate silence affirms the absence of any place for 
such a discourse within this script of disability.  
Despite Bloom’s flight into these traditional representational modes, it would be 
inappropriate to cast Bloom’s actions in a wholly uncharitable light, to characterize Bloom as 
opportunistic or exploitative. Rather, the exchange between Bloom and the stripling exemplifies 
the highly complex, subtle, and potent discursive regimes in which all bodies are bound. That 
Bloom should fall back into the language of paternalistic care in the absence of viable 
alternatives is significant here in as much as this language shapes both perception and response. 
While the prodigiously named Cashel Boyle O’Connor Fitzmaurice Tisdell Farrell navigates the 
Dublin thoroughfares with more difficulty and danger than the stripling could ever imagine, the 
normative nature of his body situates him within the purview of eccentric (but self-reliant) 
individuality, rather than the realm of need and of care that is the stripling’s habitus. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
through the modalities of clinical medicine. As an intercessory agent, clinical medicine is engaged a continuous 
process of remediating or managing the body’s vulnerabilities, identifying existing or potential deviations from an 
idealized state of completeness (i.e. total health and optimal functioning). In the era of modern prenatal testing, as 
Rayna Rapp and others have shown, this project of clinical intervention can now begin prior to birth and continue 
on until death. 
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“She Could Call Herself His Little Wife to Be”: The Well-Turned Ankle of Gerty 
MacDowell 
Discourses of disability, and particularly those pertaining to sexuality, also play out in 
important ways in the encounter in the Nausicaa episode between Bloom and Gerty MacDowell. 
While many critics have dismissed Gerty as an emblem of a frivolous female consumerism, 
Angela Lea Nemecek finds in Gerty a powerful critic of normative modernity and the gender 
norms and medico-scientific regimes which undergird it (177). For Nemecek, the reality that 
Gerty is both disabled and a woman is potent and instructive insofar as Gerty’s disability situates 
her outside of the auspices of normative femininity, providing a unique and privileged position 
from which to critique the social structures (of faith, law, and family) upon which gender 
hierarchies are based. Nemecek finds in Gerty’s stance on female priests, the prosecution of 
abusive husbands, and the institution of marriage without reproduction a revolutionary agenda 
that would have been impossible had Gerty not been situated, by virtue of her disability, outside 
of normative “female” economies of marriage and reproduction. Additionally, Nemecek finds 
more substantive proof of Gerty’s disability-inspired revolutionary consciousness in Gerty’s 
dreams of a marriage without children and in her masturbatory encounter with Bloom. 
Like Cormier’s celebratory reading of the function of the stripling within the text, 
Nemecek’s insights into Gerty’s role are profitable but incomplete in that they discount or 
misread both the material reality of Gerty’s extraordinary embodiment and their implication for a 
woman in early twentieth century Dublin. Nemecek argues that not only does Gerty deploy her 
physical attributes to entice Bloom but that her primary instrument of seduction is the very locus 
of her fundamental difference—her crippled leg (180). Nemecek is correct insofar as Gerty’s 
leg—its strategic presentation and rhythmic movements—functions more than any other part of 
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her body to arouse Bloom. Nevertheless, Gerty’s presentation of her disabled leg is a purposeful 
masquerade, designed to persuade Bloom that he is seeing what he is not. The success of Gerty’s 
efforts to arouse Bloom depends upon her capacity to erase the markers of her difference, to not 
simply conceal her disability but to eradicate it entirely—at least from the perspective of the 
observer.  
It is no coincidence, then, that Gerty’s long-distance seduction of Bloom would be 
described ultimately as a sort of “language” between them. As has been explored throughout this 
chapter, literary modernism is informed by the commitment to the substitution of the signifier for 
the sign, particularly in the recognition of the eternal absence of the sign. Representation, 
therefore, serves to articulate an intrinsic void in order both to comprehend and to tame it. The 
“language” formed in the encounter between Bloom and Gerty is the paradoxical expression and 
the concealment of Gerty’s lost “wholeness,” the loss of the “normate” self in her accident on the 
hill. Of Gerty, Joyce writes, 
[O]fttimes the beauty of poetry, so sad in its transient loveliness, 
had misted her eyes with silent tears for she felt that the years were 
slipping by for her, one by one, and but for that one shortcoming 
she knew she need fear no competition and that was an accident 
coming down Dalkey hill and she always tried to conceal it. (308) 
 
Significantly, for Gerty, the language of bodily concealment is couched in and aligned with the 
transient beauty of poetry, a beauty which is as ephemeral as Gerty’s waning loveliness, a 
loveliness which is itself always already insufficient to atone or compensate for the material lack 
of her body. Thus, the “language” that she and Bloom create in their encounter is constructed 
through the absence of the body of the desired other, by the contact of the material with 
imaginative, the desiring self and the fictive ideal. Their language is subsequently shattered in 
the moment of the assertion of the material body: the enchantment is broken when Gerty stands 
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to walk away and Bloom recognizes for the first time that she is disabled. Almost instantly, 
Bloom expresses gratitude that he had not known of her lameness moments before, because such 
knowledge would have made desire and consummation perverse, if not impossible: 
Mr. Bloom watched her as she limped away. Poor girl! That’s why 
she’s left on the shelf and the others did a sprint. Thought 
something was wrong by the cut of her jib. Jilted beauty. A defect 
is ten times worse in a woman. But makes them polite. Glad I 
didn’t know it when she was on show. Hot little devil all the same. 
I wouldn’t mind. Curiosity like a nun or a negress or a girl with 
glasses. (311) 
 
Once again, Bloom situates his encounter with the other within the traditional discourse of pity 
(“Poor girl!”) and loss (“Jilted beauty”) before ultimately locating desire for and consummation 
with this other in the arena of perversity and “abnormality,” subsuming Gerty beneath an 
homogenizing rubric of untouchability: to liaise with Gerty is to breach the boundaries of bodily 
integrity, a simultaneously thrilling and shameful mutual defilement through transgression, the 
appropriation of that which has been set apart. 
   Gerty’s departure is quickly followed by Bloom’s attempt to leave her a message in the 
sand, which Bloom immediately abandons as the waves sweep in to wash away the text: “Mr. 
Bloom with his stick gently vexed the thick sand at his foot. Write a message for her. Might 
remain. What? I…. Useless. Washed away….Bend, see my face there, dark mirror, breathe on it, 
stirs” (320). This failure of articulation beyond the physical encounter between Bloom and Gerty 
is instructive for a number of reasons. Just as the text is closed to any articulation of the 
stripling’s subjectivity beyond the traditional, pathologizing discourses of disability, Bloom’s 
inability to complete his message to Gerty, the inevitable erasure of his text by the inexorable 
sea, serves a twofold function here. First, the scene exemplifies the ineradicable but inarticulate 
presence of the material, the waves erasing Bloom’s text echoing the materiality of Gerty’s 
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aberrant body, an aberrant materiality precluding communication and understanding. When 
Bloom endeavors to locate a discourse capable of enabling communication with Gerty, the 
ineradicable other, it is, ultimately, only himself that he finds. That the first and only words 
Bloom writes are “I. AM. A.” (Ibid.) is significant insofar as this message reveals the recursivity 
of the discourse of the disability in which both Bloom and Gerty are entangled. Bloom’s efforts 
to define, construct, or articulate a language of difference are ultimately frustrated by the 
resurrection and reaffirmation of the discursive constructs through and into which he was born: 
instead of catalyzing the emergence of a new discourse of otherness, Bloom finds in his 
encounter with Gerty only the return and restoration of his own image, of the discursive “I”/eye 
through which the construction of his own normative subjectivity is affirmed and perpetuated.    
  This important scene also suggests the mutual exclusivity of matter and discourse: the 
body that can be articulated is a fictive body, just as the material body is one which defies, 
eludes, and denies discourse. Gerty and Bloom are able to “communicate” only for as long as her 
body could maintain its position as idealized fiction, but when the material reality of the body 
“intervenes,” to borrow Woolf’s term, inarticulation rolls in like the tide sweeping away Bloom’s 
letters. Thus, the elements of Gerty’s character that Nemecek reads as triumphantly feminist—
Gerty’s self-pleasuring and her dreams of a happy marriage without children—in fact serve only 
to further illustrate these twin principles of discourse and materiality in as much as the 
materiality of Gerty’s body--its deviation from the norm--situates her outside of the traditional 
marriage plot. Discursively rendered pathological, and therefore not marriageable, because of her 
disability, her recourse is a flight of narrative fancy, as she seeks solace in the fairy tale 
romances that are incompatible the material realities of her body. Gerty’s self-pleasuring is not 
an assertion of sexual freedom but rather is emblematic of her unassailable difference. The 
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reality of her material body creates a gulf between her and others that is unbreachable, one which 
can be bridged only in the idealized fiction of a phantasmagoric husband and with her own body 
functioning as surrogate. Likewise, Gerty’s dreams of a marriage without children may well 
represent the intrusion of the material into this fantasy world: Gerty’s disability may have left her 
physically unable to bear children, a reality of her material body echoed in the masturbatory 
encounter with Bloom--sex without the possibility of reproduction. Gerty’s apparently obsessive 
but ultimately vain efforts to mask her disability by deploying all the attributes of feminine 
consumer culture cannot eradicate the material fact of her impairment and, in particular, of the 
prospective barrenness which would place her irrevocably outside of the economy of marriage. 
While, as Nemecek notes, critics have dismissed Gerty as a silly and superficial victim of 
consumer culture, Gerty’s participation in consumer culture signifies far more than any vanity. 
Petra Rau has argued that the rise of the modern commodity culture derives from the 
establishment of a premise of physical insufficiency, defectiveness, and lack (126). Into this 
arena of paradigmatic or discursive disablement, mass-produced consumer goods are positioned 
as correctives. Such consumer goods operate along two trajectories, particularly for the female 
consumer. The first derive from a mimetic function, enabling the body to emulate the idealized 
form of the normate: cosmetics and fashionable attire are deployed to facilitate the consumer in 
approximating an “idealized normativity,” a fiction of mandatory (“normal”) female 
embodiment. The second, galvanized by the emerging medical commodities markets, proposes to 
remediate malfunctioning bodies through pharmacological intervention: the pills, potions, and 
devices of medical modernity promise to rehabilitate intrinsically defective bodies through the 
potent powers of scientific expertise. The “proper” citizen, then, harnesses these twin forces of 
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the medico-scientific regime—the performative and the functional/corrective—in an ongoing 
and highly public process of constructing the normate body. 
The public nature of this construction is significant insofar as physical health in 
medicalized modernity is appropriated under the auspices of the public good. For all her 
posturing in regard to both the “naturalness” of her blooming beauty and the private adornments 
not intended for public consumption (the ribbons of her undergarments, the strategic selection of 
her hosiery and garters), Gerty’s investments in the construction of her embodied appearance are 
highly commodified and intensely public. She telegraphs the signs of her participation in both 
consumer and medical commodity culture as a display of appropriate female citizenship, a 
modern identity that equates social and familial integrity with the maintenance and/or the 
restoration of physical health. In the embodied subject, the public and the private meet, with the 
construction of the modern subject profoundly implicated in an economy of a fetishized 
normativity predicated upon an essential corporeal lack. Such medicalized constructions of the 
modern body are premised upon the assumption that the innately fallible material body is (or 
should be) always already embroiled in the struggle for perfectibility even as such constructs 
require the recognition of the ultimate futility of such projects of perfectibility, a cognizance that 
ensures continuous participation in the medico-scientific consumer culture.  
As a disabled woman, then, Gerty maintains an uneasy and unique position within this 
culture insofar as the paradigms of deficiency upon which consumption depends hold a unique 
valence in regard to her physical embodiment. The materiality of her injury, manifested in the 
limp that is not revealed to Bloom until after their long-distance sexual encounter and which 
profoundly alters his perception of her, rendering future desire perverse, doubly removes her 
from the premise of perfectibility driving consumer culture. Even if the idealized body of the 
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normate is an essential fiction, the performative and corrective functions of medicalized 
consumerism enable the consumer for a time to mimic this idealized embodiment, painting on 
the rosy cheeks of good health, spraying on the lustrous shine of well-nourished skin and hair, 
drinking down the elixirs of the energy that the body in its unsupported state lacks. The mimetic 
imperative  of idealized normativity is necessarily an ephemeral one: all bodies will fall short; all 
embodied subjects will at some point in their lives fail in their performance of unimpeachable 
health and bodily functionality. However, for Gerty, as for the blind stripling, such performances 
are necessarily interrupted at every turn by the gross intrusion of the body, telegraphing the truth 
of embodied fragility that medicalized modernity demands to be concealed. 
The frivolity for which critics have condemned Gerty, the near-obsessive preening and 
the rampant consumption from which her familial background (an alcoholic and abusive father, 
an absent mother) and class status would seem to disqualify her, serves as a sort of reaction-
formation, the attempts to over-compensate for the failure of her material body to participate 
appropriately in medicalized modernity and its consumer culture. The body’s insistence on the 
signs of its difference and deficiency, despite Gerty’s conspicuous consumption, renders her 
dangerous and inassimilable. Indeed, Joyce characterizes Gerty with a mock-romantic tone that 
would situate her as the fairest of the fair, save for the one fatal and tragic flaw. The dreams of 
romance which preoccupy Gerty similarly attest to the sublimation of the romantic ideal in her 
worldview, an ideal which both accepts and transforms the reality of her material body in that 
Gerty’s ideal of married love is both transcendent and earthly: her dreams of an heroic, rapturous 
love echo the fairy tales and sensational romances marketed toward young girls and women, 
once again situating Gerty within the economy of consumer culture, but the reality of her Prince 
Charming is a concession to the reality of her material embodiment. Her Prince Charming is an 
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elderly gentleman with a storied past, a forgiving heart, and a worldly-wise nature, because only 
he will be able to understand and embrace the one deficiency, to recognize the beauty amid and 
inside dangerous and disappointing materiality. Only one who is himself situated through age 
and encroaching mortality outside of the reproductive economy of young marriage could play 
prince to this wrecked and ruined princess.           
It is no coincidence, then, that Gerty’s internal world reads like a skewed romance novel, 
playing on the familiar tropes of transporting and tragic love, in the (unsuccessful) attempt to 
offer a new discourse of embodiment. Gerty’s dreams of marriage, as has been explored, offer a 
subversive paradigm of desire and sexuality outside of the purview of reproduction and situated 
in agents not amenable to the normative ideal—the aged and the disabled. Nevertheless, despite 
the richness of Gerty’s imaginative life and its capacity to interrogate and revise the normative 
ideal of medicalized modernity, Gerty’s fantasies remain simply that—fantastic—played out in 
fleeting moments as in the purchasing of a new hat, the strategic adornment of her wondrous 
hair, the wordless seduction of a distant stranger. Such moments, however, are quickly displaced 
by the intervention and insistence of the body, retroactively undermining the discursive exchange 
Gerty had attempted to enact: the hat, the hair, the seduction lose their initial meaning in the 
recognition of a fundamental physical difference, the extraordinariness of Gerty’s body, 
(re)incorporates her body into the discourse of disability and makes  a perversion of what had 
come before. 
 
The Unsinkable Molly Bloom: From Spectacle to Speech 
While Gerty’s embodied difference both disenfranchises her from the economies of 
idealized normativity upon which medical modernity is based and precludes the construction of 
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alternative discourses of being, Molly Bloom offers a fascinating, if not wholly revisionist or 
corrective, mode of being in and speaking about the body. Joyce has famously identified the 
“Penelope” as the “clou” of the text and the ascendance of body studies in the late twentieth 
century has occasioned immense focus on this all-importance episode. Critics have variously 
read Penelope as the ur-text for the ecriture feminine, a primordial manifestation of the 
jouissance of writing from the body in subversion of the Word of the Father and the laws of 
patriarchal discourse. In his essay, “Body Words,” Brown argues that 
This body provides not only pleasure and meaning but also a 
determination to “disintellectualize writing” in order to articulate 
the body, reclaim the writing of the body from patriarchy and both 
embrace and exploit the identification of women and body as a 
means writing back through and with the body in practices of 
Cixousian ecriture. (113) 
 
Likewise, in Deviant Modernisms, Colleen Lamos situates Molly’s program of writing from the 
body firmly within the errors and errata for which the text is infamous: 
While other characters make mistakes, Molly inhabits error; 
whereas Stephen’s and Bloom’s slips simply indicate human 
epistemological frailty, Molly’s monologue is, according to Phillip 
Herring, “a tapestry of contradictions” in which error and truth 
promiscuously mingle. Previously dismissed as “formless” and 
“without style,” “Penelope” has since been celebrated by some 
feminist critics as the conclusive statement of indeterminacy in 
Ulysses. Molly’s peculiar position on the margin of the text yet 
also as its culmination…both places her outside its economy of 
righting/writing and calls upon her affirmative endorsement of it.  
(121) 
 
Alternatively, “Penelope” has been condemned as reductive and essentializing, the perpetuation 
of tropes of the female as pure body, in contradistinction to the logos of the dematerialized male.  
Of significance to this chapter, however, are the complex position of Molly’s discourse 
both within and outside of emerging discourses of the body and the extent to which her 
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monologue simultaneously participates in (and therefore seems to affirm) medicalized 
modernity’s means of speaking the body, even as it problematizes, undermines, and counters 
such discourses. Feminist disability scholars have long recognized the connections between 
disability and feminism, in that the equating of female and disabled bodies extends as far back as 
Aristotle, who famously declared the female body “monstrous” insofar as it deviates from the 
male norm. Within this context, then, Molly’s discourse of the body can be seen to participate in 
a program of elucidating otherness, of articulating a material reality always already beyond the 
pale of patriarchy and outside of systems of phallogocentric modernity. In terms of race, gender, 
and religious affiliation (at least through marriage, though Molly herself is, apparently, a non-
practicing Catholic) Molly is firmly situated outside of the discourses of normativity, 
representing a radical and multiple otherness. An Irish woman married to an Irish Jew, she 
embodies a nexus of subversive positionalities operating on both the ideological (discursive) and 
physiological (material) planes.  
Within the context of Molly’s multiple “othering,” the illustrious Penelope monologue 
takes on particular resonance. If Ulysses is, as Joyce notes, an “epic of the cycles of the body” 
(qtd. in Brown 11), and if Penelope functions as the “clou” of the text, then this final episode 
may be seen both to join and to illuminate the preceding text. Situated outside of the narrative 
itself and positioned almost as an addendum to the proper text, the Penelope monologue 
hearkens to the function of the Chorus in Classical drama, commenting upon preceding events in 
a manner that lends meaning to or problematizes the understanding of what has come before. 
Further, as Brown notes in his explication of the Penelope episode, in its linkage with the flesh of 
the body, Penelope operates outside of and yet as an essential facet of the text, much like the 
flesh of the body itself: 
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It (flesh) is not…a part usually understood to be governed or 
governable by conventional medical discourses. The “flesh” 
suggests the body in general, as defined by its libidinality and 
mortality. In that it may be thought to be as much a part of the 
cultural as of the medical sphere, the place where law, language, 
and the body meet, and moreover be thought to be the part that is, 
as it were, the material ground of all the rest. (“Body Words” 114) 
  
The trajectory of the principal narrative (i.e. the 17 episodes preceding Penelope) does indeed 
seem to present an epic of the body insofar as pivotal moments of embodied experience are 
problematized within the text. As Brown argues in “Body Words,” the novel’s episodic, non-
linear structure suggests an iconography of the discrete body parts which simultaneously seeks to 
reimagine the body as a cohesive system and to undermine such medicalized schemas which 
would subsume each part to the functioning of the whole (114). At the same time as the text 
explodes linearity and subordinates the whole to the autonomy of its parts, however, the text as a 
unit succeeds in tracing a path from the emergence of embodied materiality to the emergence of 
a discourse of the body: the novel begins at Martello Tower, described as the omphalos, where 
pagan and Christian rituals of rebirth collide in Mulligan’s mockery of the Communion rite and 
in the appearance of the milk woman, embodying the ancient Celtic mythos of the crone who is 
both the bringer of life (symbolized by the milk she brings) and harbinger and exemplar of its 
destruction (as represented in the visible decay of her aging body). Such themes are played out 
again and again in the text, as in the graphic representations of the decomposition of Dignham’s 
corpse in the Hades episode and in the reminders which emerge time and again throughout the 
text of Mina Purefoy’s agony as she lies in her third day (suggestive of death and resurrection) of 
labor.   
Thus, in a novel which seeks to present an epic of the body and to depict its component 
parts as equal to or greater than their sum, the material reality of the physical body is an 
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omnipresent fact. The body in need and in peril haunts the text: visibly disabled bodies (Gerty’s 
limp, the stripling’s cane, the veteran’s missing arm) emerge at unexpected and unsettling 
moments from the amorphous and anonymous crowds of urban Dublin. Likewise, Bloom’s 
desiring body propels him beyond any rational volition, driving him to eat, defecate, and 
masturbate in acquiescence to the demands of his embodied materiality. This reality is echoed in 
Stephen’s famous “ineluctable modalities of the visible” (35), in which material embodiment is 
aligned with intelligible signification and, above all, with the appropriate reading of embodied 
signs:  
ineluctable modalities of the visible: at least that if no more, 
thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read, 
seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. 
Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: colored signs. Limits of the diaphne. 
But, he adds, in bodies. Then he was aware of them bodies before 
of them colored. How? By knocking his sconce against them, sure. 
(Ibid.)   
 
This acknowledgment of the gross materiality of bodies inspires Stephen to close his eyes as he 
walks along the shore (foreshadowing the stripling) in an effort to simultaneously “blind” 
himself to such materiality (and to deny the materiality of his own body) even as it compels a 
more stark awareness of the condition of his own body, the feel of the sand beneath his feet and 
the sensation of the sun and the wind on his skin, which he uses to guide him forward without the 
benefit of sight. All the while, the phenomenological experience of the material body is infused 
with constant reminders of its finitude, the births and deaths which function as a motif and a 
refrain throughout the text (even as Stephen prepares for the new day at the omphalos of the 
world, he is haunted by the ghost of his dead mother; the promise that Milly’s emerging 
womanhood brings to Bloom is tempered by the reality of Rudy’s death and the extinction of the 
Bloom family name). 
165 
 
Molly’s monologue in Penelope, then, attains particular resonance as the lynchpin 
episode of a novel centered upon the realities of the material body, that paradoxical organism so 
feared and so desired. Particularly for those theorists which view Molly’s monologue as an early 
exemplar of l’ecriture feminine, the Penelope episode is valorized as the explosion of patriarchal 
discourse, the eradication of the Law of the Father. This is true insofar as Molly’s monologue 
glories in an idiosyncratic and iconoclastic discourse of the body and, in particular, of the 
personal female body. At the same time, however, as Ellman argues, Molly’s monologue must 
not be understood as the representation of a physical body—there is no effort to mimetically 
reproduce material embodiment. Rather, Molly’s monologue signifies the transmutation of the 
material body into discourse. Ellman writes: 
And far from saying yes to the flesh, her monologue revolves 
around the theme of disembodiment, particularly in the form of 
shedding skins….Joyce’s comments on “Penelope” have sent his 
critics on a wild goose chase for the flesh, obscuring the episode’s 
preoccupation with the word, particularly as an agent of 
disenfleshment. (98) 
 
Moreover, the word not only functions as an instrument of “disenfleshment” but also as the 
conduit for discursive self-(re)fashioning, the mode through which the continuous process of 
self-construction/destruction/reconstruction occurs: “Molly skins herself with words, and yet 
those very words provide her with a second skin, finer than the skin they cauterize” (105). It is 
within this context, then, that “Penelope” may be seen to operate as Joyce’s “clou” in that it 
brings to fruition the project of the previous 17 episodes, contending with the body in order to 
speak it.  
That it is Molly, rather than Stephen or Bloom, who ultimately achieves the embodied 
discourse that the preceding text seeks is significant for a number of reasons. First, the grossly 
material body which haunts the novel and Stephen and Bloom’s consciousness, in particular, has 
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been gradually sloughed away by the time they return to Eccles Street. At the end of the Ithaca 
episode, both Stephen and Bloom are described as “astral bodies,” their material bodies 
subsumed in the male-to-male discourse Bloom so vehemently craves. The dematerialization of 
the physical body enacted in the discursive exchange between Bloom and Stephen, however, 
differs from Molly’s discourse in as much as the fraternal or, more exactly, the paternal 
discourse the men share functions to deny the body while Molly’s discourse transforms it. 
Though many theorists have celebrated the Penelope episode as an articulation of the 
specifically female body, others have repudiated the novel as a whole in regard to the apparent 
isolation and stasis of Molly’s body. In a text that celebrates mobility, Molly is the only character 
who remains rooted in a single spot—her bedroom—throughout Bloomsday. While Bloom and 
Stephen emulate the flaneur in their matriculations through the city, expressing an evolving 
consciousness rooted in the sensory experience of the volatile city, Molly remains secure and 
still in her bed. Molly’s physical rootedness institutes a discourse of the body distinct from that 
which could be articulated by the text’s ambulatory figures. From Bloom and Stephen to the 
blind stripling circling the perimeters of the text, male embodied experience is configured 
through movement. In Subaltern Ulysses, Enda Duffy argues that Joyce’s text simultaneously 
articulates and problematizes the development of the postmodern embodied subject, for whom 
consciousness is a function and a product of movement (62). Brown, drawing on Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological principles of the self as an organ and articulation of sensory 
perception, asserts that Joyce configures the embodied self, as represented by Bloom and 
Stephen, as an evolving mechanism of bodies in motion, receiving, processing, and reflecting 
ephemeral, physical stimuli (17).  Significantly, however, Bloom’s and Stephen’s matriculation 
through Dublin participates in an economy of colonial subject-formation that is, as Davies 
167 
 
argues, inherently masochistic insofar as this project of self-(re)formation is enacted through a 
process of discipline, denial, and loss, a process that various post-colonial interpretations of 
Ulysses hold is inherent to the creation of a colonial consciousness.     
While Cormier notes (and refutes) the frequent associations made between disability and 
immobility (204), the stasis of an otherwise “normal” (although female, Irish, and Jewish by 
marriage) character like Molly adds a new valence to efforts to understand her, aligning her with 
“others” marginalized through an embodiment characterized by difficult (or absent) mobility: in 
other words, Molly’s stasis insinuates her within the context of disability and as a result adds a 
new dimension to her monologue. As a static figure within the text, Molly’s discourse of the 
body, then, will be inherently different from Bloom’s and Stephen’s. Davies employs Deleuze 
and Guattari’s principles of “becoming-other” to position Molly as a corrective to Bloom’s 
masochistic attempts at self-re/creation: 
Molly’s resistance to the controls of Bloom’s masochism shows us 
that there is always the alternative of “becoming-other” in a 
processual strategy beyond the reach of the controls imposed on 
the corporeal body, by taking a “line of flight” which is not an 
escape from the problems but a means of combatting it….Joyce’s 
symptomotology opens up for us the possibility of productive 
change in people and society through the “full BwO” and the 
processes of change and “becoming other” which he has brought to 
our attention in his “reembodying” of the corporeal body of Molly 
in the “Penelope” episode as he moves us beyond the ritual 
masochism of our socially-constructed selves. In doing so he offers 
us that “health” that Nietzsche and Deleuze spoke of: “[h]ealth as 
literature, as writing, [which] consists in inventing a people who 
are missing. It is the task of the fabulating function to invent a 
people. (188) 
       
The premise of health as a function of writing is significant within the purposes of Davies’ study 
in that literature is invoked here as an instrument for the creation of a people who are “missing.” 
This aligns well with the often-noted immobility of Molly’s body in this otherwise highly 
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peripatetic text. Confined, by choice or circumstance, to her bedroom throughout the duration of 
the text, Molly joins the ranks of those “missing” others whom literature must restore in a 
discourse of fabulation as cure, of story as the agent of the return of health.    
 Despite the triumphalist readings many theorists have provided of Molly’s discourse, 
however, this formulation, through which the embodied self is extracted in the process of 
discursive cure, merely reaffirms the paradigms of medicalized modernity which it would seek to 
reimagine and replace. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault situates the rise of professionalized 
medicine and the modern medico-social regime upon which it is built with the systematic 
extraction of the patient from the clinical encounter:  
If one wishes to know the illness from which he is suffering, one 
must subtract the individual, with his particular qualities….at this 
level, the individual was merely a negative element, the accident of 
the disease, which, for it and it is, is most alien to its essence. (14) 
 
Like Molly’s discourse of the body, which, according to Davies, restores health to a diseased 
society through the discursive construction of a fully Body without Organs, the clinical 
encounter also invokes discourse as curative, deploying the language of restoration in the 
construction of missing bodies, a process enabled, activated through, and authorized by the 
defining, erasure, and reconstitution through medical discourse (and namely the 
diagnosis/prognosis/treatment triad) of, to use Judith Butler’s terminology, “livable” bodies, 
bodies that matter. This erasure of the individual body is evident throughout Molly’s illustrious 
monologue, as individual subjects bleed into one another until deciphering to whom or what the 
monologue refers becomes impossible. The celebrated profusion of pronouns in Molly’s 
monologue, while echoing the stream of consciousness technique for which the text is famous, 
also exemplifies the standardization and substitution of bodies upon which medicalized 
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modernity is predicated. Just as the modern technocratic regime cannot function without the 
ultimate uniformity and fungibility of embodied subjects, so too much the diagnostic paradigm 
operate under a law of probabilities which insists upon collectivity, just as the litany of real and 
imagined lovers in Molly’s imaginings lose their particularity in a discourse of essential 
sameness.    
In addition to the extraction of individual bodies, in the specificity of their subjectivity, 
Molly’s monologue of the body enacts a discourse of somatic “fracturing” which is 
simultaneously characteristic of modernist experimentation and reminiscent of the 
deconstruction of the embodied subject through the gaze of medical science. Brown argues that 
the dismantling of the physical body in modernist representation suggests an effort to interrogate 
and undermine Enlightenment insistence upon the functionality of the body and, in particular, 
industrial modernity’s instrumentalizing of the embodied subject. An extended quote from 
Brown’s “Body Words” is helpful here: 
Take, for example, the image of the unimagineably disintegrated 
body of the mentally unstable boy Stevie who is the first and most 
obvious victim of the bomb outrage in Joseph Conrad’s 1907 novel 
The Secret Agent—a body whose status as enigmatic evidence, 
whose clues, provide a paradigm for a discourse that runs 
throughout the novel in which the grotesque or extreme or 
dramatically altering bodily states of the characters provide a 
symbolic language of clues to the reader in a language that is at 
once embedded in and attempting to reach beyond those 
nineteenth-century discourses of phrenology, physiognomy, and 
Lombrosian criminology...With its scattered eyes, ears, feet, hands, 
teeth, nails, hair and, above all, bones, there is also a dismembered 
buried body in “The Waste Land”….We might perhaps even 
claim, in a spirit of Bakhtinian carnival  or of an epochal mirror 
phase that the body is the waste land of literary Modernism that its 
discourses encounter as waste but refuse to abandon as merely 
waste, indeed perhaps rediscover as meaning because it is a waste 
of parts, in the sense of these parts being uncontained by function 




Brown’s formulation is significant in that the fractured body to which he refers is, principally, a 
discursive body rather than a material one. Brown defines this body as “enigmatic evidence,” as 
“meaning,” as a “symbolic language of clues.” It is, in other words, a fictive body constructed of 
words and images, a body that is, paradoxically, speakable only insofar as it is materially 
unimaginable and unlivable: a linguistic rather than a fleshly body.  
Thus, while Brown reads into literary modernism’s fracturing of the physical body the 
subversion of regimes of power, regimes which would insist upon the myth of bodily wholeness, 
functionality, and standardization, Valérie Bénéjam argues that the fracturing of the body related 
in particular both to the text’s representations of Molly and to Molly’s monologue itself in 
Penelope replicates the techniques of the peep show, techniques with which Molly, as a stage 
performer, would be intimately aware. For Bénéjam, the deconstruction of Molly’s body ensures 
its status as fetish in that the promise of the body’s revelation is continuously invoked and yet 
never fulfilled, the frustration of desire ensuring the continuation of that desire:  
Molly’s body is never shown or seen directly. The book ends on a 
kiss, the promise of some further consummation, which is never 
given, thus ensuring the reader’s unabated desire. Indeed, the point 
is not to show, but to stage the showing. (74) 
 
Significantly, the staging of Molly’s body in the production of desire is inextricably bound up in 
the re/construction of the material body through its replacement by material and/or linguistic 
signs: 
From “Calypso” onwards, and mainly through the mediation of 
Bloom’s viewpoint, one can observe a double strategy of 
dissimulation and replacement of Molly’s body. The two main 
techniques used are synecdochic fragmentation and metonymic 
fetishism….[W]e never see Molly’s whole body, only body parts, 
and those body parts are very often replaced by the corresponding 




Further, as Bénéjam notes, such techniques of fetishization lead to the substitution of the grossly 
material body with the symbolic/discursive one: “cut up into disconnected pieces or replaced by 
garments as it is, the body that we are reading about is not one that may be imagined or 
synthesized easily” (66), a body which, by the end of the “Ithaca” episode has “disappeared 
behind the abstract music of philosophical and Latinate terminology” (68).  
 This transmutation of the material body into the unimagineably discursive body is 
significant here in that such practices simultaneously echo and problematize the deconstruction 
of the material body and its subsequent reconstruction through discourse which characterizes the 
rise of professionalized medicine. Ian Hacking, in his “Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts,” 
describes in vivid detail the fracturing of the corporeal body through medical surveillance. For 
Hacking, the modern medical gaze became one that “did not see through bodies to their humors 
in balance or imbalance. Instead, it began to look at internal organs and tissues….Illness and 
disease became, not a matter of the whole body, but of its parts and their pathologies” (78).  This 
fracturing of the material body into its component parts serves a key function in medicalized 
modernity in as much as it simultaneously authorizes and necessitates the hegemony of the 
medico-social regime. The whole body, particularly when that body is always already rendered 
pathological through illness, injury, or deformity, is othered from itself through the medicalized 
breakdown of the system into its constituent parts. Molly’s body, like the body of the patient, is 
rendered unimaginable, inconceivable, because it is never and can never be represented as a 
totality. The only recourse, therefore, is a reconstitution through language—whether this be 
through the medicalized language of the diagnostic paradigm or the language of experimental 
modernism. Once again, Foucault is helpful here:  
Alone the (medical) gaze dominates the entire field of possible 
knowledge; the intervention of techniques presenting problems of 
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measurement, substance, or composition at the level of invisible 
structures is rejected….On the line on which the visible is ready to 
be resolved into the invisible, on that crest of its disappearance, 
singularities come into play. A discourse on the individual is once 
more possible, or, rather, necessary, because it is the only way in 
which the gaze can avoid renouncing itself, effacing itself in the 
figures of experience, in which it would be disarmed. The principle 
of visibility has its correlative in the differential reading of cases. 
(167-168). 
 
Within the framework of medicalized modernity, embodied specificity born of material 
experience, threatens the epistemologies upon which its authority is based; the differential 
reading of cases, therefore, intervenes to restore and confirm the authority of the medico-social 
regime. Individual cases are subsumed within a collectivity of knowledge-formation for the 
purposes of probabilistic comparison. Most significant for the purposes of this argument, 
however, is the reality that such comparative projects operate through the dismantling of bodies 
into their component parts for the purposes of analysis and classification. Within this paradigm, 
knowledge rests squarely within the greater insight of the medical gaze and its capacity to reveal 
truth through the recognition and articulation the realities obscured by the material body in its 
totality, rendering visible what was once invisible through the appropriate reading of embodied 
signs and thereby transforming the body into narrative. 
 Though Joyce’s “epic of the body” goes far to articulate that which is largely 
unspeakable, the gross materiality of embodiment, the evolution of professionalized medicine in 
the late nineteenth century gave rise to a medico-social regime predicated upon and authorized 
by the discursive and ideological construction of pathological bodies. Thus, Joyce’s experimental 
techniques, his efforts to problematize and to reimagine modernity’s narratives of the body, are 
embroiled in frameworks which they would resist. In “speaking” the body, Joyce transmutes the 
corporeal into the linguistic, a process that at once illuminates, interrogates, and, ultimately, 
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perpetuates the economies of the discursive erasure of the material body in which modern 
medico-social regimes are so deeply invested and from which they derive their power.   









































Dis/Embodying the Community: 




All day, all night, the body intervenes. 
Virginia Woolf 
 
Bodies show up in stories as dynamic entities that resist or refuse the cultural scripts assigned to them. 
David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder 
 
The Dis/Embodied Politic: Monstrous Singularity and the Limits of Community 
 In Bojana Kunst’s study of representations of the monstrous in the Baroque era, the 
author argues that 
[T]he monstrous (exhibited during that period in many museums of 
curiosities, private collections, etc.) was not only a kind of 
‘entertainment’ for the skeptical mind, but also a topos for the 
temporary visibility of connections between man and animal, 
human and non-human, natural and artificial….[T]his visibility of 
connections quickly became subject to different regimes of 
representation….[and] it is exactly the regulation of the 
monstrous—the attempt to make the monstrous invisible—which 
enabled the continuous production of hybridity in the scientific 
‘black box’ as well as in political procedures. The appearance and 
disappearance of the monstrous, therefore, are somehow two sides 
of the same coin: the monstrous theatrum mundi was a kind of 
spectacular prelude to early modern science and politics. (212) 
 
As this study has shown, the regulation of the extraordinary body, its systematic and purposeful 
display and disappearance, extends far beyond the early modern period, exerting a profound 
influence on Victorian, fin de siècle, and high modernist art, literature, and culture. Indeed, the 
regulation of the visibility of the monstrous so potently analyzed in Kunst’s assessment of the 
Baroque era plays perhaps an even greater role in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as 
modern technocratic cultures began to emerge and the professionalized sciences began to 
organize, define, and assert their identity and authority, most notably through the regulation of 
the extraordinary “other” in its myriad forms.  
The first half of this study centered upon the visibly “monstrous” body and the projection 
of cultural anxieties, questions, and ideological commitments onto the extraordinarily embodied 
in the Victorian era, exemplifying what Christopher Lawrence has described in his investigation 
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into the role that the rise of modern medicine played in modern British identity-formation as “a 
world in which discrimination and selection were based on measurement, whether it was a 
written examination for the civil service or a physical examination for life insurance (ch. 2).  
Such classificatory regimes, as Lawrence notes, were based upon a normative ideal, derived from 
empirical observation and statistical analysis and yoked to paradigmatic images of cultural 
“others” defined by class, race, gender, and other forms of “deviant” embodiment. Of paramount 
importance within Victorian taxonomies of the normal and the abnormal is the use of material, 
embodied signs as an index of both identity and cultural belonging—or the lack thereof. 
Consequently, both “freak shows” for the lower classes and the exhibition of “prodigies” for the 
elite serve comparable purposes insofar as they render aberrant corporealities highly visible for 
the purposes of self-and-community identity-formation.    
Though modernist aesthetics have long been characterized as representing marked shift 
toward relativistic individualism,
52
 this chapter will demonstrate that Mrs. Dalloway troubles and 
complicates such assumptions. In the juxtaposition of Clarissa and Septimus, Woolf interrogates 
the boundaries of community and problematizes modern praxes of belonging. Though this novel 
has widely been recognized as a post-war elegy, a work of mourning amid the devastation of the 
First World War, relatively little attention has been paid to Woolf’s deployment of the character 
of the war-wounded soldier in her project of communal boundary-making, an aesthetics of the 
(re)construction of the social body through the imaginative interplay between normative and 
non-normative figures.  Woolf’s concern in Mrs. Dalloway with the re/definition of the social 
body reflects and responds to a burgeoning body of literature on group psychology. Freud, 
inspired by predecessors like Gustave LeBon and William McDougall, began to postulate on the 
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dynamics of the group mind in the wake of the catastrophe of World War I.    Likewise, Mrs. 
Dalloway takes as its principal concern the eponymous character’s efforts to “combine, to 
connect” through the giving of a dinner party.  
Such a plot line, however, provides important insight into what Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson has identified as the shift from prodigy to pathology in the treatment of extraordinary 
bodies. As this chapter will show, in both Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren Smith, Woolf 
creates characters who exemplify the shift Garland-Thomson speaks of. The pathological 
visibility of the extraordinary body, as discussed in previous chapters, is reversed in modernist 
texts, with the inassimilable body being rendered increasingly invisible, cloaked and contained 
through medicalization. As Ann Ardis notes in her analysis of Woolf’s first novel, The Voyage 
Out, “St. John Hirst, modeled, as any number of critics have pointed out, after Lytton Strachey, 
espouses a Bloomsbury-ite’s disdain for the grotesque fleshiness (read femaleness) of the 
material world” (3). As will be seen in this chapter, the repudiation of the flesh in such high 
modernist texts is galvanized by the intrinsic instability of the material body, its lack of 
amenability to control unless and until it is coopted, for better or worse, into the medico-
scientific regime. Mrs. Dalloway illustrates the vexed position of the material body within 
modern power/knowledge structures, of which professionalized medicine is a particularly potent 
tool. Thus, while Woolf’s injunction that “for the moderns…the point of interest lies very likely 
in the dark places of psychology” (qtd. in Gordon 19) may seem to endorse the sequestration of 
the material body into the purview and the control of  medico-social structures, the novel’s 
representations of Clarissa and Septimus undermine the privilege Woolf appears to afford of the 
mind over the body, problematizing the regulation of the visibility of physical (and, in particular, 
deviant) bodies by the disciplinary regimes which seek to direct and define modern subject-
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formation as a project of community-making. In casting Septimus, the shell-shocked veteran of 
the working classes, as the foil of the affluent but no less materially embodied (and aging) 
Clarissa, Woolf embeds the understanding, representation, and treatment of the embodied subject 
in a complex network of economic, political, aesthetic, and scientific discourses. Further, she 
demonstrates that the decreasing visibility of inassimilable, extraordinary bodies is a hallmark of 
a post-World War I British modernity seeking to (re)constitute itself in the face of a global 
trauma in as much as the singular embodiment of the war-wounded veteran operates both as a 
material reminder of catastrophic loss and as an emblem of the intrinsic uncertainty embedded 
within an programmatics of collective healing. Unlike the countless monuments to the war dead 
and in contradistinction to the dead themselves, wounded and traumatized veterans proved in 
their resistant
53
 embodiment the limitations of catharsis. Thus, if Mrs. Dalloway endeavors to 
articulate the work of mourning that must be accomplished before an act of collective re-creation 
in the aftermath of war can be achieved, then the deformed and dysfunctional bodies of veterans 
inevitably unsettle and undermine such projects. These inassimilable figures constitute the 
indefinable and unstable element that must be identified and contained if the new social body is 
to emerge as a bounded, discrete, and enduring entity.  Woolf’s masterpiece exemplifies this 
program of modern self-and-community-making by foregrounding the unprecedented potency of 
modern professional medicine in a collective project to deny and disavow those whose aberrance 
threatens the integrity and continuity of the modern, post-war British nation-state. 
The novel’s opening scene is paradigmatic of the shift from the individualist to the 
collectivist orientation characterizing post-war modernity. The narrative voice slips freely and 
randomly in and out of individual character’s consciousness, at times assuming a poly-vocal 
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character speaking for the group as a whole. At the same time, the arresting images of the 
motorcade carrying some unknown but illustrious person, followed by the appearance of the 
plane writing messages which the passersby endeavor individually and as a unit to decipher, 
exemplify, as Gordon notes, the formation of a group through the collective concentration of 
attention and mental effort on a single object (183). Speculation as to the identity of the person in 
the motorcade gives way to an effort to divine the messages written in the sky. Thus, in this 
iconic first scene, Woolf seems to trace the evolution of a post-war nationalist identity from a 
foundation in what Freud might have viewed as a totemistic deference to an ego ideal—a 
charismatic leader of the monarchy or another political figurehead—to a more capitalistic one 
grounded in consumer consumption and mass marketing. Even more significant for the purposes 
of this study, Woolf’s opening scene grounds this project of community-(re)making in collective 
(if unstable and evolving) processes of meaning-making, in which the fixation on and definition 
of the spectacular object unite individual subjects in a shared project of communication and 
understanding.   
  As has been discussed, at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of 
the twentieth century, early psychology’s interest in the nature of individual consciousness began 
to expand to the focus on the nature of human consciousness within groups. For theorists like 
LeBon, McDougall, and Freud, the “group mind” operated both in alignment with and in excess 
of the expected parameters of individual consciousness. Thus, the group mind was, by its nature, 
extraordinary, possessing both the superhuman characteristics of superlative achievement—
strength, vigor, courage, and morality—as well as the retrograde attributes of an atavistic 
primitivism—herd mentality, irrationalism, and barbaric cruelty. In his ground-breaking, The 
Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, LeBon asserts that “the substitution of the unconscious 
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action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal characteristics of 
the age” (n.pg.). Furthermore, LeBon situates this not merely as an object of scientific inquiry 
but also as an instrument of great social and political import: “The philosopher who studies 
social phenomenal should bear in mind that side by side with their theoretical value they possess 
a practical value, and that this latter, so far as the evolution of civilization is concerned, is alone 
of importance” (n.pg., emphasis added). Thus, while the Victorian era and the fin de siècle 
projected collective questions, concerns, and anxieties on the material substance of 
extraordinarily embodied individuals, from racial and ethnic others to giants, dwarves, and 
conjoined twins, the modernist era shifted to a focus on the incorporeal and amorphous operation 
of the crowd and the latent, often unconscious, impulses which unite, drive, and direct it. 
This shift to the interrogation of the nature and functioning of the group mind exemplifies 
an increasingly collectivist cultural concern, as the imago of the group began increasingly to 
replace the extraordinarily embodied individual upon whom cultural anxieties were projected 
and discharged. In his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud attributes group 
formation to the herd instinct as rooted in a fundamental “gregariousness” informing human 
nature. Freud writes, 
Biologically, this gregariousness is an analogy to multicellularity 
and as it were a continuation of it. From the standpoint of libido 
theory, it is a further manifestation of the inclination, which 
proceeds from the libido, and which is felt by all living beings of 
the same kind, to combine in more and more comprehensive units. 
The individual feels “incomplete” if he is alone. The dread shown 
by small children would seem already to be an expression of this 
herd instinct. Opposition to the herd is as good as separation from 
it, and is therefore anxiously avoided. But the herd turns away 
from anything that is new or unusual. The herd instinct would 
appear to be something primary, something “which cannot be split 
up.” (ch. 9) 
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As had been explored in part one of this study, in the nineteenth century, anomalous bodies, 
society’s so-called “monsters,” were deployed to represent and to domesticate pervasive social 
concerns, from the “giant’s” somaticization of the anxieties of imperial growth both at home and 
in the periphery to the conjoined twins’ embodiment of the fear of the compromising of bodily 
integrity, of the contamination of the self from without and from within.  
The increasing popularity of group psychology in the early twentieth century, however, 
suggests the diffusion of contemporary cultural anxieties. No longer focalized onto the bodies of 
single extraordinary individuals, the collectivist orientation of the early twentieth century casts 
the representation, interrogation, and discharging of social questions as a collective/communal 
project. More important for the purposes of this study, however, is the fact that the substitution 
of the collective for the individual signifies an increasingly potent trend in this era toward the 
public erasure of extraordinary bodies. As Freud notes, the formation of the group is predicated 
upon the homogeneity of the collective:  
What appears later on in society in the shape of Gemeingeist, esprit 
de corps, ‘group spirit’, etc., does not belie its derivation from 
what was originally envy. No one must want to put himself 
forward, everyone must be the same and have the same. Social 
justice means that we deny ourselves many things so that others 
may have to do without them as well, or, what is the same thing, 
may not be able to ask for them. This demand for equality is the 
root of social conscience and the sense of duty. (Ibid.)                        
 
Collectives can only come into being when differences are erased or subsumed beneath the group 
identity. Inassimilable bodies are, by definition, incapable of such erasure; they are the 
heterogeneous element which the newly-formed group must abject or deny. In their ineradicable 
singularity, extraordinary bodies insist on an egoistic individuality that the normative
54
  self must 
disavow and repress in order to become a part of the group.  
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It is no coincidence that the shift from the individual to the collective should take place in 
the first decades of the twentieth century. The progressive liberalism which had characterized 
British culture from the Enlightenment to the end of the nineteenth century was predicated upon 
an individualistic paradigm, the model of the autonomous Enlightenment subject. As will be 
explored later in this chapter, the ravages of World War I were particularly potent in subsuming 
Enlightenment individualism beneath a shifting but powerful tide of collectivism. As Froula 
notes,  
The war not only shattered millions of lives but unleashed a 
virulent nationalism that rent the economic and cultural fabric of 
what had been becoming an increasingly international 
civilization….Yet even as it seemed to negate even the idea of 
Enlightenment, it also dismantled four ancient empires, swept 
away an outworn social and political order and left Europe a 
“laboratory atop a vast graveyard” in which communism, fascism, 
and liberal democracy vied to promise the suddenly enfranchised 
masses a “New Order”, a state of their own….By 1923 Freud’s 
early confidence that Europeans would rebuild and perhaps 
improve their democratic and internationalist civilization after the 
war was losing ground to the totalitarian political orders that, 
fostered by the Versailles Treaty, were already beginning to form. 
(90)   
 
Constipated Britons and Naked Germans: Entropy and Exhaustion at the End of Empire 
In addition to the collectivist tendencies borne of the aftermath of the war, the ascendance 
and rapid decline of the British Empire from the second-half of the nineteenth century on also 
helped to incite the rabid nationalism which only grew with the hostilities of World War I. The 
imperialist enterprises in the colonial periphery demanded the imposition of a cohesive, 
impermeable, and potent British identity which would define and assure British presence against 
the threats it faced abroad. More significantly, this stalwart British nationalism, subsuming its 
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heterogeneous citizens beneath its homogenous auspices, would erect a formidable bulkhead 
against its enemies in theaters of war and of imperial conquest.  
In her compelling analysis of Woolf’s “nationalistic modernism,” Petra Rau notes the 
powerful influence of the German peoples on British consciousness. According to Rau, in the 
early twentieth century, the Germans were a profound force acting on the British popular 
imagination. Configured as almost pure body, they emblematized both the voraciousness and the 
vigor that the British, with their faltering empire and slipping reputation on the world economic 
and political stage, seemed to lack. Moreover, German rapacity as it was characterized in the 
British paradigm, functioned as an object both of admiration and of revulsion; the seemingly 
endless vitality of the German body was a force to which the British, in the era’s obsession with 
health restoratives—pills, potions, treatments, and cures—could only aspire. At the same time, 
however, the Germans’ physical insatiability, the luxurious appetite which they seemed to devote 
their lives to satisfying, was equated with a primitive barbarism spurned by the upright British 
citizen.  
It is within this context, then, that the shift in British models of physical embodiment in 
the years surrounding World War I can best be understood. The nineteenth century obsession 
with the extraordinary body situated anomalous corporeality within a context of profound 
individuality, the irruption of the prodigious within the collective to represent and transmogrify 
the culture (most often through the representations of its deepest questions, concerns, and fears), 
In the years surrounding World War I, such unsettling encounters of the other within were no 
longer a luxury. In the presence of a real and encroaching threat, such as in the massive figure of 
hale and hearty Germans, whose numbers on the ever-nearing front seemed to be infinite, the 
fracturing of the British public body by the extraordinary individual could no longer be 
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countenanced. Rau’s analysis of Clarissa’s rival for Clarissa’s daughter’s affection, Miss Kilman,  
is telling: 
A representative of the educated, working woman, she is too much 
of everything: too much brain and too much body. She represents 
Woolf’s ‘bad’ modernity through all the trope we have already 
seen at work in pre-war fiction: unseemly appetite, German 
descent, excessive visibility, grotesque corporeality….She 
embodies the paradoxical phenomenon of the grotesque in 
combining excessive physicality and social marginality; the 
tension between her near-invisibility as a minor character and her 
spectral, monstrous omnipresence as a preoccupation. (131)  
 
Indeed, it is precisely Miss Kilman’s menacing omnipresence, the threat of her excessive, 
transgressive body which necessitates its invisibility, the exclusion which enables the normative 
group—defined by what it disavows—to form. As the quintessential hostess and the charismatic 
leader whose entire raison d’etre is “to combine, to create,” it is no coincidence, then, that 
Clarissa should perceive Miss Kilman’s threat as largely a threat to influence Clarissa’s child, to 
re/create Elizabeth in Miss Kilman’s image, rather than her own. Thus, the conjoined twins, 
“secret sharers,” vampires, and Hottentot Venuses which populate fin de siècle Gothic romances 
as a projection of latent cultural anxieties over the integrity of the family and the perpetuation of 
a pure racial identity give way in this high modernist text to the spectral hauntings of very real, 
but highly marginalized, cultural others.   
Significantly, World War I both prompted and rationalized the creation of a new, modern 
nationalist identity even as it engendered the means of bringing such a collectivist identity to 
fruition. Specifically, the war brought about a revised, prolific, and potent medical model which 
would ultimately come to play a powerful role in British paradigms regarding the acquisition and 
maintenance of the ideal citizen’s body. As Fiona Reid argues in her analysis of “shell shock” in 
Britain, physical health began to be articulated in terms of civic obligation. Reid writes, 
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Shell shock developed in a culture that already stressed the 
importance of moral responsibility for both mental and physical 
health. As the war developed, medical and military responses to 
shell shock repeatedly stressed the importance of will power and of 
the man’s personal commitment to his own recovery. This 
emphasis upon self-control was not simply the consequence of 
military discipline during a wartime crisis; it also reflected a pre-
existing culture. Eugene Sandow, the bodybuilder and “famous 
health specialist”, ran a campaign for health, fitness and endurance 
at the beginning of the war, and stressed the way in which one 
could cultivate and develop nerve force and willpower. He offered 
books on the subjects of neurasthenia and nervous disorders and 
described neurasthenia in pejorative terms….Mr. Sandow insisted 
that “weakness is a crime today”, and made clear links between 
neurasthenia and lack of military success. (15)    
 
While extraordinary bodies had long been associated with a lack of control, an excessive 
individuality that was both dangerous and alluring, the World War I era coincided with and 
authorized the ascendance of a medicalized modernity which defined physical and mental health 
as a public virtue. Curatives were couched in militaristic terms, with the process of reaching, 
holding on to, or returning to a state of ideal wellness articulated through the language of a 
militaristic regime. Not surprisingly, of course, the failure to maintain such an ideal standard of 
wellness was represented in similarly militaristic language, as the “shirking” of one’s duty, an 
offense against one’s nation. 
In addition to the extensive obligations of physical wellness borne of the World War I 
era, psychological wellness also became a duty to which every good British citizen was subject. 
This requirement played a particularly significant role in this period due to the widely-
recognized epidemic of shell-shocked soldiers in this era. While late-nineteenth century 
psychologists like Charcot had long repudiated the ancient association of mental illness with 
females exclusively, it was not until World War I that the study and treatment of mental illness in 
males became ubiquitous. Bogousslavsky describes the frequently brutal methods deployed in 
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the treatment of shell-shocked veterans motivated by the rehabilitation model accounting 
“success” as the return of the soldier to the frontlines and informed in practice by the premise of 
illness—particularly psychiatric illness—as the failure of willpower: 
In the center at Tours, [Clovis] Vincent initially used faradization 
with “persuasion”, which had initially been developed by Babinsky 
before the war for treating hysterics, but limited success 
encouraged him to develop a more painful but ‘efficacious’ 
method associating galvanic current with forced ‘rehabilitation’. 
Usually, electric charges were repeatedly delivered on the affected 
parts of the body, while the doctor exhorted the patient to improve 
immediately….[Vincent] reported large statistics of successful 
results, with fighters quickly being sent back to the front, and only 
less than 3% failure….This therapy for war hysteria was not at all 
limited to France, and was used in the Allied and German troops as 
well, even with particularly aggressive methods, justified by a 
renewed emphasis of the concept of a “weakness of the 
will”….After the war, the future Nobel laureate Julius Wagner-
Jauregg…had to face trial on this issue, where Freud testified in his 
favor. (154-156) 
 
Further, as Reid notes, the treatment of shell shock in World War I veterans was fraught with 
complications, carrying with it a host of social and economic implications which impacted both 
the treatment and the overall understanding of the disorder:  
[M]ixed messages characterized popular perceptions of mental 
illness and also featured in the official discourse, which recognized 
the validity of nervous complaints while simultaneously making 
explicit associations between nervous debility, idleness, and fraud. 
The initial official responses to shell shock stemmed from research 
into fraudulent compensation claims in the workplace, and it is no 
coincidence that Sir John Collie, the pre-war expert in malingering, 
eventually became responsible for managing Homes of Recovery 
for shell-shocked men and for the allocation of war pensions. (16)   
 
As a result of widespread efforts of men like Collie to prevent the distribution of government 
funds to “undeserving” veterans, Reid argues, the treatment of shell-shock came to be ensconced 
in the language of “detection” rather than diagnosis. While diagnosis would still situate the 
patient squarely within the modern medical model, the verbiage of “detection” foreground the 
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visibility of the patient, situating him firmly as the transmitter of embodied signs which, 
significantly, are decipherable only by expert authorities. Reid describes at great length the 
intensive training physicians, psychiatrists, and other authorities underwent in order to 
successfully differentiate between true sufferers and malingerers. Of special significance here is 
the fact that the visibility of the purportedly shell-shocked veteran was a highly dangerous reality 
to be carefully controlled if fraud was to be prevented: only the expert could read the material 
bodies of the veteran appropriately. Lay persons, the public at large, would be incapable of 
discerning between authentic illness and performance—a fact which simultaneously validated 
and necessitated the removal of the shell-shocked body from the purview of an inexpert public 
and its incorporation into medico-scientific regime. This reality is powerfully illustrated in 
Woolf’s description of Septimus’ first meeting with Dr. Bradshaw, who enjoyed 
the reputation (of the utmost importance in dealing with nerve 
cases) not merely of lightning skill, and almost infallible accuracy 
in diagnosis but of sympathy; tact; of understanding the human 
soul. He could see the first moment they came into the room (the 
Warren Smiths they were called); he was certain directly he saw 
the man; it was a case of extreme gravity. It was a case of complete 
breakdown—complete physical and nervous breakdown, with 
every symptom in an advanced stage, he ascertained in two or 
three minutes. (106) 
  
This expertise in quick and rapid “detection” of authentic nervous illness eludes those uninitiated 
into the exclusive knowledge of the elite—the physicians, the scientists,  the lawmakers 
(themselves frequently submissive to medical authority), and even those closest to the patient—
wives, mothers, fathers—must acquiesce to their judgments, as does Lucrezia, despite her 
misgivings, when Sir William prescribes Septimus’ removal to the country, alone, for psychiatric 
care and “instruction.”  
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 One key factor in the social understanding of shell shock was social class. As has been 
explored in previous chapters, the predisposition to physical and mental illness was situated 
largely with racial, gendered, and economic frameworks. Not only were women and racial/ethnic 
“others” configured as vulnerable to disease, so, too, were the lower classes. Such prejudices 
carried over, Reid asserts, into the discourse of and approach to shell shock. Diagnoses of shell 
shock in officers and other elites were often reluctantly given and couched in a language of 
heroism and ultimate recuperability. Reid writes, “there is a key categorical distinction between 
neurasthenic officers and hysterical men, and the subtext is clear: the man suffering from 
neurasthenia is more respectable and more refined than the man suffering from the more vulgar, 
and more physical, hysteria” (17). For common soldiers of the lower classes, diagnoses of 
nervous disorders were defined as both the manifestation of an innate and frequently inherited 
predisposition, as well as the enactment of a moral and civic failure, the dereliction of duty 
through weakness. Such class-based distinctions are evident time and again throughout Mrs. 
Dalloway, particularly in regard to Holmes’ and Bradshaw’s exhortations to Septimus to accept 
treatment: “‘Nobody lives for himself alone,” said Sir William, glancing at the photograph of his 
wife in Court dress. ‘And you have a brilliant career before you,’ said Sir William…. ‘An 
exceptionally brilliant career’” (109). Likewise, when Dr. Holmes cajoles a suicidal Septimus to 
leave his bed, he does so on the grounds of the patriotic obligations of the bourgeois husband: 
“He had actually talked of killing himself to his wife, quite a girl, a foreigner, wasn’t she? Didn’t 
that give her a very odd idea of English husbands? Didn’t one owe perhaps a duty to one’s 
wife?” (102). 
Such class differentiations in regard to shell shock extended into the treatment regimes 
prescribed for the condition. While officers and members of the upper class were sent to 
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recuperate at spa-like establishments where they would enjoy sumptuous meals and luxurious, 
private quarters, lower class soldiers suffering from shell shock would frequently be shunted off 
to over-crowded sanitariums on the Continental front lines. According to Reid, “A General Order 
in 1916 stated that any patient who was affected by nervous exhaustion ‘arising from insufficient 
self-control’ should be kept in France for treatment” (31). There, they would experience Spartan 
living conditions where they would be subjected to brutal treatments, including the electric 
shocks, described above, that were designed to “recondition” them to the demands of military 
life. Reid writes, “Psychologically wounded officers were housed in single rooms in secluded 
residences….in a very pleasant environment….Nervous casualties from the other ranks could be 
dispatched to filthy asylum-like conditions, but gentlemen-soldiers went to something more like 
a country house” (33).   
This class-based dichotomy in the treatment of illness plays out in important ways in 
Woolf’s twinning of Clarissa and Septimus. While both suffer from severe illnesses, the 
understanding and the treatment of their illnesses vary greatly. Though Woolf suggests that 
Clarissa’s illness is some sort of heart condition that is never named, Craig Gordon asserts that 
the symptoms and treatments Clarissa undergoes are suggestive of neurasthenia, a form of 
hysteria with which Woolf was also repeatedly diagnosed. The text is never definitive in regard 
to Clarissa’s diagnosis, but the refusal to specifically name her disorder aligns well with attitudes 
toward illness, and particularly psychiatric illness, among the upper class. In the novel’s first 
scene, Evelyn Whitbread is depicted as frequenting the finest physicians in Europe on a quest for 
a diagnosis of symptoms which, ultimately, cannot be discussed in polite company:  
[T]he Whitbreads came “to see doctors.” Times without number 
Clarissa had visited Evelyn Whitbread in a nursing home. Was 
Evelyn ill again? Evelyn was a good deal out of sorts, said Hugh, 
intimating a kind of pout or swell of his very well-covered, manly, 
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extremely handsome, perfectly upholstered body (he was almost 
too well dressed always, but presumably had to be, with his little 
job of Court) that his wife had some internal ailment, nothing 
serious, which, as an old friend. Clarissa Dalloway would quite 
understand without requiring him to specify. Ah yes, she did of 
course; what a nuisance; and felt very sisterly and oddly conscious 
at the same time of her hat. (4) 
 
 Likewise, the erasure of Clarissa’s diagnosis from the text suggests the disavowal of the 
pathological from elite purview. The frailties of mind and body are neither to be discussed nor 
seen in circles which, as will be explored later in this chapter, thrive upon spectacularity, of 
which Clarissa is the ultimate emblem.  
For Septimus, however, such an erasure is impossible. Woolf devotes a great deal of time 
to the exploration of Septimus’ social class and his attempted rise to the ranks of the bourgeois 
through all the traditional forms of the impoverished young clerk aspiring for a better life:  
[S]o that he was, on the whole, a border case, neither one thing nor 
the other, might end with a house at Purley and a motor car, or 
continue renting apartments in back streets all his life; one of those 
half-educated, self-educated men whose education is all learnt 
from books borrowed from public libraries, read in the evening 
after the day’s work, on the advice of well-known authors 
consulted by letter. (93) 
 
As that of a working-class male, Septimus’ shell shock, predictably, is situated as a failure of 
performance, the neglect of his civic obligations as both a promising business man and as a 
husband and potential father. In his years as a clerk preceding the war, Septimus’ employer, Mr. 
Brewer, sees in Septimus the potential to rise to bourgeois affluence, a potential, predicated, 
significantly, upon his ability to “keep his health,” for which Mr. Brewer advises a vigorous 
athletic regimen and hearty food. But when the war arrives, it precipitates for Septimus, as for so 
many of his class, the transition from anemic boyhood into virile masculinity. Woolf writes,  
There in the trenches the change which Mr. Brewer desired when 
he advised football was produced instantly; he developed 
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manliness; he was promoted; he drew the attention, indeed the 
affection of his officer, Evans, by name. It was a case of two dogs 
playing on a hearth-rug. (95-96) 
 
It is no coincidence, then, that after the war is over and Septimus returns to his previous 
employment, his heroic performance as a soldier is embraced as a source of collective pride and 
obligation:  
At the office they advanced him to a post of considerable 
responsibility. They were proud of him; he had won crosses. “You 
have done your duty; it is up to us—“ began Mr. Brewer; and 
could not finish, so pleasurable was his emotion. (98)   
 
Thus, when Septimus begins to exhibit the signs and symptoms of shell-shock, symptoms so 
severe that they ultimately destroy his ability to perform in the workplace, it is taken as a 
collective, rather than an individual, failure. It is telling then, that even efforts to seek medical 
care are couched by experts in economic terms, as is evinced when Septimus and Lucrezia 
request a second opinion and Dr. Holmes, the general practitioner, asserts the inappropriateness 
of the request: “And if they were rich people, said Dr. Holmes, looking ironically around the 
room, by all means let them go to Harley Street; if they had no confidence in him, said Dr. 
Holmes, looking not quite so kind” (104).  
 
Someone Has to Die: The Extraordinary Body as Scapegoat 
As has been explored throughout this study, the reception of the extraordinary body, the 
body which fails to “perform” appropriately within normative social parameters, is predicated 
upon presumptions of that body’s predictability and controllability—or lack thereof. The greater 
support and compassion afforded to officers and elites battling physical and mental illnesses 
derive to a large extent, as we have seen, from expectations of their ultimate recuperability to the 
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norm. Intrinsic or inherited illnesses, such as those presupposed in the lower classes, offer less 
hope of cure or containment than those illnesses which derive from external forces, from trauma 
or environment. Thus, while the elites are subject to palliative therapies designed to restore their 
minds and bodies to their purportedly “natural” state, the lower classes endure the harsher, more 
punitive therapies designed to drive out or at least domesticate the pathological tendencies which 
reside within. For Septimus, the tokens of his nervous debility are profoundly material: 
[A]ll the other crimes raised their heads and shook their fingers 
and jeered and sneered over the rail of the bed in the early hours of 
the morning at the prostrate body which lay realizing its 
degradation…and was so pocked and marked with vice that 
women shuddered when they saw him in the street. The verdict of 
human nature on such a wretch was death. (101) 
 
Thus, while approaches toward physical and mental illness vary greatly among the classes, all 
are united in one important aspect: the removal of the sufferer from traditional society. As Reid 
notes, in the years surrounding World War I, the number of in-patient psychiatric hospitals being 
built in and around London exponentially increased, particularly those dedicated to the treatment 
of shell-shocked soldiers. This surge in the practice of institutionalizing the unwell coincides in 
important ways with an increasing trend in the early twentieth century toward what disability 
theorists have identified as the cure, cover, or kill paradigm.  
The visibility of the extraordinary subject has long been an instrument for the reflection 




 centuries, the foregrounding 
of anomalous bodies, though often conducted in rigidly controlled circumstances, authorized 
such bodies as objects of speculation for the lay public and professional audiences alike. From 
freak shows to museum displays to the celebrated presentations of Charcot in the medical 
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theater, the Enlightenment’s “dare to know” rendered extraordinary bodies highly visible: the 
tactile manifestation of society’s deepest questions, concerns, and fears. 
However, with the rise of the modern professional sciences, the visibility of the 
extraordinarily embodied came under the increasing control of medical authorities and was soon 
eclipsed by a medical discourse which took the place of tangible manifestations of physical and 
mental pathology. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault writes,  
The space of configuration of the disease and the space of 
localization of the illness in the body have been superimposed, in 
medical experience, for only a relatively short period of time—the 
period that coincides with nineteenth-century medicine and the 
privileges accorded to pathological anatomy. This is the period that 
marks the suzerainty of the gaze, since in the same perceptual 
field, following the same continuities or the same breaks, 
experience reads at a glance the visible lesions of the organism and 
the coherence of pathological forms; the illness is articulated 
exactly on the body, and its logical distribution is carried out at 
once in terms of anatomical masses. The ‘glance’ has simply to 
exercise its right of origin over truth. (3-4) 
 
The rampant construction of asylums and sanitariums in this era testifies to the growing control 
exerted by medical experts on the pathological body in the early twentieth century, a reality 
poignantly illustrated in a passage from Woolf’s novel in which Septimus, walking around 
London, watches a group of patients from a nearby institution: “[O]nce a maimed file of lunatics 
being exercised or displayed for the diversion of the populace (who laughed aloud), ambled and 
nodded and grinned past him, in the Tottenham Court Road, each half apologetically, yet 
triumphantly, inflicting his hopeless woe” (100). Of paramount importance here is that the 
“lunatics” described are presumably being “exercised or displayed” only under the auspices of 
the medical authorities of the asylum/institution they inhabit, not by virtue of their own will.
55
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 In Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats, and the Culture of Degeneration, Donald Childs describes a 
similar scene which Woolf herself had witnessed and her “negative” eugenicist response to it. Childs cites a 1915 
journal entry as an early indicator of Woolf’s eugenic orientations. Woolf writes,  “[W]e met & had to pass a long 
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The important distinction between this display of the “lunatics” and that of earlier prodigies and 
freaks, such as Daniel Lambert, Sarah Baartman, or the McKoy and Hilton sisters, is the 
collective nature of this display. Whereas the exhibition of Victorian and fin-de-siècle prodigies 
foreground the singularity of their embodiments, showcasing them as exemplars of wondrous, if 
potentially threatening, individuality, the asylum patients here are displayed collectively, their 
individuality subsumed by their status as patients and inmates. In their co-optation within the 
medical model, their institutionalization, they form an homogenous group that, in its failure of 
assimilation, opposes and thereby affirms the normative collective, the new, post-war social 
body operating within strict and rigorously defined parameters of “appropriate” form and 
functioning.    
It is significant that Septimus should witness this spectacle just as he, himself, is making 
his way to the offices of Dr. Bradshaw on the elite Harley Street. It is a sight that prompts 
Septimus immediately to ask whether he, too, would go mad. The scene is arresting not only to 
Septimus, but to the other passersby, for whom the “display” of the lunatics elicits an 
uncomfortable laughter borne of fear. Such an exhibition, now under the control of the medical 
authorities, authorizes and motivates Bradshaw’s doctrine of Proportion: 
Health we must have; and health is proportion; so that when a man 
comes into your room and says he is Christ (a common delusion), 
and has a message, as they mostly have, and threatens, as they do, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
line of imbeciles….and then one realized that every one in that long line was a miserable ineffective shuffling 
idiotic creature….It was perfectly horrible” (qtd. Childs, ch. 1). The passage concludes, Childs notes, with Woolf’s 
declaration that “They (the patients) should certainly be killed” (Ibid.). Though such sentiments appear shocking in 
the post-Nazi era, the sentiment embraced here by Woolf is emblematic of the era’s concern with the purification, 
protection, and preservation of the social body. Moreover, the collectivist concern associated with such eugenicist 
ideologies is paired with an admittedly paternalistic but not wholly condemnable concern for the sufferer. Woolf 
here describes the inmates as “miserable…creatures”, echoing prevailing assumptions the non-normative bodies 
are a source of agony to those trapped within them. Within this paradigm, pathology, whether physical, 
developmental, or psychological, is an untenable state that robs the sufferer of his/her humanity and which 
necessitates the eugenic intervention of the professional (especially the medical professional) to end present 
suffering and to ensure that such suffering is not perpetuated in the future. Such intercessions include not only 
voluntary and compulsory sterilization or controlled reproduction, but also,  at the furthest extreme, euthanasia.    
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to kill himself, you invoke proportion; order rest in bed; rest in 
solitude; silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, 
without messages; six months’ rest; until a man who went in 
weighing seven stone six comes out weighing twelve….  
 
Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself 
but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade 
childbirth, penalised despair,  made it impossible for the unfit to 
propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of 
proportion—his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw’s if they were 
women. (110-111)  
 
While the power to define, control, and contain the extraordinary body was increasingly 
being claimed by and for medical experts, such authority was not infrequently bestowed—or 
happily relinquished--by the lay public itself. In The Black Stork, Martin S. Pernick study of the 
mercy killings of disabled and deformed infants in the United States in the early twentieth 
century, the author traces increasing public and institutional demands for the censorship of 
graphic medical images and discourse (including that related to the death by medical neglect of 
“defective” infants) between the 1910s and 1930s:  
“I think all monstrosities should be permitted to die,” wrote one university 
president from New Mexico, “but I do condemn the physician for making 
such a public ado about the matter.” Columbia University sociology 
chairman Franklin H. Giddings applauded the death of “molasses-minded” 
mental defectives, but felt it was a “question that should be considered 
soberly, thoughtfully and by rigorous intellectual processes. To put it up to 
the general public in all the emotional and imaginative setting of a photo-
play is, in my judgment, an utterly wrong thing to do.” (118-119) 
 
By 1930, efforts to censor images of medical conditions and treatments by various state and 
motion picture industry regulators were consolidated in the first Production Code of the Motion 
Picture Producers and Distributors of America, which, among its list of proscribed images 
included images of disease and deformity.  Thus, the misgivings expressed by the medical and 
academic communities regarding the “appropriateness” of public discussion—and images—of 
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disease, deformity, and disability—had evolved into a paternalistic discourse espoused by critics 
and the lay public alike that authorized the institutional “sanitization” of the entertainment 
industry. The expert opinions of medical and intellectual authorities only confirmed what the lay 
public had long feared about exposure to the visibly diseased and deformed: 
Some opponents meant it literally when they insisted that film 
depictions of disease were sickening. Variety critic Jonathan Lowe 
worried that The Black Stork’s vivid portraits of defectives would 
cause birth defects if pregnant women were allowed to see them. 
Others who believed that powerful emotions influenced bodily 
health in adults insisted that films like The Black Stork threatened 
the health of all audiences, not just the captive fetal audience. 
(123)  
 
Such concerns were not only prevalent in the US, but were increasingly operative  across 
England, where the situating of physical and mental illness within the purview of the medical 
expert coincided with an equal erasure of pathology within the parameters of “normal” social 
life. Constructions of “normality” emanating from the medical authority outward to the lay 
public play a significant role in Woolf’s text not only in Bradshaw’s doctrine of Proportion but in 
its corollary: Conversion. Woolf writes, 
But Proportion has a sister, less smiling, more formidable, a 
Goddess even now engaged—in the heat and sands of India, the 
mud and swamp of Africa, the purlieus of London, wherever in 
short the climate or the devil tempts men to fall from the true belief 
which is her own….Conversion is her name and she feasts on the 
wills of the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own 
features stamped on the face of the populace….offers help but 
desires power….had her dwelling in Sir William’s heart, though 
concealed, as she mostly is, under some plausible disguise; some 
venerable name; love, duty, self-sacrifice. How he would work—
how toil to raise funds, propagate reforms, initiate institutions! But 
conversion, fastidious Goddess, loves blood better than brick, and 




Furthermore, as Septimus’ response to “human nature” in the forms of Holmes and Bradshaw 
indicates, when such conversion to the mandates of proportion could not be accomplished 
through persuasion, it was done through force:  
Sir William had a friend in Surrey where they taught, what Sir 
William frankly admitted was a difficult art—a sense of 
proportion. There were, moreover, family affection, honour, 
courage; and a brilliant career. All of these had in Sir William a 
resolute champion. If they failed him, he had to support police and 
the good of society, which, he remarked very quietly, would take 
care, down in Surrey, that these unsocial impulses, bred more than 
anything by the lack of good blood, were held in control. And then 
stole out from her hiding-place and mounted her throne that 
Goddess whose list is to override opposition, to stamp indelibly in 
the sanctuaries of others the image of herself. Naked, defenceless, 
the exhausted, the friendless received the impress of Sir William’s 
will. He swooped; he devoured. He shut people up. It was this 
combination of decision and humanity that endeared Sir William 
so greatly to the relations of his victims. (113-114) 
 
This process whereby individuals come to embrace the forces which would subjugate and 
discipline them and their loved ones is, as Freud notes, a remnant of the horde instinct whereby 
the collective body is preserved both through the expulsion of anomalous bodies without and 
destructive impulses from within. Such a repudiation of the disruptive element is accomplished 
through the submission of the individual ego to an ego ideal, corporealized in a totemistic 
fashion in the body of a charismatic leader, (real or fictitious) cultural hero, or other archetypal 
figure:  
This demand for equality is the root of social conscience and the 
sense of duty. It reveals itself unexpectedly in the syphilitic’s dread 
of infecting other people, which psychoanalysis has taught us to 
understand. The dread exhibited…corresponds to their violent 
struggles against the unconscious wish to spread their infection to 
other people; for why should they alone be infected and cut off 
from so much? Why not other people as well?....Thus, social 
feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling 
into a positively-toned tie of the nature of an 
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identification…effected under the influence of a common tender 
tie with a person outside the group. (ch. 9) 
 
This trend lies at the heart of Mrs. Dalloway as well insofar as both Clarissa and her foil, 
Septimus, function in significant ways as spectacular objects in as much as both exhibit a kind of 
totemistic charm which serves to absorb and diffuse the discrete individualities of the group 
through identification (“the tender tie”) with the one outside the group, forming a collective 
group through the centering of attention on a singular object—the hostess (Clarissa) and the 
patient (Septimus).  Clarissa’s success as a hostess, for example, is predicated largely upon the 
extent to which she is able to achieve a normative visibility. The text is replete with references to 
Clarissa’s posturing, her extraordinary capacity to “fill the room,” which Peter both admires and 
repudiates. Peter recalls this exceptional ability as one which Clarissa has enjoyed throughout her 
life:  
She came into a room; she stood, as he had often seen her, in a 
doorway with lots of other people round her. But it was Clarissa 
one remembered. Not that she was striking; not beautiful at all; 
there was nothing picturesque about her; she never said anything 
particularly clever; there she was, however; there she was. (84) 
 
Indeed, the narrative itself may be seen principally as Clarissa’s quest to establish the ideal 
conditions through which Clarissa may exhibit herself as object, the focal point through which 
the spectators can bring together their admiring gaze. For Clarissa, however, this ambition is less 
an exercise in vanity than an effort to offer herself as the instrument and ground through which 
her efforts “to combine, to create” will be brought to fruition. Woolf writes,  
And she felt quite continuously a sense of their existence; and she 
felt what a waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they 
could be brought together; and so she did it. And it was an 
offering; to combine, to create; but to whom?....An offering for the 
sake of offering, perhaps. Anyhow, it was her gift. Nothing else 




In this capacity, then, Clarissa resembles the iconic leader Freud describes in his analysis of 
group formation and psychology. The charismatic leader, for Freud, is one on whom the desires 
of the group are projected and in whom their individual personalities are subsumed.  
 The inherent interconnectedness of individual subjects lies at the root of Mrs. Dalloway, 
as is evinced by repeated images, related both to nature and to culture, which seek to replace the 
atomism of autonomous Enlightenment subjectivity with, as Gordon notes, a new vision of 
community-making which, he argues, is configured most significantly through the imagery of the 
“neural tissues” and “fibrous networks” of sympathy which diffuse the boundaries of the 
personal self and connect human beings to one another. As Clarissa walks the crowded streets of 
her beloved London on her way to buy the flowers for her party, she muses, 
[D]id it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go 
on without her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe 
that death ended absolutely? But that somehow in the streets of London, 
on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, 
lived in each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; 
of the house there, ugly, rambling, all to bits and pieces as it was; part of 
the people she had never met; being laid out like a mist between the 
people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the 
trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself. (7-8) 
 
This dynamic of diffusion and connection is experienced not only by Clarissa, but by each of the 
characters to some extent for another. Lady Bruton, for example, experiences her connection 
with Richard Dalloway and Hugh Whitbread physically, within her body, after having lunched 
with them:  
And they went further and further from her, being attached to her 
by a thin thread (since they had lunched with her) which would 
stretch and stretch, get thinner and thinner as they walked across 
London; as if one’s friends were attached to one’s body. (125)   
 
Significantly, Lady Bruton foregrounds this feeling of connection with Richard and Hugh in her 
having just lunched with them. Like Clarissa, for Lady Bruton, it is the capacity to participate 
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together in culturally-sanctioned activities
56
 which help to inspire, define, and perpetuate this 
feeling of communal belonging, the dissolution of the boundaries of the self through an on-
going, though highly prescriptive, form of community-making and re-making.  
 It seems hardly coincidental that the imagery informing Woolf’s novel parallels in 
significant ways LeBon’s descriptions of the group mind, which implicate the dissolution of the 
bounded self in the workings of a sort of collective unconscious, imaged as the waves of a great 
ocean: 
Perceptible phenomena may be compared to the waves, which are 
the expression on the surface of the ocean of deep-lying 
disturbances of which we know nothing….[Y]et there are…acts in 
which they appear to be guided by those mysterious forces which 
the ancients denominated destiny, nature, or providence, which we 
call the voices of the dead, and whose power it is impossible to 
overlook….It would seem, at times, as if there were latent forces in 
the inner being of nations which serve to guide them. (n.pg.)  
  
LeBon’s “perceptible phenomena” which reflect the “deep-lying disturbances” of the group 
subconscious is expressed in Mrs. Dalloway in the dialectic formed between the novel’s most 
illustrious symbol, the chiming of Big Ben, and the bells of St. Margaret’s, its “feminine” 
counterpart. Throughout the novel, Big Ben’s “leaden circles” are configured as irrevocable, 
inviolable, and inexorable. They elicit a hush from the crowd and a sense of anticipation, 
bordering on dread, in the seconds before their first strike. The leaden circles do not merely 
chronicle the hours, they impose them, demanding submission to the Law of the Father which 
would regulate, parcel, standardize, systematize, and subjugate human experience to the 
chronological mandates of the clock.
57
  Juxtaposed against the commanding tones of Big Ben are 
the chimes of St. Margaret’s, which 
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 An example would be Lady Bruton’s “exquisite luncheons.” 
57
 Indeed, the hallmark and great pride of British modernity is that all the trains run on time. 
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like a hostess who comes into her drawing-room on the very stroke 
of the hour and finds her guests there already. I am not late. No, it 
is precisely half-past eleven, she says. Yet, though she is perfectly 
right, her voice, being the voice of the hostess, is reluctant to inflict 
its individuality. Some grief for the past holds it back; some 
concern for the present. It is half-past eleven, she says, and the 
sound of St. Margaret’s glides into the recesses of the heart and 
buries itself in ring after ring of sound, like something alive which 
wants to confide itself, to disperse itself, to be, with a tremor of 
delight, at rest—like Clarissa herself. (54) 
 
Unlike the formidable and irrefutable bells of Big Ben, the chimes of St. Margaret’s privilege 
connection above Law; they are both elegy and steward, uniting present and past and self and 
others through the tender services of the hostess. Like LeBon’s “voices of the dead” which 
galvanize the unseen currents driving the waves of surface phenomena, the tension between the 
bells of Big Ben and the chimes of St. Margaret’s inaugurate a new formulation of community-
making which incorporate the  feminine
58
  while acknowledging the inexorable Law of the 
Father. 
Mrs. Dalloway’s double plot structure elaborates on the dialectic symbolized through Big 
Ben and St. Margaret’s insofar as Septimus operates as the scapegoat to the Law of the Father, 
the sacrifice required to enable Clarissa, the quintessential hostess, to bring her project “to 
combine, to create” to fruition and, as a consequence, to unite her friends in a new, if ephemeral, 
community. Like Clarissa, Septimus is also a spectacular object, but his inability to confine his 
spectacular embodiment within normative parameters renders him pathological, amenable to 
correction or confinement. Clarissa’s station in life, shored up by her fortuitous marriage to 
Dalloway and her own unimpeachable knack for social convention, situates her squarely in the 
paradigmatic role of the upper class hostess. As such, she astutely embodies her ideal, the 
contingencies of somatic experience erased by the obligations and strictures of social norms.  
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 This includes the dissolution of the boundaries between self and other. 
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Septimus, on the other hand, is the inassimilable other in whom the verities of physical 
and mental life defy efforts at remediation. Time and again, Septimus is depicted in the novel as 
an obstructive and unsettling force. In the illustrious opening scene, which Gordon describes as 
an ideal example of group formation within the novel, Septimus is represented as the 
paradigmatic outsider whose hallucinations exclude him from the nascent collective developed 
through a shared locus of attention.
59
 Importantly, while the spectators gaze from a distance at 
the passing limousine, wondering silently and aloud as to whom it contains, Septimus steps into 
the street and arrests its progress: “It is I who am blocking the way, he thought. Was he not being 
looked and pointed at; was he not weighted there, rooted to the pavement, for a purpose? But for 
what purpose?” (14-15) Subsequently, when the spectators turn their attention to the skywriter, 
reading in the letters collective messages most often derived from commerce, Septimus discovers 
not a communal message but an individualistic, personal one which, as Gordon notes, is aesthetic 
rather than commercial: “So, thought Septimus, looking up, they are signaling to me. Not indeed 
in actual words; that is, he could not read the language yet; but it was plain enough, this beauty, 
this exquisite beauty” (22).   
This scene, therefore, is a crucial early demonstration of Septimus’ role in the narrative, 
as well as of the vital differences between him and his seeming twin, Clarissa. While Clarissa’s 
spectacular objectification serves as the unifying force within her social group, Septimus’ 
visibility is divisive, as is evinced in Lucrezia’s conflicting desire to reveal and to conceal their 
suffering: 
People must notice; people must see. People, she thought, looking 
at the crowd staring at the motor car; the English people, with their 
children and their horses and their clothes, which she admired in a 
                                                          
59
 The first instance is on the passing limousine presumably containing some illustrious person—a royal or a head 




way; but they were ‘people’ now, because Septimus had said, ‘I 
will kill myself’; an awful thing to say. Suppose they had heard 
him? She looked at the crowd. Help, help! She wanted to cry out to 
butchers’ boys and women….But failure one conceals. She must 
take him away into some park. (15) 
 
Septimus’ physical presence impedes the progress of the great man or woman of the Empire, 
even as his visibly inappropriate jubilation at the sight of the skywriter undermines the project of 
collective meaning-making inspired by the sight of the plane. This frustration of meaning is a 
recurring theme throughout the text, as primary and tangential characters alike watch Septimus’ 
actions and, especially, Septimus’ interactions with Lucrezia, and misinterpret them. That the 
meanings assigned to Septimus’ actions should reflect the idiosyncratic cares and concerns of the 
observer illustrates yet again the extent to which anomalous bodies are made to signify broader 
meanings, carrying the load of collective questions and anxieties with which they may have no 
relation.  
The transference of symbolic significance onto the extraordinary other inevitably ties 
with efforts in the early twentieth century to contain the dangerous force of this emotionally and 
ideologically charged figure. As Cohen argues, such efforts can be most clearly delineated in the 
seemingly contradictory behaviors toward the war wounded and the war dead. In describing the 
exclusion of disabled veterans from the Peace Procession of 1919 which celebrated the return of 
living and whole soldiers while honoring the war dead, Cohen writes:  
Disabled veterans watched the parade from the sidelines. Instead of 
an invitation to march in the procession, men in hospital blue were 
relegated to special grandstands not far from widows and orphans. 
For those who had lost limbs, there was an “alternative privilege”: 
a paid trip home with ten shillings allowance for expenses. To the 
government’s undoubted relief, most availed themselves of the 




At the same time as the war wounded were shunted off to grandstands, asylums, and 
long-term care institutions, post-war Britain was characterized by the call to mourning and 
remembrance; “Lest we forget” resounded in virtually every corner of the Empire, implicating all 
British citizens in dutiful remembrances to both honor the victims of war and to prevent the 
repetition of the tragedy. Significantly, however, the work of mourning and remembrance was 
complicated by ambivalent attitudes toward the dead and the mentally and physically wounded. 
Cohen writes, 
Disabled veterans were segregated: in sheltered workshops, in 
homes in outlying suburbs, in rehabilitation centers. They rarely 
took part in the Armistice Day parades. Disabled veterans in 
Britain were not forgotten. Loyal subscribers like Miss Hilda 
Monamy King continued to remember them with monthly checks. 
However, they were never fully rehabilitated either as workers or 
as citizen. The Great War’s most conspicuous legacy, they became 
its living memorials. (102) 
 
 The honored dead were invoked with every injunction that survivors remember and, as 
King notes in his studies of war monuments, memorials to the fallen dotted the English 
landscape. The construction of and the meditation on these monuments served to unite the 
British in a common act of mourning and remembrance, consolidating a modern British identity 
through the trauma of war and the homogenization of grief. Indeed, references to these 
monuments abound in Mrs. Dalloway, and characters are frequently depicted as experiencing 
unexpected flashes of war memory, almost as though the citizens themselves suffered a taste of 
the post-traumatic disorders which assail Septimus and his shell-shocked brethren. In a scene 
bearing remarkable resemblance to the “display of lunatics” witnessed by Septimus earlier in the 
day, Peter Walsh watches a parade of young soldiers on the march: 
[O]n they marched, past him, past every one, in their steady way, 
as if one will worked legs and arms uniformly, and life, with its 
varieties, its irreticences, had been laid under a pavement of 
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monuments and wreaths and drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse 
by discipline. One had to respect it; one might laugh; but one had 
to respect it, he thought. There they go, thought Peter Walsh, 
pausing at the edge of the pavement; and all the exalted statues, 
Nelson, Gordon, Havelock, the black, spectacular images of great 
soldiers stood looking ahead of them, as if they too had made the 
same renunciation…trampled under the same temptations, and 
achieved at length a marble stare. But the stare Peter Walsh did not 
want for himself in the least; though he could respect it in others. 
He could respect it in boys. They don’t know the troubles of the 
flesh yet. (56) 
 
While soldiers and civilians alike largely aspired to the “marble stare” of the war-hardened hero, 
the flesh intervenes to belie the seeming invincibility of the memorialized heroes. Even the 
young soldiers whose marches arrest traffic and whose shoulders carry the burden of national 
pride are themselves all too embodied, expressing the vulnerability of the flesh: “But they did not 
look robust. They were weedy for the most part, boys of sixteen, who might, to-morrow, stand 
behind bowls of rice, cakes of soap on counters” (55).  The seeming lack of vigor in the young 
soldiers on whom the survival of the British Empire will someday ultimately depend reflects 
broader anxieties concerning the vulnerability and ultimate failure of the British body. Rau 
writes, 
The English body remained a social body, even if its symptoms 
were manifestations of a diseased individuality. It was firmly 
locked in a market economy in which a vast patent medicine 
system promised cure (not perfectibility!) through consumption. 
Somehow, the body seemed out of place in modernity, too 
concrete, and it its materiality newly inadequate. (126) 
 
As Rau’s analysis suggests, in a climate of pervasive fears over the materiality of the body, 
medical intervention, in the form of the consumption of medically-authorized curatives, is not 
looked to both for the rehabilitation of the dysfunctional body and as the means to deny and 
deflect its malfunction. 
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It is no wonder, then, that soldiers wounded in body and mind received comparatively 
little public attention beyond the various government and civilian relief agencies designed to 
economically support the wounded. While the plethora of national war monuments united all 
Britons in a communal act of remembrance, the living wounded, as has been discussed, were not 
typically included in these acts of remembrance or commemorated in war memorials. Such a 
prioritization of the honored dead over the living wounded, indeed, exemplifies a fetishizing of 
the dead which the living could not withstand. In their immutable absence, the dead, like the 
monuments erected in their honor, could bear the weight of the signification communally 
ascribed to them. The meaning of their sacrifice would be imposed collectively from without, 
enabling a communal discharge of grief while also activating and authorizing a shared project of 
meaning-making. In the years following the war, postures toward the honored dead enabled the 
creation of a modern, British national identity, a project sorely needed in a nation ravaged by war 
and shaken by the eclipse of its imperial, economic, and technological dominance on the world 
stage in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Unlike the war dead, however, the wounded could not bear silently and perfectly the 
significations imposed upon them by a society seeking to redefine itself. Agencies like the Ex-
Services’ Welfare Society (ESWS), which lobbied for public recognition of and assistance for 
the war wounded, argued that these soldiers were forced to bear the burden of the act of 
remembrance to which all Britons were obligated, with the important exception that, for the shell 
shocked and wounded veteran, such remembrances were perpetual and all-consuming. While 
providing a powerful rationale for veterans’ aid programs, this distinction nevertheless gives 
important clues to the seemingly paradoxical treatment of the dead versus the wounded. 
Disability scholars have long noted the discursively amorphous character of the disabled body, 
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its inherent instability defying both control and concrete understanding. Unlike the unchanging 
dead, the living wounded not only bear the burden of remembrance in their bodies and minds, 
but they also problematize the constellation of significations that a collective project of identity-
re/formation would impose upon them. Deborah Cohen describes the case of Charles Neal, a 
wounded ex-serviceman whose adamant refusal to abide by the proscriptions of the philanthropic 
agencies designed to aid wounded veterans both showcased and problematized the precarious 
social position of such men: 
Disabled ex-servicemen turned to philanthropy when the state 
failed to provide for them. Yet, as Charles Neal discovered, the 
objects of charity could not live as they liked. Their conduct was 
proscribed. There were standards to be met. On the “outside”, as 
Neal put it, a man could peddle stationary without fear of the 
consequences. However, as a tenant at the War Seal Mansions, 
Neal had to abide by a different set of rules or face eviction. To 
live in the War Seal Mansions, Neal had to surrender a measure of 
freedom….Neal asked only for the capacity to provide for his 
family….At the same time, the rehabilitation of individuals was 
not [the philanthropists’] only priority….Above all, they viewed 
charity work as a means of social reform, the practical incarnation 
of their (often unorthodox) principles….[D]isabled men soon 
found themselves entangled in the philanthropists’ schemes. Their 
own needs became a means to a larger end. (117)  
 
As will be shown in the final sections of this chapter, Septimus, as scapegoat, also functions as a 
means to a larger end. News of his death authorizes, motivates, and gives meaning to Clarissa’s 
efforts to throw her party, a party on the brink of failure until word of the suicide unites the 
group in a collective act of sympathy, their remembrance of the dead, like the remonstrations of 
the war memorials and parades themselves, enabling the creation of new community where 
dissolution had been imminent through their shared focus on the now-absent object. 
As has been widely noted, World War I, as the first technological war, created a league of 
wounded veterans suffering catastrophic physical injuries. Landmines and aerial bombings 
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meant that thousands of veterans would be returning from the front with missing and deformed 
limbs. Indeed, facial injuries were so common and so horrific that they came to be called les 
guelles cassées
60
 by the French. Even for those soldiers who escaped visible physical injuries, 
the psychological toll was often just as debilitating, as soldiers frequently sought to heal their 
trauma through the inadvertent and endless replaying of it—hence the injunction to continuous 
remembrance for the shell-shocked veteran. 
The saturation of modern city streets with the broken bodies and minds of the war 
wounded, however, frustrated attempts at a cathartic communal meaning-making because as both 
agents and sufferers, the war wounded sought the right to ascribe their own significations to their 
war experiences. Such meanings not infrequently clashed with those of the civilian community 
seeking to define and then move on from the war. Even where no conflict existed, however, the 
sight of the extreme physical and mental suffering endured by the veterans inevitably gestured 
toward the unthinkable, the sense of futility and meaninglessness which would come to haunt 
twentieth century estimations of the “Great War.” Cohen cites a particularly telling passage from 
a 1934 edition of the British Legion’s Journal which captures the destabilizing force of the war-
wounded incapable of re-assimilating into normative British society: 
A man who wears a V.C. on his coat lapel, or an empty sleeve, or a 
sagging trousers leg, or whose lungs are still racked by the effects 
of enemy gas, is of far less account to the community in which he 
dwells than one who has a two-seater car in his garage and the 
money to pay his domestic bills on the nail. That is War. (Qtd. in 
Cohen 102) 
 
Likewise, Septimus’s cooptation into the powers of “human nature,” in the forms of Holmes and 
Bradshaw, derives less from the desire to relieve his own mental anguish than to restore him to 
the “brilliant career” and the faithful duties of a good “English husband.” If the Great War had 
                                                          
60
 The term literally translated means “the men with smashed faces.” 
209 
 
been motivated by the desire to preserve and perpetuate British-style civilization for the future of 
mankind, then the presence of soldiers now unfitted by the war for participation in civilized 
modernity would seem to repudiate and diminish the collective sacrifice. 
The exclusion of the wounded veteran from public acts of remembrance and the attempts 
to contain and condition the war wounded in mental asylums or rehabilitation institutions 
function to salvage the project of collective identity-re/formation, with the war as its catalyst. As 
Reid notes, within these institutions, the effort to restore moral and, by extension, civic health 
was as significant as any effort toward physical or psychological healing. The projects extend the 
paradigms of optimal health as a public virtue and obligation, discussed earlier in this chapter, to 
the treatment of the war wounded. These are paradigms which play out powerfully in Mrs. 
Dalloway and in particular in Dr. Bradshaw’s chilling paean to Proportion. Bradshaw’s frequent 
references to the “places” throughout the countryside to which he sends his troubled patients in 
order to restore their sense of proportion is a not-so-veiled reference to the institutionalizing 
fervor of the era. The “friends” of Dr. Bradshaw who wait in these residential facilities to “help” 
patients regain their proportion are the medical and psychological authorities Septimus so 
vociferously resists as agents of “human nature.”  
 
The Inarticulate Cry: Speaking the Unspeakable Body 
The perpetual remembrance that Septimus and his fellow shell-shock sufferers require, 
invoked so powerfully by the philanthropic agencies as a rationale for the supportive care of 
veterans, also authorizes their frequently involuntary cooptation into the medico-legal regime 
insofar as perpetual remembrance, born of trauma, constitutes an act of disproportion. While 
remembrance and other works of mourning function in post-war Briton to unite citizens and to 
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discharge grief and fear, the excess of remembrance as exemplified by the shell-shocked veteran 
undermines, rather than advances, the work of mourning. Rather than finding the communal 
bonds strengthened between him and his fellow Britons, Septimus’ pathological remembrances 
isolate him, as he turns inward to a war narrative of Edwards which his fellow mourners can 
neither understand nor share. This frustration of the project of collective meaning—and myth—
making marks Septimus out as a perpetual other whose ineradicable difference will lead 
ultimately to his scapegoating. In his study of group formation, Freud, after le Bon, notes that the 
homogenizing impulses of the nascent group will often lead to the discharging of primitive and 
frequently violent tendencies against the inassimilable one.  
While Gordon argues that Septimus’ status as scapegoat and his subsequent suicide 
functions in a positive way as an act of successful and, significantly, transgressive 
communication across time and space with Clarissa, it must nevertheless be noted that the 
success of Septimus’ speech/act is still predicated upon his death. Moreover, while Septimus 
does seem to be at least momentarily understood and empathized with by Clarissa, he remains 
subject to the interpretations of the social body, his acts situated within the grand narratives of 
his time. For Holmes and Bradshaw, the medical authorities whose declarations carry prodigious 
weight in medicalized modernity, Septimus’ suicide is the predictable outcome of pathological 
disproportion. For Peter, the ambivalent imperialist, Septimus’ act galvanizes the rescue efforts 
which emblematize the wonders of modern British civilization. Even for Clarissa, Septimus’ foil, 
the suicide revitalizes and affirms Clarissa’s project, reigniting her determination to “combine, to 
create.”  
Like the war wounded and dead, the division Septimus sowed in life is transmuted to 
unification in his death through a shared project of meaning-making. That different characters 
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would ascribe diverse meanings to Septimus’ death does not undermine the identity-re/formation 
at play here insofar as the constellation of interpretations assigned to Septimus’ death conforms 
to the grand narratives through which modern Britain sought to define itself. In their own turn, 
each character ascribes to Septimus’ death meanings which authorize and catalyze post-war 
nationalistic paradigms, from the ascendance of the medico-judicial power/knowledge structures, 
to the perpetuation of the civilizing mission at home and abroad, to the formation of networks of 
affiliation, obligation, and care through the careful ministrations of the modern, upper-class 
hostess.    
Septimus’ suicide constitutes the domestication of a body which in life was rendered 
extraordinary through its incapacity to “perform” post-war British subjectivity appropriately. His 
disproportionate memory threatened at every turn to unsettle and undermine the community 
being re/formed through the act of memorialization and mourning. Such excess of memory casts 
Septimus beyond the boundaries of the emerging post-war collectivity and, as such, galvanizes 
the objectification of his body as symbol of that for which the collective must unite in grief. As 
the scapegoat, he can be neither the subject of nor the participant in the work of mourning but 
must instead be the emblem toward which these energies are directed. Mrs. Dalloway abounds 
with scenes of isolation, in which Septimus gazes at a distance on the civilization of which he is 
no longer a part: 
 [N]ow that he was quite alone, condemned, deserted, as those who 
are about to die are alone, there was a luxury in it, an isolation full 
of sublimity; a freedom which the attached could never know. 
Holmes had won, of course; the brute with the red nostrils had 
won. But even Holmes himself could not touch this last relic 
straying on the edge of the world, this outcast, who gazed back at 
the inhabited regions, who lay, like a drowned sailor, on the shore 




The luxurious detachment of the condemned that Septimus savors as the last refuge from the 
contamination of human nature in the form of Holmes is articulated at greater length in Woolf’s 
intensely personal long essay, On Being Ill. Here, Woolf asserts what can only be gestured at in 
this novel whose project is the re/formulation of community: the perspective of the inassimilable 
other, the subjective (and profoundly embodied)
 
experience of the outsider whose individuality 
cannot be subsumed beneath or into the identity the collective. In her essay, Woolf describes the 
isolation of the ill, who, cut off from the rush and ramble of modern bourgeois life, experience an 
internal and external reality unimaginable to the collective. This internal reality, of course, is the 
experience of the mind and body in pain and weakness, verities which industrialized capitalism 
would deny in its requirements that the human body be a reliable instrument of optimal 
productivity. The external reality, likewise, is an experience of the world—of the city—that the 
“fully functioning” cannot know—the view of the London sky blocked to passersby on the 
streets but in full view of the supine patient at her window; the shadows the sunlight casts at 
hours of the day when the man or woman of business would not be home to see them.  
  Thus, despite Woolf’s attestations in “Modern Fiction” to the preeminence of the 
consciousness in modernist literature, as Gordon notes, Woolf’s latter works in particular are 
profoundly situated within the body. Most important for the purposes of this study is the fact that 
Woolf situates the occasion and the creation of the scapegoat squarely within the boundaries of 
his/her abject body. Disproportion, as exemplified through embodied signs, activates the casting 
off of the extraordinary body in the face of community efforts to define itself through what it is 
not. The body described in On Being Ill is a body “othered” through sickness. Here, Woolf takes 
up the militaristic language of health that was so common in her period to describe the ill subject 
as a “deserter” of the battle of life. Fundamentally, for Woolf, the sick subject is one whose 
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physiological and/or psychological vulnerabilities render him/her unsuitable for the vicissitudes 
of modern life, unfit for the economic and social competition which comes from participation in 
contemporary capitalistic society. That such participation is obligatory, in Woolf’s purview, 
necessitates the characterization of the isolated ill as renegade and shirker.  
This iconoclastic consciousness created through such detachment, however, extends in 
important ways to the nature of language itself. Woolf notes in her essay that a new language is 
required to express the experience of illness. The cool, dispassionate discourse of Enlightenment 
positivism, she suggests, fails to represent adequately (or at all) the wonders and the torments of 
the vulnerable body. The foregrounding of the body in Mrs. Dalloway suggests an effort to 
redefine post-war community-making paradigms along a framework reminiscent of 
phenomenology insofar as the nationalist alliance of individual selves would be necessity 
recognize and accommodate the inter-dynamics of embodied consciousness in the construction 
of the self and of a language capable of representing this new vision of the self. Even more 
significant, as Gordon notes, is that, for Woolf, the fluidity and reciprocity of thought and 
perception would extend far beyond the individual subject, uniting bodies and minds in a fibrous 
network of thought, feeling, and sensation. Like the body in pain’s cry for a new language, the 
affiliated, communal body supersedes rational (Enlightenment) discourse, resembling more the 
jouissance of the mother/female than the Word of the Father. Gordon argues that the inarticulate 
cry, rather than the spoken word, is cornerstone of this new discourse of embodied plurality. 
However, the utopian ideal of community-making as first envisioned by Woolf in Mrs. 
Dalloway and more fully developed in Woolf’s later, more experimental works cannot ultimately 
escape the contexts of its time. Gordon asserts that the final failure to realize the communal ideal 
in Woolf’s novels is the recognition that the inassimilable will always already be the other. The 
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tenets of group psychology so ubiquitous in Woolf’s time were predicated upon an inevitable 
homogenization, an erasure of individual difference, that conditions the formation of the group. 
It is for this reason that Woolf so powerfully asserts in On Being Ill that the body “intervenes” 
and that the cry of a fevered brain will supersede articulate declarations of love from a dear one, 
that the demands of a headache will weigh more heavily than the bonds of familial obligation.  
Thus, the amorphous and unpredictable body in pain is also in the final analysis an 
incomprehensible body, as inarticulate as its cry. The failure of Woolf’s ideal community rests 
upon the same conditions which activate the othering of the extraordinary body—the ultimate 
frustration of communication. The inarticulate cry is always already abortive, foreclosing rather 
than furthering understanding and connection.      
Therefore, though there are undoubtedly moments in Woolf’s oeuvre which would seem 
to celebrate the sumptuous isolation of the unattached, Mrs. Dalloway, like On Being Ill, remains 
highly cognizant of the consequences of being “superfluous” and incomprehensible in industrial 
modernity. Septimus’ inability to assimilate into and communicate properly with the nascent 
community being formed in post-war Britain justifies and requires his instrumentalization as a 
scapegoat, catalyzing Clarissa’s efforts “to combine, to create.”  
Significantly, the problematization of the role of the incomprehensible, inassimilable one 
is not only evident in the character of Septimus, but also in his foil, Clarissa. Time and again, the 
novel expresses a tension between invisibility and visibility in regard to Clarissa, linking this in 
important ways with a fundamental inability to express both the realities of the embodied self 
and the subjectivity housed within its shell. In the novel’s opening scene, Clarissa alternates 
between a sense of rapture in the rush and flow of London life and despair at the sense of her 
waning share in that rush: 
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[O]ften now this body she wore (she stopped now to look at a 
Dutch picture), this body, with all its capacities, seemed nothing—
nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible; 
unseen; unknown; there being no more marrying, no more having 
of children now, but only this astonishing and rather solemn 
progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. 
Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more; this being Mrs. Richard 
Dalloway. (9) 
 
Rau argues that this powerful scene not only exemplifies what Teresa Fulkner has described as 
the “menopausal epiphany” but that it also demonstrates a fundamental division between the 
mind and the body: 
Mainstream culture deems the middle-aged woman a nonentity in a 
sea of inconspicuous, anonymous bodies because it still defines 
femininity through youth and sexual availability. However, this 
menopausal epiphany does not fully explain the oddity of the first 
sentence….In fact, the sentence suggests a cleft between the life of 
the mind and the life of the body. (128) 
 
Rau goes on in her discussion to explore Molly Hite’s argument that Woolf’s oeuvre centers 
upon the construction of two bodies: the social body and the visionary body (Rau 131). As Rau 
explains, the social body is that which is culturally constructed, encompassing the functions, 
desires, and motivations demanded of it in the construction of the ideal community. The social 
body, therefore, is the body sacrificed to and subsumed by the collective identity. That this social 
body plays a preeminent role in Mrs. Dalloway is exemplified in the scene in which Clarissa 
watches herself in her mirror as she dresses for her party: 
That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, 
drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how 
incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, 
one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a 
meeting point, a radiancy no doubt in some dull lives, a refuge for 




It is precisely this construction of the proper social body which Septimus himself cannot achieve 
and which, therefore, both justifies and necessitates his scapegoating. 
Significantly, Septimus’s suicide, his scapegoating, functions for Clarissa as an 
instrument for the construction of the visionary body Hite describes. When the Bradshaws 
discuss Septimus’s suicide at her party, Clarissa’s immediate reaction his highly physical: 
Always her body went through it first, when she was told, 
suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had 
thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; 
through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he 
lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of 
blackness. So she saw it. (207-208) 
 
Septimus’ suicide enables for Clarissa the experience of a visionary body which is excessive, 
transgressive, and inassimilable. Septimus’s suicide situates his body as superfluous, an object to 
be “flung away” as Clarissa had once flung the shilling into the Serpentine. Unlike Clarissa’s 
own body, which had been instrumentalized through marriage and motherhood, Septimus’s act 
had been an affirmation of the excess of his body, an excess that Clarissa had denied in 
eschewing her attraction to Sally, which would have foreclosed the ultimate purpose of the 
woman’s body—motherhood—rendering it superfluous. As the party continues, Clarissa finds a 
private room where she reflects on Septimus’s suicide and her thoughts discharge her joy in the 
visionary body, for which Septimus’s body has served as a proxy: 
 [S]he did not pity him; with the clock striking the hour…she did 
not pity him, with all this going on….But what an extraordinary 
night! She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had 
killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away. 
The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. He 
made her feel the beauty, made her feel the fun. But she must go 
back. She must assemble. (210) 
 
That Clarissa’s last thought, after the very sensory pleasure that his act had made her feel, is that 
she must rejoin her party, “must assemble,” is telling. The visionary body is the very body which 
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prohibits such assembly, which explodes efforts “to combine, to create.” In its individuality, it is 
profoundly atomistic, breaking apart that which would coalesce. While Victorian and fin-de-
siècle literature deployed extraordinary, “monstrous,” bodies to project and absorb pervasive 
cultural questions, fears, and desires, medicalized modernity demanded instead the construction 
of just such a “visionary” body, existing in the abstraction of the mind’s eye and, perhaps, in 
fleeting glimpses of and vicarious experiences through the materiality of the inassimilable other. 
As Septimus’s suicide and Clarissa and the others’ responses to it demonstrate, however, the 
function of the extraordinary body in modernity is achieved only through its removal: whether 
through “rehabilitation,” institutionalization, or death, the visibility of the extraordinary body is 
of necessity brief, its function irrevocably imposed from without and contingent upon the 
extinction which will make the creation of the “normative” community possible.  



















Abbott, Stacey. Celluloid Vampires: Life After Death in the Modern World. Austin: University of  
Texas Press, 2007. Print. 
Ardis, Ann L. Modernism and Cultural Conflict, 1880-1922. New York: Cambridge UP, 2002.  
Print. 
“Asylum Reports.” The Journal of Mental Science LIII (1907): 200-214. Print. 
Attridge, Derrick. “The Body Writing: Joyce’s Pen.” European Joyce Studies Volume 17: Joyce, 
‘Penelope’ and the Body. Ed. Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 47-62. 
Print. 
Bache, R. Meade. “Double Consciousness and Duality of Mind.” Monist I (April 1891): 362. 
Print.  
Bashford, Alison. Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism, and Public 
Health. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Kindle file. 
Bell, Kevin M. Ashes Taken for Fire: Aesthetic Modernism and the Critique of Identity. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. Print. 
Bénéjam, Valérie. “Molly Inside and Outside ‘Penelope.’” European Joyce Studies Volume 17: 
Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the Body. Ed. Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 
63-74. Print. 
Bernheimer, Charles Kline & Naomi Jefferson Schor. Decadent Subjects: The Idea of Decadence 
in the Art, Literature, Philosophy, and Culture of the Fin de Siècle in Europe. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2002. Print. 
Bleeker, Maaike. Anatomy Live: Performance and the Operating Theater. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2008. Print. 
Bloom, Peter J. French Colonial Documentary: Mythologies of Humanitarianism. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Print. 
220 
 
Bogdan, Robert. Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1988. Print. 
---. “The Social Construction of Freaks.” Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary 
Body. Ed. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson. New York: New York UP, 1996. 23-37. Print. 
Bogousslavsky, J. Frontiers of Neurology and Neuroscience, Volume 29: Following Charcot: A 
Forgotten History of Neurology and Psychiatry. Basel: Karger Publishers, 2011. Print.  
van Boheemen-Saaf, Christine. “Joyce’s Answer to Philosophy: Writing the Dematerializing 
Object.” European Joyce Studies Volume 17: Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the Body. Ed. 
Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 31-46. Print. 
---. Joyce, Derrida, Lacan & the Trauma of History: Reading, Narrative, and Postcolonialism. 
New York: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. 
Bondeson, Jan. The Two-Headed Boy and Other Medical Marvels. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004. 
Print. 
Brown, Richard. “Introduction.” European Joyce Studies Volume 17: Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the 
Body. Ed. Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 11-30. Print. 
---. “Body Words.” European Joyce Studies Volume 17: Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the Body. Ed. 
Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 109-128. Print. 
Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
Kindle file. 
Cavallaro, Dani. Gothic Vision: Three Centuries of Horror, Terror and Fear. London: 
Continuum, 2002. Print. 
Chadwick, Edwin. Report from the Poor Law Commissioners on the Sanitary Conditions of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain. London, 1842. 369-72. Web. 8 July 2013.  
221 
 
Childs, Donald J. Modernism & Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats, and the Culture of Degeneration. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Kindle file.  
Cohen, Deborah. War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 2001. Print. 
Cormier, Andre. “Our Eyes Demand Their Turn. Let Them Be Seen!: The Transcendental Blind 
Stripling.” Joyce Studies Annual (2008): 203-225. Print. 
Davies, James. “Beyond Masochistic Ritual in Joyce and Deleuze: Reading Molly as Non-
Corporeal Body.” European Joyce Studies Volume 17: Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the Body. 
Ed. Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 171-188. Print. 
Davies, William. “Case of Cataleptiform Hysteria.” Provincial Medical and Surgical Journal 
14.12 (12 June 1850): 314-318. pdf file. 
Davis, Lennard J. Introduction. The Disability Studies Reader. Ed. Lennard J. Davis. 4
th
 ed. New 
York: Routledge, 2013. Kindle file. 
---. “J’Accuse! Cultural Imperialism-Ableist Style.” Social Alternatives 18.1 (1999): 36-40. 
Print. 
Dickens, Charles. Bleak House. Ed. Stephen Gill. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Print. 
Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger. New York: Routledge Classics, 2002. Print. 
Dryden, Linda. Modern Gothic and Literary Doubles: Stevenson, Wilde, and Wells. Virginia: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print. 
Duffy, Enda. Subaltern Ulysses. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Print. 
Eide, Marian. Ethical Joyce. New York: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print. 
Eigen, Joel Peter. Unconscious Crimes: Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in 
Victorian London. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2003. Print. 
222 
 
Ellmann, Maud. “ ‘Penelope’ Without the Body.”  European Joyce Studies Volume 17: Joyce, 
‘Penelope’ and the Body. Ed. Richard Brown. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006. 97-
108. Print. 
Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. Trans. A.M. 
Sheridan Smith. New York: Vintage, 1994. Print. 
---. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 
1995. Print.  
Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Trans. James Strachey. London: 
The International Psychoanalytical Press, 1922. Kindle file. 
---. Reflections on War and Death. Trans. A.A. Brill & Alfred B. Kuttner. New York: Moffatt, 
Yard, and Company, 1918. Kindle File. 
Frost, Linda. Conjoined Twins in Black and White: The Lives of Millie-Christine McKoy and 
Daisy and Violet Hilton. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009. Print. 
Froula, Christine. Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury Avant-Garde: War, Civilization, 
Modernity. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. Print. 
Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American 
Culture and Literature. New York: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print. 
Glendenning, John. Evolutionary Imagination in Late Victorian Novels. Great Britain: Ashgate, 
2007. Print. 
Gordon, Craig. Literary Modernism, Bioscience, and Community in Early 20th Century Britain. 
Virginia: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print. 
223 
 
Grosz, Elizabeth. “Intolerable Ambiguity: Freaks as/at the Limit.” Freakery: Cultural Spectacles 
of the Extraordinary Body. Ed. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson. New York: New York UP, 
1996. 55-67. Print. 
Hacking, Ian. “Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts.” Critical Inquiry 34.1 (Autumn 2007): 78- 
105. Print. 
Hale, Dana S. Races on Display: French Representations of Colonized Peoples: 1886-1940.  
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. Print. 
Helman, Cecil. The Body of Frankenstein’s Monster: Essays in Myth and Medicine. New York:  
Paraview, 2004. Kindle file. 
Holmes Stoddard, Martha. Fictions of Affliction: Physical Disability in Victorian Culture.  
Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 2009. Print. 
Huff, Joyce L. “Freaklore: The Dissemination, Fragmentation, and Reinvention of the Legend of 
Daniel Lambert, King of Fat Men.” Victorian Freaks: The Social Context of Freakery in 
Britain. Ed. Marlene Tromp. Columbus: The Ohio State UP, 2008. 27-59. Print. 
Joyce, James. Ulysses. Lexington: Simon & Brown, 2012. Print. 
King, Alex. Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of 
Remembrance. Oxford: Berg, 1998. Print. 
Kunst, Bojana. “Restaging the Monstrous.” Anatomy Live: Performance and the Operating 
Theater. Ed. Maaike Bleeker. Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2008. 211-222. Print. 
Lamos, Colleen. Deviant Modernism: Sexual and Textual Errancy in T.S. Eliot, James Joyce and 
Marcel Proust. New York: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. 
“Latter Day Problems of Psychology.” The London Times. 5 June 1914: 5. Print. 
224 
 
Lawrence, Christopher. Medicine in the Making of Modern Britain, 1700-1920. London: 
Routledge, 1994. Kindle file. 
LeBon, Gustav. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Public Domain. Kindle file.  
Low, Gail Ching-Liang. White Skins/Black Masks: Representation and Colonialism. Kentucky: 
Routledge, 1995. Print. 
McHold, Heather. “Even as You and I: Freak Shows and Lay Discourse on Spectacular 
Deformity.” Victorian Freaks: The Social Context of Freakery in Britain. Ed. Marlene 
Tromp. Columbus: The Ohio State UP, 2008. 21-36. Print. 
Mitchell, David, and Sharon Snyder. “Narrative Prosthesis: Literature and the Undisciplined  
 
Body of Disability.”  The Disability Studies Reader.  Ed. Lennard J. Davis. 4
th
 ed. New  
 
York: Routledge, 2013. Kindle file. 
 
Nemecek, Angela Lea. “Reading the Disabled Woman: Gerty MacDowell and the Stigmaphilic  
 
Space of Nausicaa.” Joyce Studies Annual (2010): 173-202. Print. 
 
O’Connor, Erin. Raw Material: Producing Pathology in Victorian Culture. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000. Print. 
Pernick, Martin S. The Black Stork: Eugenics and the Death of ‘Defective’ Babies in American 
Medicine and Motion Pictures Since 1915. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print. 
Rau, Petra. English Modernism, National Identity, and the Germans, 1890-1950. Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2009. Print. 
Reid, Fiona. Broken Men: Shell Shock, Treatment, and Recovery in Britain, 1914-1930. London: 
Continuum Publishing, 2010. Print. 
Shildrick, Margrit. Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self. London: Sage 
Publications, 2002. Print. 
225 
 
Smith, Andrew and William Hughes. Empire and the Gothic: The Politics of Genre. Virginia: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print. 
Shuttleworth, Sir James Kay. The Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes 
Employed in Cotton Manufacture in Manchester. Hong Kong: Forgotten Books, 2012. 
Print. 
Smythies, W. Gordon. “Some Famous Giants.” The English Illustrated Magazine. 18.162 (1897). 
715-22. Print.  
Stevenson, R.L. The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Other Tales. Ed. Roger 
Luckhurst. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Print. 
Stoker, Bram. Dracula. Eds. Nina Auerbach & David J. Skal. New York: Norton, 1997. Print. 
Thurschwell, Pamela. Literature, Technology, and Magical Thinking: 1880-1920. West Nyack, 
New York: Cambridge UP, 2001. Print. 
Tougaw, Jason Daniel. Strange Cases: The Medical Case History and the British Novel. Ed. 
William E. Cain. New York: Routledge, 2006. Kindle file. 
Urquhart. A.R. “On Insanity—with Special Reference to Heredity and Prognosis.” The Journal 
of Mental Science LIII (1907): 233-314. Print. 
Williams, Anne. Art of Darkness: A Poetics of Gothic. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1995. Print. 
Woolf, Virginia. “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown.” Collected Essays. Ed. Leonard Woolf. Vol. 1.  
 London: Hogarth Press, 1966. 319-337. Print. 
---. Mrs. Dalloway. London: David Campbell, 1993. Print.  
Youngquist, Paul. Monstrosities: Bodies and British Romanticism. Minneapolis: University of  
 Minnesota Press, 2003. Print. 
Vrettos, Athena. Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture. Stanford: Stanford,   
226 
 






Terri Beth Miller was born in Johnson City, TN, to parents, Terry and Linda Miller. She is an 
only child. Terri Beth graduated summa cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts in English degree 
from Tusculum College in Greeneville, TN. From there, Terri Beth relocated to Charlottesville, 
VA, where she earned her Master of Arts in English degree from the University of Virginia. 
After the M.A., Terri Beth returned home to Tennessee, accepting a position as a Graduate 
Teaching Associate at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, where she will earn her Ph.D. in 
English in May 2013. Her areas of specialization include British modernism, disability studies, 
postcolonial studies, and rhetoric, writing, and composition (RWL). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
